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INTRODUCTION

"Property" has two distinct meanings. When most people think of
property, they think of some physical object, some thing. If I own a house, I
think of the house as my property. In the legal world, however, property is
. Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B. 1968,
Princeton
University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland. Partner, Kutak Rock 1986-1994. I thank Frank Alexander,
David Gray Carlson, Tom Davies, David Epstein, Bill Henning, Amy Hess, Don Leathernan, Bob Lloyd,
Colleen Medill, Steve Schwarcz, Greg Stein, and Charles Tabb for their helpful comments on drafts of this
Article and TaKisha Fitzgerald and Victoria IXrebs for their excellent research assistance.
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not the thing--the land and the improvements. It is the relationship among
one person, the thing, and other persons. It is one's "property interests" in the
thing.' If I own a house in fee simple absolute, I have the largest aggregate of
property interests in the land and the improvements. 2 I can possess them, use
them, sell them, and exclude other people from them as I please. I can also

create lesser property interests in them, such as a mortgage to a lender to
secure its purchase price, but in doing so I retain only a lesser property interest
in the land and the improvements
The Bankruptcy Code4 explicitly adopts the legal understanding of
"property" as interests in property. Under § 541(a)(1), the filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an "estate" which consists primarily of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property" as of the filing.' This defined
term---'property of the estate"-pervades the Code.6 Therefore, a coherent
resolution of the claims and rights of a debtor, her creditors, and third parties
in bankruptcy requires a rigorous analysis of the specific interests of the
debtor in property. Specifically, for each property thing in which the debtor
t

See ROGERA. CUNNINGHAMElAL-, LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.1, 1.2, at 1-7 (2d ed. 1993).

2 See id. § 2.2, at 29. This also applies to personal tangible or intangible property things. See Id. § 2.2,
at 35.
3 I would normally continue to possess the house, but I can no longer sell it free of the lender's interest.
Ifl fail to repay the loan, the lender can force its sale to repay the loan. See generally GPANT S. NELSON &
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAw § 1.1, at 1-5, §§ 5.1-5.3, at 237-42, § 5.21, at 294-310, §§
7.1-7.3, at 467-72 (3d ed. 1994). As the homeowner, I may be required to repay the debt upon sale or may be
allowed to sell subject to the security interest, in which case the debt must be repaid in accordance with its
scheduled payments. See Id. §§ 5.1-5.3, at 237-42, § 5.21, at 294-300. My interest in the property thing is
my equity interest: the right (normally granted by the lender) to continue to possess it and to use it, the right
to redeem the lender's security interest by paying the debt, the right to notice of any foreclosure sale if I fail
to pay the debt, and the right to any surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale. See Id. §§ 4.1-4.29, at 127225. The same division of interests--the lender's security interest and the borrower's equity interest-exists
for personal property things. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1Xa), -205, -306(2), -311, -501 to -506 (1995). This
division is only an example. There are many ways to create lesser property interests in property things. See
infra notes 24-47 and cccompanying text.
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-1330 (1994), enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
5 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994), quoted infra note 114. The other enumerated items refer to community
property, Id. § 541(a)(2), and to property added to the estate after the commencement of the case, Id. §
541(a)(3)-(7). For the adjustment of debts under chapter 12 (family farmers) and chapter 13 (individuals with
regular income), property of the estate also includes property of the kind specified in § 541 acquired by the
debtor and earnings from services performed after the commencement of the case until the case is closed,
dismissed, or converted. See id. §§ 1207, 1306.
6 See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. The Code also includes property concepts through the
more ambiguous word "property" or the phrase "property of the debtor" without any notion of someone
having an interest "in" property. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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may have an interest, bankruptcy courts must (1) distinguish between the
property thing and the different property interest interests in the property thing
and (2) identify the scope and substance of those property interests.
For the simplest property interests, such as household goods not subject to
any third party's property interest, there is no practical difference between the
property thing and the property interest. These have not caused courts any
difficulty. For more complex property interests, some courts have success-

fully analyzed the interests of the debtor in property, whether they be the

familiar ones 7 such as leaseholds and security interests in things like real
estate or goods or more unusual property interests,g to decide what is property
of the estate. Other courts, however, have struggled because they failed to

distinguish between the property thing and the debtor's interests in the
property thing or otherwise failed to identify those interests correctly.'0
7 See, e.g., Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re Guild and Gallery Plus, Inc.), 72 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1995)
(distinguishing between a property item, a painting, in the custody of the debtor under a bailment agreement,
and the debtor's property interest, the debtor's rights under the bailment agreement); Arizona Appetito's
Stores, Inc. v. Paradise Village Inv. Co. (In re Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc.), 893 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1990)
(unexpired leasehold interest is "property of estate," which debtor may assume or reject, only if debtor is
lessee of property at time that bankruptcy petition is filed); Erickson v. Polk, 921 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1990);
Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc. v. Auto-Use (In re Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc.), 50
B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (debtor's leasehold interest in leased automobile was property of the
estate); Kipp v. Depoy (In re Depoy), 29 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (residential lease, not covered by
§ 541(b)(2), that terminates is not property of the estate).
8 See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16,21 (1995), discussed infra Part IV; Appeal of
Lincoln Office Supply Co., Inc. (In re Carousel Int'l. Corp.), 89 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1996) (a $250,000
escrow fund held by trustee in which estate claimed an interest was not property of estate by virtue of claim;
only $10,000) finally determined to he in property of estate; therefore, postpetition liens on fund did not
violate stay of liens against property of estate under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), quoted infra in text at note 311);
First Indent. of Am. Ins. Co. v. Modular Structures, Inc. (In re Modular Structures, Inc.), 27 F.3d 72 (3d Cir.
1994) (the right to payment of moneys under a contract was not property of the estate because the debtor
defaulted under the contract and no moneys were owed under the contract); Houston v. Edgeworth (In re
Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that, although a medical malpractice policy was
property of the estate, neither the debtor nor the estate had a claim against the proceeds of such policy and
the proceeds were not property of the estate; therefore, they may be paid to a victim of the debtor's
malpractice notwithstanding the debtor's discharge from personal liability on the claim for malpractice);
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Pinetree, Ltd. (In re Pinctree, Ltd.), 876 F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. 1989) (because
unrecorded deed to debtor, though effective between the parties, is not effective against third parties and
creditors under state law without notice of the deed, real estate project subject to foreclosure by creditor not
part of property ofthe estate).
9 The Code contributes to the difficulty. Several sections of the Code use the term "property of the
estate" in a sense that is inconsistent with its definition of property by suggesting that other persons may have
interests in property of the estate, that is, in the interests of the debtor in property. See infra notes 157-71 and
accompanying text.
10 See infra note 297 and Part V; see also N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank (In re N.S.
Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985). N.S. Garrott & Sons involved moneys deposited by the
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The Supreme Court's first decision to analyze "property of the estate"
under the Code, United States v. Whiting Pools," is a leading example and a
major cause of the difficulty. In this case, the Internal Revenue Service had
seized all the goods of Whiting Pools to obtain repayment of past due taxes.
Whiting Pools then filed a bankruptcy petition to reorganize its business under
chapter 11 and sought the return of the goods under § 542(a). Section 542(a)
requires an entity in possession of property of the estate to return that property
to the debtor.' 2 The property of the estate did not include the goods or the
right to possess or use the goods. It consisted only of Whiting Pools' interests
in property at the commencement of the case-the debtor's right to redeem
the goods from the IRS by paying the taxes due, the right to notice of the
IRS's foreclosure sale of the seized goods, and the right to any surplus from
the sale. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the debtor was entitled to the
return of the goods.
In so doing, the Court confused the property thing-the goods owned by
the debtor but in the rightful possession of the IRS--and the property of the
estate. The Court's action rejected the precise language of § 541(a)(1)
defining property of the estate as the "interests of the debtor in property."
Even worse, it suggested that this definition did not limit what could be
included in the primary element of property of the estate. This suggestion
incorrectly implies that property of the estate could include other things not
specified in § 541(a). Instead of analyzing the language of the Code, the
Court relied on the general policy of Congress favoring rehabilitation of
debtors and a weak and incomplete examination of legislative history. In the
face of the precise definition of "property of the estate," this reliance on
policy and on an obscure and incomplete legislative history eschews a
principled basis for determining the property of the estate and for analyzing
property concepts in the Code.

debtor in an escrow fund to defease two existing mortgages that could not be prepaid without penalty. The
court recognized that the Code did not enlarge the rights of the debtor, and criticized the lower courts for not
recognizing the limited rights of the debtor in the fund. See id. at 466. Nevertheless, stating that "the entire
fund is technically property of the estate," the court failed to analyze the debtor's rights to the escrow fund
under simple principles of property law and instead imposed a constructive trust on those moneys, in part
because of the questionable activities of the debtor. Id. at 467. The constructive trust analysis, however, is
not necessary. The only property interest that was part of the property of the estate were the debtor's limited
rights in the escrow fMnd, the right to excess interest earnings.
11 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
12 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994), discussed infra in Part III.
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In 1995, the Supreme Court in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strump'
rejected the analytical method of interpreting § 541(a)(1) that it had previously used in Whiting Pools. In this case, a bank put an administrative hold
on a debtor's checking account, preventing the debtor from withdrawing
money from the account, to preserve the bank's right to set off the checking
account balance against a debt that the debtor owed the bank. In addition to
concluding that the administrative hold did not violate the prohibition of a set
off, the Court held that the administrative hold did not violate the automatic
stay's prohibition against exercising control over property of the estate. The
Court ruled that the property of the estate consisted not of the money in the
checking account but only of those rights in the account under the debtor's
agreement with the bank, which rights were subject to the set off rights of the
bank. 4
The application of the Court's analysis of property of the estate in Strumpf
to the facts in Whiting Pools, coupled with the insubstantial basis for the
Court's decision in Whiting Pools, suggests that Whiting Pools should no
longer be considered good law. Still, the Court in Strumpf did not explicitly
overrule Whiting Pools. Relying on Whiting Pools, before and after Strumpf,
other courts have disregarded the precise statutory boundaries of § 541(a)(1)
of the Code and have expanded the reach of Whiting Pools to include in
property of the estate property interests that did not belong to the debtor.
Accordingly, unless courts follow the methodology of Strumpf, Whiting Pools
remains a menace to a principled determination of the boundaries of the
bankruptcy estate as well as a threat to an analytical solution to other property
issues in bankruptcy.
Applying the result in Whiting Pools has imposed additional costs on
repossessing secured creditors and their borrowers.' 5 Whether imposing these
costs is justified by the benefits conferred on reorganizing debtors or the
creditors of reorganizing or liquidating debtors is a policy issue properly
addressed by Congress. 6 Secured lenders and borrowers should not, however,
13 Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
14 See Id. at 19-20.
15 The increase in the costs of secured creditors would be passed on to borrowers, and these costs in the
aggregate could be substantial. As of June 30, 1998, there was $11.9 trillion of debt owed by entities other
than the federal government or financial institutions. See Board of Gov. of Fed. Res. System, Domestic
FinancialStatistics, 84 FED. REs. BULL. A4), tbl. 1.59,1. 5 (Dec. 1998).
16 Whether increased costs for originators or borrowers decreases social welfare is an empirical question
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN.
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suffer these increased costs because the Court incorrectly read the Bankruptcy
Code and relied on a dubious and incomplete legislative history and its general
musings about Congress's intent divorced from the statutory language that
Congress enacted.

Moreover, uncertainty in determining what is property of the estate poses a
risk for a larger universe of business transactions. These include the entire
securitization industry, which involves many hundreds of billions of securities
transactions. 7 As I discuss in Part V, securitizations are particularly sensitive
to court decisions that would expand the property of the estate beyond its
statutory boundaries. Accordingly, the securitization industry serves like the
canaries that miners used in the mines to warn them of odorless but lethal
gases.'8 The sensitivity of the securitization industry to illogical court
decisions' presages the damage to more mundane business transactions that
L REv. 817, 820-21 (1995); David Gray Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 643, 645 (1987).
17 Board of Gov. of Fed. Res. System, Domestic Financial Statistics, 84 FED. RES. BULL. A35, tbl. 1.54,
!1. 1, 68 (Dec. 1998) (of$5.4 trillion of mortgage loans outstanding as of the end of March 1998, $484 billion
was held in the form of private pools of securitized assets): id. at A36, tbl. 1.55, II. 5, 11 (of the
approximately $1.3 trillion of consumer credit loans outstanding as of the end of July 1998, $346 billion was
held in the form of pools of securitized assets) (not seasonably adjusted figures).
Is OtTo voN FRISCH, CANARIES 6 (1979) (explaining use by Tyrolean miners in Gernany); PATRICIA
MALONEY MAP, UN, THE FIRST BOOK OF MINING 61 (1959) (stating that, because a canary was very
susceptible to poison gas, if the canary died, the miners would evacuate quickly); BRIAN ROBINSON & SCOTT
ADAMS, HOWELL BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO CANARIES 8 (1985). Other animals have been used as well. See,
e.g.. ALAN R. GRIFFIN, MINING INTHE EASTMIDLANDS, 1550-1947, at 6 (1971) (describing how dogs lowered
into coal mines would howl if gases were present); 1 JOHN HATCHER, THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COAL
INDUSTRY BEFORE 1700: TOWARDS THE AGE OF COAL 237 (1993) (mentioning the use of small animals, and
particularly dogs, but stating "we hear nothing of the use of birds in our period [before 1700]").
19 See infra note 401 and accompanying text. Another example of the sensitivity of the securities
markets to illogical court decisions is the infamous case of Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank (In re Twist
Cap, Inc.). 1 B.R. 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979). Under the well-settled independence principle governing
letters of credit, a letter of credit issued by a bank on behalf of an applicant, the party who requests the
issuance of the letter of credit, is an independent obligation of the bank issuing the letter of credit. See
U.C.C. § 5-103(d) & cmt. 1 (1995). Notwithstanding this ancient principle, the bankruptcy court in Twist
Cap preliminarily enjoined the payment of a letter of credit by a bank, which had a secured reimbursement
obligation from the debtor applicant (previously called the account party), on the grounds that the payment
by the bank of the letter of credit was a preferential transfer of property of the debtor. Twist Cap, 1 B.R. at
285-86. This nuling raised questions about the creditworthiness of myriads of debt securities supported by
letters of credit and caused a disruption in the credit markets. Rating agencies required structural changes to
avoid the effect of the ruling. Eventually, the rating agencies and the credit markets dismissed this decision
as an aberration. See JAMES J.WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-4, at 83839 (4th ed. 1995) (noting that issuers of bonds backed by letters of credit had trouble getting ratings for their
bond issues); Douglas G. Baird, Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHIC. L REV. 130, 132
(1982); Helen Davis Chaitman & Jeff Sovem, EnjoiningPayment on a Letter of Credit In Bankruptcy: A
Tempest in a Twist Cap, 38 BUS. LAW. 21, 22 n.6 (1982) (citing statement of counsel for Standard & Poor's
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follow from the failure of courts to analyze the property concepts set forth in
the Code. A threatened expansion, perceived or real, of the ability of debtors
to recapture assets would impose costs on buyers and sellers. Any such costs
should follow from the conscious choices by Congress and not from courts'
failure to analyze and apply the language of the Code.
This Article seeks the restoration of the fixed boundaries of the property of
the estate. Part I discusses the different formulations of property concepts in
the Code and the analytical challenges presented by these formulations. Part
II describes the evolution of the definition of the property of the estate through
the legislative process and the extent to which the Code consistently applies
the dominant bundle of sticks metaphor of "interest in property." Part III
analyzes the Court's discussion of property of the estate in Whiting Pools. It
reveals the weakness of the Court's analysis of the statutory language and its
reliance on large generalizations about the policy favoring reorganization of
debtors and a skimpy and incomplete legislative history.
Part IV discusses the Court's repudiation, in Strumpf,21 of the analytical
method for interpreting "interests of the debtor in property" in Whiting Pools.
that "absent the resolutions ofthe 'Twist Cap' problem ... S&P will not rate [commercial paper backed by
standby letters of credit] solely on the creditworthiness ofthe bank"); Howard N. Gomey, EnjoiningPayment
of Letters of Credit Under the Bankruptcy Code: New Concerns for Issuers and Beneficiaries, 66 AM.
BANIJ. LIJ. 333, 334-36 (1992); George A. Hahn & Jeffrey L Schwartz, Letters of Credit Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 16 U.C.C. Li. 91, 94-95 (1983).
20 This is ofcourse an empirical question. I believe that these costs exist. In working on many of these
types of transactions, I witnessed many cases in which investors either (i) refrained from consummating
transactions when they could not receive assurance in the form of unqualified legal opinions that the
transaction would be isolated from the bankruptcy risk of the sponsor, (ii) lowered the price to be paid for
assuming the risk, or (iii) required a restructuring of the transaction that imposed additional costs on or
lowered the price to be paid to the sponsor. See also Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the
Economic Efficiency of CommercialLass, in a Vacuum ofFact, 133 U. PA. L REv. 929, 941-54 (1985).
One study supports the contention that different legal interpretations can change prices. See Janine S.
Hiller & Stephen P. Ferris, Mortgage Loan Costs: The Impact of Variable Interest Rates and Negotiability,
18 REAL ESTATE LJ. 259, 274 (1990). This study measured the effect of different interpretations of rule
change on interest rates on variable rate mortgage loans. The study compared interest rates over 10 calendar
quarters on mortgage notes bearing interest at a variable rate originated in Illinois, which had held that a
variable rate note was not a negotiable instrument and could not impart "holder in due course" status on
purchasers of the note, with variable rates notes originated in the District of Columbia, which had not ruled
on the issue. The study concluded that the clearly non-negotiable notes originated in Illinois had average
effective rates in the 10 quarters that were 13 to 88 basis points (each basis point is 0.01 percentage points)
higher than the rates ofpotentially negotiable variable rate notes originated in the District of Columbia, and
that in 4 ofthe 1t) quarters studied, this difference was statistically significant. This study suggests, but does
not prove, that one adverse rule imposed significant costs on the borrowers financing their homes with
variable rate notes in Illinois.
21 516U.S. 16 (1996).
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This repudiation restores the boundaries of the property of the estate, under
§ 541(a)(1), to only those property interests of a debtor as of the commencement of the case.
Finally, Part V discusses Whiting Pools' and Strumpf s past and future
legacies. It reexamines one of the most important provisions of the Code, the
automatic stay, in light of the precise definition of property of the estate. This
reexamination challenges the general consensus that attempts by secured
creditors to enforce their security interests violate the prohibition against
actions to control property of the estate. It then analyzes, in light of Strumpf
and the precise definition of property of the estate, representative cases
relying on or applying Whiting Pools to find violations of the automatic stay
or to require turnover of property held by creditors. To the extent that these
cases have no independent basis for their conclusions, they should no longer
be considered good law. It also discusses the lingering threat that the
analytical method of Whiting Pools presents to the interests of third parties
who are not creditors of the debtor. The application of the precise definition
of property of the estate, as shown in Strumpf, should dispel this threat
I. MEANINGS OF PROPERTY IN THE CODE
Before turning to the definition and use of the terms "property of the
estate," this Part examines some of the basic features of property as a legal
concept. It first describes the ambiguity inherent in the word "property" and
the underlying complexity of property interests. It then turns to the Code's
use of the bundle of sticks metaphor in the definition of property of the estate
(as "interests in property") to attempt to achieve a greater precision in
understanding property interests. Finally, it discusses the use in the Code of
the more ambiguous terminology of simply "property."
A. The Structureof Property
As used in the Code, the term "property" could have two meanings. It
could mean the property thing or it could mean the property interest-the
legal relationship between the owner, the thing, and other persons. Although
in a colloquial sense, most of us think of "property" as the thing, the
complexity of modem life requires that we think of property as the property
interest. Only rarely will the more colloquial understanding be sufficient. An
analysis of different property structures confirms this conclusion.
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In the case of a single tiered property structure, the ambiguity in property
has no practical consequence. If a debtor owns a thing-a home, a car, an
account-outright, "property" could mean either the thing or her fee simple

ownership interest in the thing, her "property interest."22 If no one else has a
property interest in the thing, like a lessee or a secured creditor, then there is
only one property interest in the thing. The property interest is coterminous
with the thing. With the exception of household goods of consumers,

however, this happy condition of unencumbered ownership is not common.
Frequently, a property thing will embody a set of two property interests,
and each of two persons will have a property interest in the thing. This two
tiered property structure requires a greater precision in analyzing the specific
interests.2 For example, if a fee simple absolute owner of a house or a car
leased it to a lessee for one year, she may continue to think of it as her
"property," since she "owns" it, but her property interest is now only a
reversionary interest, the right to regain its possession and use in one year and
24
the other incidents of a reversion. The tenant may also think of the thing as
his property, but his "property" is his leasehold interest, a lesser property
interest, in the thing. This interest includes the right to possess and to use it
22 See CUNNINGHAM, supranote 1,§ 1.1,
at 1, §2.2, at 29, 35.
23 Security interests and leasehold interests are the most common forms of property interests in a
property interest. Other kinds of interests, such as an easement, are interests in a real property interest. See
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 436-41. Real estate purchase options present an interesting question. If
a third party has an option to buy any real property interest, it has a separate property interest, a contract
right, that it may sell. Cunningham states that for most purposes a real estate purchase option is not
considered an interest in real property. Id. § 10.14, at 751 & n.17. Nevertheless, this contract right could be
considered a property interest in the real propcrty interest because it restricts the owner of the real property
interest fiom transferring the real property interest free of the option holder's rights under the option.
Recording the option puts the world on notice of the option and gives the option holder more than just a
contract right against the owner ofthe real property interest. It gives the option holder the power to exclude
the world from its interest in the real property interest. Conceptually, I would consider such an option to be
an interest in the real property interest. See Ronald B. Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase
Options, 12 NOVA L REV. 147, 188-91 (1987) (explaining how optionee may prevent alienation of land free
ofoptionee's rights).
In the case ofpersonal property, U.C.C. § 2-501 grants to a buyer of goods that have been identified to
the contract a "special property" in the goods. This status gives the buyer certain rights under U.C.C. § 2502. These rights are themselves a property interest, but it is not clear whether they represent a property
interest--the rights-in a property thing-the goods--or the aggregate property interests that the goods
embody. Whether a particular set of property interests relating to a property thing or greater property interest
is an interest in a property thing or property interest is relevant under the Code only in a few cases, such as II
U.S.C. § 363(f), discussed infra note 130 and accompanying text, which authorizes the trustee to sell
property in which the estate and some other entity have an interest if certain conditions are met.
24 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 3.3, at 89-91, § 6.1, at 249-250, § 6.12, at 260-61; see also U.C.C.
§ 2A-103(1)0j)-(m), (p), (q) (1995).
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for one year and all the other incidents of a leasehold.2 Subject to any
limitations in the lease agreement, both of these property interests are
generally transferable. 6

Another common example is a security interest. An owner of a thing-a
tangible thing like a house or a car or an intangible thing like an account-can
grant a security interest in the thing to a lender to secure repayment of a debt.
The lender now has a limited property interest in the thing. This property
interest--a security interest-allows the lender to force the sale of the thing to
repay the debt and prevents the owner from transferring it
without paying the
28
debt in some way.27 The lender may transfer this interest.
Although the owner of the property thing subject to a security interest may
continue to think of it as her "property," her property interest is now only an
equity interest. This equity interest consists of the right to redeem the lender's
security interest by paying the debt and the right to surplus if the lender were
to force a sale for her failure to pay the secured debt.29 In almost all cases of
real estate and most cases of personal property, 0 the equity interest includes
the continued right to possess and to use the thing.3 In the case of personal
property, however, the lender may repossess the thing upon default, and the
owner may lose the right to possess and to use the thing before the lender
forecloses on it.1 Except as otherwise may be provided in the security

25 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note I, § 6.1, at 249-50, § 6.1 1, at 260, § 6.22, at 274-75; see also U.C.C. §
2A-103(1)0)-(n) (1995).
26 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, §§ 6.67-6.72, at 386-94; see also U.C.C. §§ 2A-303, -304, -305,
-307 (1995).

27 See generally NELSON& WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 1-5, §§ 5.1-5.3, at 237-42, § 5.21, at 294300, §§ 7.1-7.3, at 467-72 (1994); see also U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), -501 to -505 (1995). The owner may be
required to repay the debt upon sale or may sell subject to the security interest, in which case (with certain
exceptions) the security interest continues and the debt must be repaid in accordance with the original
agreement. See NELSON & VHTMAN, supra note 3, §§ 5.1-5.3, at 237-42, § 5.21, at 294-300; see also
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1995).
28 See NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 3, §§ 5.27-5.35, at 334-406; see also U.C.C. § 9-302(2) (1995).
29 See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, §§ 4.1-4.29, at 127-225 (real property); see also
U.C.C. §§ 9-502, -504(2), -506 (1995) (personal property).
30 In the case of tangible personal property things, an owner of property may create a security interest in
favor of a secured creditor by delivering possession of the thing to the secured creditor. See U.C.C. § 9203(a)(1) (1995).
31 See generally NELSON & WHrrmAN, supra note 3, §§ 4.1-4.3, at 127-135 (real property); see also
U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(a), -205, -311 (1995) (personal property).
32 See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1995).
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agreement creating the security interest, the owner's equity interest is
generally transferable."
The creation of more than one property interest in a property thing requires
distinguishing between the "ownership" of the thing and the ownership of the
separate property interests.34 In determining ownership of the thing, however,
it is important to avoid using a gross lump concept analysis of ownership.
This analysis inappropriately uses "ownership" or "title" as a lump concept to
solve a myriad of legal disputes simply by determining who the owner of the
property thing is. This use of the lump concept prevailed as a dominant mode
of analysis in sales law before the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code." Karl Llewellyn criticized the use of the "title-lump" as being
incapable of solving many legal controversies involving the sale of goods.36
As some scholars observed, 37 courts that use this gross lump concept to solve
legal problems by determining who "owns" a property thing are really not

articulating their analysis.'

They are only attaching 39a conclusion to an

unarticulated thought process to justify a particular result.

33 See generally NELSON & WVHmN, supra note 3, §§ 5.1-5.27, at 237-333 (real property); see also
U.C.C. §§ 9-306(2), -311 (1995) (personal property).
34 See, e.g,. First Fed. Bank of Cal. v. Cogar (In re Cogar), 210 B.I. 803, 809 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997)
(debtor's third mortgage lien on real estate was property of estate).
35 See, e.g., Elvin R. Latty, Sales and Title and the ProposedCode, 16 LAw & CONEMP. PRoB. 3, 3-4,
8-9 (1951); Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. LQ. 159, 163-91
(1938).
36 Llewellyn, supra note 35, at 169, 171-72, 175-82, 182-88 (discussing in detail the shortcomings of
the title-lump for resolving disputes over an action for the price or risk of loss and mentioning in summary
fashion its inappropriateness for many other issues). See also Jeanne L Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration:The Myth that the UC.C. Killed "Property, " 69 TEMP. LQ. 1281, 1282-91 (1996) (discussing
Llewellyn's criticism of the use of"title" and the ways those criticisms were later misinterpreted).
37 See, e.g., Latty, supra note 35, at 10; Llewellyn, supra note 35, at 171-75.
38 The court in Jones v. GE Capital Mort. Co. (In re Jones), 179 B.R. 450 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995),
remarked that disagreement among courts on treating insurance proceeds is "partly explained by the tendency
of some courts to attach overriding significance to the detemination of the issue of whether certain property
is property of the estate in deciding the respective rights of parties to certain property." Id. at 455.
39 See, e.g., Leverette v. NCNB S.C. (In re Leverette), 118 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990)
(requiring return of a repossessed automobile because the debtor's right to redemption "is sufficient to bring
the property [the automobile] within the meaning of'property of the estate'.).
Although the Court in Whiting Pools did not explicitly rely on a gross lump concept analysis, its result
is consistent with this analysis. See infra note 200 and accompanying text. One bankruptcy court has
interpreted Whiting Pools as requiring a gross lump sum analysis. See In re Seay, 97 B.R. 41, 43 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1989) ("The key element in Whiting Pools, which is controlling, indeed decisive, of the issues in this
case is the court's ruling that only when ownership of property seized by a creditor is transferredfrom the
debtor is it then not an asset of the estate and not recoverable as an asset of the estate.") (quoting U.S. v.
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 209-10 (1983)) (emphasis added by the bankruptcy court). See also Craig S.
Provomy, Note, The Outer Limits of Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code: United States v. Whiting Pools
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Although using ownership as a gross lump concept may have given
"ownership" a bad name in legal circles, there nevertheless remains an
important role for the concept of ownership. In all of the possible sets of
property interests with respect to any property thing,40 there will always be one
person (or in the case ofjoint owners, a group of persons with co-equal rights)
who is the "owner" of the property thing or of lesser property interests.4t The
"owner" will be the person who has the residual interest, that is, the residual
risks and rewards of ownership. Determining who is the owner of a property
interest is still necessary for resolving many legal controversies.4 This is
particularly true in the case of bankruptcy.43
Revisited, 7 CARDozo L REv. 935, 938, 940 (1986) (confusing property in which a debtor has an interest and
the interest of the debtor in property).
40 See infra notcs 45-47 and accompanying text.
41 For example, in a true lease, the tenant has the right to use a property item for a limited term, but the
"owner" will ultimately reacquire the right to use it. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1995) (distinguishing true
lease from security interest in personal property): CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 249-250, § 6.12, at
260-61. In the case of an option, discussed supra note 23, if the value of the property item increases, the
option holder may (and is likely to) divest the owner of her ownership interest, and therefore the seller of an
option has given up the benefit of an increase in value. However, if the value of the property item declines,
the "ownee, retains this risk. The option holder does not have the risk of a decline. He need not exercise the
option to acquire the item. Finally, the secured lender's property interest is limited to having the ability to
cause the encumbered property item to be sold to repay the secured debt. Absent agreement to the contrary,
the secured lender does not have the right either to use the property item or to benefit from any increase in
the value of the item. It does, however, bear the risk that the value of the property item will decline to less
than the amount of the secured debt.
42 For example, the steps taken to perfect an assignment of intangible property other than accounts and
chattel paper are different depending on whether the assignment is for security, in which the filing
requirements of Article 9 of the U.C.C. would apply, oris a transfer of ownership. See Thomas E. Plank, The
True Sale ofLoans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON U. L REV. 287, 310-11 (1991). Whether a
transfer of accounts or chattel paper is a sale will determine who is entitled to surplus from collections. See
U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1995); Plank, supra, at 312. Whether a transfer of property called a "lease" is a true lease
or a seller financed sale will dictate what steps the transferor must take to protect its ownership or security
interests. See Thomas C. Homburger & Gregory R. Andre, Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Transactions and
the Risk of Recharacterization in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.95 (1989); James
Charles Smith, Leases ofPersonal Property, in ID PETER F. COOoAN ErAL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 30.02 (1998). See also Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property
Lease Under the UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (1988). The transfer of ownership of a loan or note at a discount
will preclude the application of usury law, but if the transfer is held not to be a sale but a transfer as security
for a loan, then it may be subject to those laws. See Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103 (1833) (absolute
transfer of note despite full recourse not usurious); Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 U.S. 568 (1916)
(assignment of accounts a secured transaction void under usury law); Plank, supra, at 307 n.59, 313 n.82.
Other implications include various tax consequences, Walter C. Cliff & Philip J. Levine, Reflections on
Ownership-Sales andPledges ofinstallment Obligations, 39 TAX LAW. 37 (1985), and whether the property
is subject to garnishment, Deutscher v. Tennesco, Inc., 45 B.R. 97, 99 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (mortgage
loan originator who sold mortgage loans but who retained possession of the mortgage documents to service
the loans did not retain an ownership interest in the loans and therefore the loan payments were not subject to
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The need to distinguish ownership of different levels of property interests
becomes more important in multi-tiered property structures. In a multi-tiered
structure, one may have a property interest in property that is not a property
thing. In this case, we must recognize the distinction between (i) the
aggregate of property interests-what I will call in this Article a "property
item"--in which an entity has an ownership interest and (ii) the actual
property interest in this property item that the entity has retained.4
For example, assume that the owner of a warehouse facility in fee simple
absolute has leased her warehouse to a tenant for thirty years. The tenant has
a leasehold interest in the warehouse. 45 Further assume that the tenant in turn
has granted one or both of the following lesser property interests in this
leasehold: (a) a security interest in the leasehold to a secured lender (in which
case the tenant retains his equity interest in the leasehold); or (b) a five year
lease to a subtenant (in which case the tenant retains a reversionary interest in
the leasehold).46
Although the owner of the warehouse facility has granted a thirty year
lease to the tenant she still has an ownership interest in the largest set of
aggregate property interests, a fee simple absolute. From the perspective of
the owner, this aggregate set of property interests is a "property item." The
owner of the warehouse facility retains only a reversionary interest in this
property item. This reversionary interest is her "property interest" or her
"interest in property." If the owner of the warehouse facility becomes a
debtor under the Code, the language of § 541(a)(1) requires that the property
of the estate contain only the owner's remaining reversionary interest.
Similarly, the tenant has an ownership interest in the leasehold interest
and from the perspective of the tenant, this leasehold interest also is a
"property item." The tenant's property interest, however, is only his residual
interests remaining after the conveyance of a security interest or sublease

garnishment by a judgment creditor), or a fcderal tax lien, 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1994) (providing for lien on
property of taxpayer who fails to pay taxes), or liability for the costs of removing hazardous wastes, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (1994) (liability of owner ofvessel or facility).
43 See, e.g., In re Scay, 97 B.RL 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (holding that entry of judgment on
garnishment of debtor's bank account by creditor before filing of petition terminates debtor's interest in
account under state law and therefore account is not property of estate and payment by bank of funds in
account after filing of petition does not violate automatic stay); see also Plank, supra note 42, at 307-10.
44 See, e.g., Infra note 134 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
46 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1,§ 6.1, at 250. § 6.70, at 389-91.
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described above. The scope and content of these residual interests consist
only of (a) the equity interest in the leasehold in the case of the grant of the
security interest, and (b) the reversion in the leasehold after the expiration of
the subtenant's five-year lease. If the tenant becomes a debtor under the
Code, the property of the estate contains only the tenant's remaining interests
in the leasehold, not the leasehold-the property item--itself.
Finally, the two subordinate parties-the holders of the security interest in
the leasehold interest or the subtenant--also have an interest in property.
These are property interests in the property thing, the warehouse, only in a
colloquial sense. They are more properly considered interests in the property
item consisting of the leasehold property interest of the tenant.
Multi-tiered property interests are not uncommon in business transactions. 47 Accordingly, an analysis of what is property of the estate under the
Code requires the following tasks for each property thing subject to a dispute
in a bankruptcy case: (1) determination of the scope and content of the largest
aggregate set of property interests consisting of a "fee simple absolute"
ownership in a property thing, such as fee simple ownership of a tangible
property thing or the rights under an intangible property thing like a contract;
(2) identification of the aggregate set of immediately subordinate property
interests, if any, in that absolute property item, e.g., a subordinate property
item consisting of a leasehold or a security interest in the absolute property
item; (3) successive identification of the aggregate set of the next immediately
subordinate property interests, if any, in the subordinate property items
identified, e.g., a subleasehold or a security interest in a leasehold, a subsubleasehold in a lease, and so on; (4) identification of the entities that hold
the ownership interest in each of the identified property items, that is, the
entity who is the "owner" of or who has "legal title" to each of the property

47 Multi-tiered sets of property interests appear most often in real estate. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note
1, § 2.1, at 26-29. Although not as common, they can also exist in tangible and intangible personal property
things. For example, the latest version of Asticle 8 of the U.C.C., adopted in 1994, specifically recognizes
the creation of"security entitlements" in "financial assets" (as defined in U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9)) as part
of a
multi-tiered set of property interests. Thus, issuer A may issue a security to securities intermediary S1, SI
may create a security entitlement in the security (which is also a "financial asset") in favor of securities
intermediary S2,and 52 may sell to customer B a security entitlement in S2's security entitlement (which is
also a "financial asset"). B may think that she has bought the security issued by the issuer, but she has no
property interest in the security held by St. Her property interest consists of her security entitlement, which
under U.C.C. §§ 8-501 to -511 also represents a limited property interest in the financial asset held by S2.
See U.C.C. Al. 8, Prefatory Note, § II.C
(1994). B may also create other interests in her securities
entitlement, including a security interest. See id. Prefatory Note, § II.D.
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items described in (1) though (3) above; (5) determination of the scope and
content of each of the subordinate property interests in each of the property
items; (6) identification of those specific property interests that the debtor has
with respect to any of the foregoing property items; (7) identification of those
property interests, if any, that others have with respect to any of the foregoing
property items.
B. The Bundle of Sticks Metaphor
The phrase "interest of the debtor in property" is the most important
element of the defined term "property of the estate" § 541(a)." In turn, many
important provisions of the Code involving "property of the estate"
incorporate by reference the formulation of "interest of the debtor in
property." For example, the trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation is to gather,
liquidate, and distribute property of the estate in satisfaction of creditor
claims.49 In liquidation and reorganization cases, the trustee in bankruptcy 0
may use, sell, lease, or borrow against "property of the estate"'" or require the
return of property of the estate. 52 The automatic stay protects property of the
estate.53 Altogether, the phrase "property of the estate" appears many times in
the Code.54
48 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), quotedinfra note 114.
49 Id. § 704(1) (trustee shall "collect and reduce to money the property of the estate"); id. § 726(a)
(distribution); Id. § 726(c) (provisions for community property).
under
50 In chapter 11 reorganization cases, a debtor in possession has most of the powers of a trustee
the Code. Id. § 1107. The "debtor in possession" means the debtor unless a separate trustee has been
appointed. Id. § 110l1(1). In chapter 11, the debtor as a debtor in possession-existing management, in the
case of a corporation-retains significant control of the bankruptcy case.
or lease), quoted and discussed infra note 127; id. § 364(c)(2), (c)(3),
51 Id. § 363(b)(1), (c)(1) (use, sale
(d)(1) (borrowing secured by property of estate).
52 Section 542(a) requires the return
of"property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section
363" of the Code. Id. § 542(a). Under § 363(b) and (c), the trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the
estate. Id. § 363(b), (c). In addition, an entity that owes a debt that is "property ofthe estate" must also pay
that debt to the trustee. Id. § 542(b). An entity without notice or knowledge of the case, however, may
transfer "property of the estate" in good faith. id. § 542(c). A life insurance company also may transfer
"property ofthe estate" to pay certain premiums. Id. § 542(d).
53 The filing of a petition automatically stays actions by a creditor against "property of the estate,"
including actions to enforce a judgment against property of the estate; to obtain possession of, to exercise
control over property of the estate; or to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the estate. Id.
§ 362 (a)(2)-(4). See also id. § 362(b)(2)(B), (b)(9)(D) (exceptions to stay); id. § 362(c)(1), (e) (temaination
of stay).
54 See id. § 101(32) (definition of insolvent); id.§ 106(b), (c)(sovereign immunity); id. § 303(g)
(involuntary petitions, appointment of interim trustee). id.§ 329(b)(1) (attorney's transactions); id.§ 346
0)(5)(B) (special tax provisions); id.§ 347(a) (unclaimed property); id.§ 348(0 (effect of conversion from
chapter 13 on property of estate): id.§ 349(b)(3) (evesting of property of estate upon dismissal); id. § 502
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The formulation "interest in property" also appears in other important
sections. These include § 541, relating to property of the estate;5 giving the
trustee the power to avoid preferential, 5 fraudulent," or unperfected
transfers;5 requiring disposition of property "in which an entity other than the
estate has an interest";59 defining secured claims; 6° prescribing ways of

(bX3) (disallowance of certain tax claims); Id. § 521(2), (4) (debtor's duties); Id. § 522(a)(2), (b), (d)(8), (1)
(exempt property); id. § 549(a) (avoidance of postpetition transfers); Id. § 551 (preservation of avoided
transfers for benefit of property of estate); Id. § 554(a), (b), (d) (abandonment of property of the estate); Id.
§ 557(d)(1)(F) (expedited disposition of grain assets); Id. § 559 (liquidation of repurchase agreement); Id.
§ 723(a) (partnership trustee's rights); id. § 725 (disposition of property); Id. § 727(a)(2)(B), (d)(2) (denial or
revocation of discharge): id. § 728(d) (special tax provisions for partnerships); Id. § 748 (liquidation of
securities; stockbroker liquidation); Id. § 761(10)(A)(viii) (definition of customer property; commodity
brokers liquidation); id.§ 766(0 (liquidation of property of estate); id. § 1105 (restoring debtor to
management of property of the estate); id. § 111 l(b)(1)(A) (allowance of secured claims); Id. § 1123(a)(5),
(b)(4) (contents of plan); id. § 1141(b), (d)(3) (effect of confirmation of plan); § 1173(a)(2) (confirmation of
plan; railroad reorganization); id. § 1174 (liquidation); id. § 1202(b)(3)(D) (trustee duties; farmer reorganization); id. § 1207(a), (b) (additions to and possession of property of the estate); id. § 1222(b)(7), (8), (10) (plan
provision for payment of claims and disposition of property of estate); id. § 1227(b) (effect of plan-vesting
of property of estate); id.§ 1306(a), (b) (additions to and possession of property of the estate; wage-earner
reorganization); id. § 1322(b)(8), (9) (plan provision for payment of claims and disposition of property of the
estate): id. § 1327(b) (effect of plan-vsting of property of estate).
These references are in addition to those discussed in the text, e.g., §§ 704, 726, 541, 362, 363, 364,
and they do not include references solely to the "estate." See, e.g.. id. § 552(a) (status of liens on "property
acquired by the estate").
55 The formulation "interest in property" appears throughout § 541. See Id. § 541(a)(2)-(5), (7)
(defining other elements of property of estate), quoted Infra
note 114; id. § 541(b)(2), (4), (5) (providing
exclusions from property of the estate); id. § 541(cX1) (invalidating clauses teminating or conditioning
property interests because of bankruptcy); Id. § 541(d) (distinguishing legal and equitable interests), quoted
infra note 248.
56 The trustee may avoid a transfer of "an interest of the debtor in property" that is preferential. Id.
§ 547(b). A preferential transfer is one to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent
debt made within 90 days of the filing of a petition (or within one year, in the ease of an insider creditor)
while the debtor was insolvent that enabled the creditor to receive more than it would have received in a
chapter 7 liquidation if the transfer had not been made. See id. § 547(b). See also Id. § 547(c)(3) (exceptions
to preference for purchase money security interest in property); Id. § 547(d) (avoidance of transfer to or for
benefit of surety).
57 The trustee may avoid a transfer of "an interest of the debtor in property" that is actually or
constructively fraudulent. Id. § 548(a), (b); see also id. § 548(d)(2) (definition of value).
58 The trustee may avoid a transfer of"an interest of the debtor in property" that would be avoidable by
an actual creditor. Id. § 544(b).
59 Inachapter7case, under 11 U.S.C. § 725:
After the commencement of a case under [chapter 7], but before final distribution of property of
the estate under section 726 of this title, the trustee, after notice and a hearing, shall dispose of
any property in which an entity other than the estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has
not been disposed of under another section of this title.
0 Id. § 506(a), discussedInfra note 157 and accompanying text.
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providing adequate protection of property interests of third parties;"'
authorizing and regulating the use, sale, or lease of property; 62 detailing the
debtors;63
individual
of the
propertystay;6
exemptionstofrom
federal
6
others.
andestate
many for
the automatic
making exceptions
The term "interest in property" reflects the "bundle of sticks" metaphor.
The entire bundle of sticks represents the aggregate property interests in the
single property thing, and an individual stick or group of sticks represent the
lesser interests." Despite its limitations, which I discuss below, the bundle of
61

Id. § 361, discussed infra note 152 and accompanying text; id. § 522(d), discussed infra note 144 and

accompanying text.
62 Id. § 363, discussed infra notes 129, 130, and 137-42 and accompanying text.
63 Id. § 522(d), discussedinfra note 144 and accompanying text.
64 Id. § 362(b)(3), discussed infra note 153 and accompanying text.

65 See id. § 101(37) (definition of lien as "interest in property" to secure repayment of debt); id.
§ 101(54) (definition of transfer as disposition of"property or... an interest in property"); id. § 364(d)(1)(B)
(authorizing superior security interest in property of estate if adequate protection provided to existing secured
creditor); id. § 3650) (providing lien for rejection of executory contract to purchase property); id. § 502(b)(3)
(disallowance of tax claims); id. § 522(b)(2)(A) (exemption of interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint
tenant in property); id. § 523(a)(16) (exception to discharge for condominium fees); id. § 546(b) (limitations
on trustee's avoidance powers); id. § 557(c), (d), (g) (expedited disposition of interests in grain); id. § 724(b)
(treatment of liens on property in which estate has interest); id. § 742 (definition of securities contract;
stockbroker liquidation); id. § 1110(a)(1) (security interest in aircrafit equipment); id. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(i)
(ineligibility of inconsequential interests in property for treatment as fully secured claims); id.
§ 1123(a)(5)(D) (distribution of property among those having interest in property of the estate, discussed
infra note 169 and accompanying text); id. § 1123(b)(5) (prohibition of modifying security interest in
principal residence of debtor in plan); id. § 1129(a)(7)(B), (b)(2)(A) (confirmation of plan; treatment of a
holder of a secured claim having an "interest in the estate's interest in" property, discussed infra note 160);
Id. § 1168 (security interest in milroad rolling stock equipment); id. § 1205(b) (means of providing adequate
protection of "interest of an entity in property"; farmer reorganization); id. § 1206 (sale of property of the
estate), discussed infra note 131; id. § 1222(b)(8) (plan provision for disposition of property of estate),
discussed infra note 171; id. § 1322(b)(2), (c)(2) (plan provision for security interest in real property that is
principal residence); see also id. § 101(56A) (definition of term overriding royalty as an "interest in liquid or
gaseous hydrocarbons").
"Interest" also appears by itself and is used to mean a property interest, including a "security interest."
See. e.g., id. § 10 1(25), (26) (definition of forward contract and forward contract merchant); id. § 101(53)
(definition of statutory lien distinguishing judicial lien and security interest); id. § 101(53D) (definition of
time share plan and time share interest); id. § 362(b)(13) (exception to automatic stay allowing foreclosure of
security interest held by the Secretary of Commerce in a fishing facility); id. § 365(h)(2), (i) (rejection of
timeshare interest).
Finally, "interest" is also used to refer to an ownership interest in an entity. See, e.g., id. § 101(14)
(reference to "interest in the debtor"); id. § 101(16)(B) (equity security includes "interest of a limited partner
in a limited partnership"): id. § 101(49)(A)(xii)-(xv) (definition of security). In this context, an entity is not
"property" in which one has an "interest." The "interest" in property is the interest itself-the share of stock,
the partnership interest. This interest is a property thing in which one may have a property interest, such as
an ownership interest or a security interest.
66 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 4-6.

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

sticks metaphor illustrates that more than one person may have a property
interest with respect to "property." Examples include the leasehold interests
of the lessor and tenant, the tenant's remaining equity interest or reversion in
the leasehold, and the security interest and the subleasehold of the subordinate
entities discussed above.67 Accordingly, the phrase "interest in property"
avoids the ambiguity in the term "property." Even if "property" meant the
thing, "interest in property" cannot be read to mean the thing.
This bundle of sticks metaphor does have its limitations, as Jeanne
Schroedere and J.E. Penner 9 have shown in varying contexts. First, it is a
physical metaphor presupposing that property things are only tangible. 70
Indeed, one may be less likely to think of interests "in" intangible property
things, like a contract, an account receivable, or a security, 7 instead of
"owning" or having an intangible property interest. Nevertheless, in
interpreting the Code, we must not let the metaphor obscure that fact that
"property" includes both tangible and intangible property. The language of
§ 541(a)(1)
refers to "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
''n
property.

67

See supranotes 45-47 and accompanying text.

68 See Jeanne L Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregatlon of
Property,93 MicH. L REV. 239 (1994); Schroeder, supra note 36; Jeanne L Schroeder, The Vestal and the
Fasces:The Feminine and Propertyin Psychoanalysis& Law, 16 CARDOZO L REV. 805 (1995).
69 J.E. Penner, The "Bundle ofRights " PictureofProperty,43 UCLA L REv. 711 (1996).
70 See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces,supra note 68, at 810-12.
71 Negotiable instruments, chattel paper, and certificated securities are tangible property things that

"iily" intangible property interests. The intangible property interests consist of the rights created by these

property things. Thus, a negotiable instrument evidences an order or promise to pay a fixed amount of
money. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1995). Chattel paper evidences a promise to pay and a security interest in

goods. See id. § 9-105. A certificated security is a security, which represents an obligation of an issuer or an
interest in an issuer orin property oran enterprise of an issuer, in the form ofa physical certificate. See Id.

§ 8-102(a)(4), (15).
72 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d
1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that property of estate of debtor software company includes debtor's
causes of action and intellectual property). Ifthere were any doubt about the meaning of the language of this
section, the House and Senate reports remove that doubt. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 175 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136:

The bill determines what is property of the estate by a simple reference to what interests in
property the debtor has at the commencement of the case. This includes all interests, such as
interests in real or personal property, tangible and intangible property, choses in action, causes of
action, rights such as copyrights, trade-marks, patents, and processes, contingent interests and

future interests, whether or not transferrable by the debtor.
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Second, the metaphor suggests a false sense of precision in defining what
are property interests.73 This false sense creates different problems in
determining what is property of the estate. The Code does not address
whether a particular interest with respect to a property thing-any particular
stick in the bundle-is a "property interest." 74 That analysis depends on
whether under non-bankruptcy law a particular interest, right, or power is a
property interest 73 Nevertheless, courts have occasionally become confused
on this point and included things that are not property interests in the
See also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5868: .
Under paragraph (1) of subsection (a), the estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interest of
the debtor in property, however located, as of the commencement of the case. The scope of this
paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property,
causes of action (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6)), and all other forms ofproperty currently specified
in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act § 70a, as well as property recovered by the trustee under
section 542 of proposed title 11, if the property recovered was merely out of possession of the
debtor, yet remained "property of the debtor." The debtor's interest in property also includes
"title" to property, which is an interest,just as are a possessory interest, or leasehold interest, for
example.
73 See Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-0-Stix, supra note 68, at 243; Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces,
supranote 68, at 812.
74 For example, I may have an interest in having my neighbor maintain a well-landscaped yard with
attractive plants, a right to look at those plants, and the power to steal the flowers that bloom in her yard.
Unless they are embodied in an easement, see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 8.1 at 436-41, none of these
interests, rights, or powers is a property interest. See infra note 77.
75 As a matter of interpretation, courts look to non-bankruptcy law to determine what is "property."
See, e.g., Barhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1991) (debtor's and creditor's rights in check); Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979) (creditor's rights to rents determined by state and not federal
common law); Commercial Fed. Mortgage Corp v. Smith, 85 F.3d 1555, 1557 (11th Cir. 1996) (debtor's
rights to home foreclosed upon); Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. Partnership, 73 F.3d 218, 219 (9th Cir. 1996)
(opportunity to renew professional basketball season tickets not property under state law and therefore not
property of the bankruptcy estate); Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 37 (3d Cir.
1993) (mortgagor's and mortgagee's rights to rents); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Pinetree, Ltd., 876 F.2d
34, 36 (5th Cir. 1989) (remarking that "[b]anlkuptcy law does not create property," in case involving debtor's
interest in real estate project under an unrecorded deed); In re Kaiser, 791 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1986)
(estate's interest in land and goods owned by shareholder of corporate debtor but used by, paid in part by,
and represented to be owned by the debtor); see also Peter V. Panteleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse
In the Sale of FinancialAssets,52 Bus. LAW. 159, 182-89 (1996).
Further, as a matter of constitutional power, courts must look to non-bankruptcy law to determine the
rights of parties other than the debtor or its creditors. Under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, Congress may alter the property rights of secured creditors but may not otherwise create
property interests for the debtor that do not exist under state or federal non-bankruptcy law and may not alter
the property rights of non-creditors. See Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits of Bankruptcy, 63
TENN. L REV. 487, 559-81 (1996). In my view, property of the estate may include the fullest extent of
interests that could be property interests under non-bankruptcy law, and it may include only a lesser set of
property interests, but it cannot include more than the property interests of the debtor under non-bankruptcy
law.
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bankruptcy estate, with all of the ramifications of the Code, such as
applicability of the automatic stay.76 This issue--whether any particular
interest, right, or power has sufficient substance to qualify as a property

interest7 and hence property of the estate-is beyond the scope of this

Article.7 8

76 For example, under general contract law, until notification to the account debtor of an assignment of
a right to payment, an assignor retains the power to discharge or modify the duties of the account debtor. See
generally U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (1995): RES TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 338(1) (1981). I am not sum
that this power is actually a property interest. Nevertheless, this power has been held to become property of
the estate under § 541(a)(1) and to give the bankruptcy trustee the sole right to collect the "assigned" asset.
See In re Modem Settings, Inc. 74 B.R. 358, 361 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987). Cf.Dewhirst v. Citibank, 861
F.2d 241, 245 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating in dicta that, in the case of a true assignment, notification would
take an account receivable out of the estate). Further, the court in Modern Settings stated in dicta that the
assignee was stayed from giving notification of the assignment after the bankruptcy case is filed. Modern
Settings, 74 B.R. at 361.
77 David Carlson and I have enjoyed a running debate on the question ofwhcther a seller of accounts
in
a properly perfected sale retains sufficient interests that qualify as a property interest. In Thomas E. Plank,
Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paperunder the UCC and the Effects of
Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle,26 CONN. L REV. 397, 461 & n.280 (1994), I criticized the
court's treatment ofthe sale of an account in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.
1993), discussed infra note 387 and accompanying text. In doing so, I remarked that a seller of accounts
retains certain minor rights and powers that arise under Article 9 of the UC.C. (primarily a result of poor
drafting), including the power, after five years, to sell the accounts to a third party and defeat the interests of
a buyer, ifa previously perfected buyer fails to file a continuation statement as required by U.C.C. § 9-403
(1995). The thin film of residue that Article 9 leaves with the seller of accounts neither constitutes a property
interest in itself nor, more importantly, provides a sufficient basis fora claim that the accounts that have been
sold would be part ofthe bankruptcy estate ofthe seller.
David Carlson disagrees. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten FoundationsqfSecurtlzaton, 39 WM.
& MARY L REV. 1055 (1998). Professor Carlson argues that the future power of the seller to defeat the
buyer's ownership of an account is a sufficient contingent future interest for bankruptcy jurisdiction over the
account. See id. at 1096-99. This power fails to be a property interest, however, for several reasons. By its
very nature, the seller can never transfer this power. As long as the account exists, the seller always retains it.
Reselling the account to a second buyer does not divest the seller of this power. In addition, as long as the
seller is solvent, it has no value. Ifthe seller sold the account to a second buyer, and the second buyer took
priority because ofthe first buyer's failure to file a continuation statement, the first buyer will have a cause of
action for the amount ofthe account resold. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 333(1)(a)
(1982). Even in bankruptcy, the value of the power is very speculative. The trustee can obtain any value
from this power only ifthe five year perfection period ends without the buyer filing a continuation statement
(which it may now do under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A)) during the bankruptcy case and the trustee avoids the
buyer's interest as unperfected. Finally, even if this contingent power were an "interest in property," it is
only this interest, and not the account itself that is property of the estate. This is a point that I admittedly did
not fully appreciate in my initial ruminations on Whiting Pools in Plank, supra, at 461 & nn.280, 281 (citing
Whiting Pools).
78 See, e.g., In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1301 (3d Cir. 1991) (right to file renewal application within
10 months of expiration of liquor license is property of the estate).
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Whatever the limitations in the bundle of sticks metaphor beyond an
elementary level, its use in the definition of property of the estate and its use
throughout the Code reflect Congress's deliberate choice. Property of the
estate under § 541(a)(1) must be analyzed by identifying the specific property
interests that a debtor had at the commencement of the case. To complete the
analysis of property interests in the Code, however, it is necessary to discuss
those instances in which the Congress did not use the bundle of sticks
metaphor.
C. The Bundled Term "Property"in the Code
Though dominant, the formulation "interest in property" is not the only
formulation of property
in the Code. Several sections use the phrase
"property of the debtor,'.7 "debtor's property,"8 or simply "property" without
any notion of someone having an interest "in" property. 8' For example, a
custodian must deliver to the trustee certain "property of the debtor."' A
trustee may avoid certain unperfected transfers of "property of the debtor."
The automatic stay acts to obtain possession of "property . . . from the
71 See Id. § 101(2)(D) (definition of affiliate); id. § 101(11)(A), (C) (definition of custodian); id.
§ 102(2) (rules of interpretation); id. § 303(b)(1), (h)(2) (involuntary petition); id. § 347(b) (unclaimed
property); Id. § 362(b)(17) (exceptions to stay); id. § 363(i) (right of spouse to purchase community
property); Id. § 365(d)(1), (2), (6)(C) (time limits on assumption); id. § 502(b)(1) (disallowance of claims); id.
§ 507(b) (priority); id. § 522(h) (debtor avoidance power); id. § 523(a)(15)(A) (exceptions to discharge); id.
§ 524(a)(3), (d)(2) (effect of discharge, reaffirmation agreement); id. § 541(b)(5) (exclusion from property of
the estate); id. § 545 (avoidance of statutory liens); id. § 552(b) (security interest in proceeds and rents); id.
§ 727(a)(2)(A) (exception to discharge); id. § 741(4)(A) (definition of customer name security; stockbroker
liquidation); Id. § 749(a) (voidable transfers); id. § 761(10)(AXvii), (ix) (definition of customer property;
commodity brokers liquidation); Id. § 764(a) (voidable transfers); Id. § 901(2) (definition of property of the
estate; municipal reorganization); id. § 904(2) (limits on court's powers); Id. § 922(c) (automatic stay;
administrative expense priority); Id. § 926(b) (limit on avoidance powers); Id. § 1171(b) (priority of claims;
railroad reorganization); id. § 1222(b)(7) (plan provision for payment of claims; farmer reorganization); id.
§ 1322(b)(8) (plan provision for payment of claims; wage-earner reorganization). These references are in
addition to those discussed in the text, e.g., §§ 543(a), (b), 544(a), and 362(a)(5).
80 See id. § 101(28) (definition of indenture); id. § 3460)(5) (special tax provisions); id. § 542(e)
(turnover of information); id.§ 727(a)(3)(D) (exception to discharge).
81 See, e.g., Id. § 101(2)(C) (definition of affiliate); id. § 101(21A) (definition of farmout agreement); Id.
§ 101(32) (definition of insolvent); Id. § 101(35A) (definition of intellectual property); id. § 101(38)
(definition ofmargin payment); id. § 101(42A) (definition of production payment); Id. § 101(44) (definition
of railroad); Id. § 101(51B) (definition of single asset real estate); id. § 101(51C) (definition of small); Id.
§ 101(56A) (definition of term overriding royalty); id. § 109 (qualification as debtor). The word "property"
by itselfappears too many times to cite completely.
82 Id. § 543(a), (b).
83 Id. § 544(a) (avoidance of a transfer of property of the debtor to the same extent that a hypothetical
lien creditor could avoid such transfer).
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estate '84 or to create, perfect, or enforce certain liens against "property of the
debtor. ' ' s'

There are several reasons for this formulation."6 The most important use of
the phrase "property of the debtor" is to distinguish between property of the
debtor and property of the estate. First,property of the estate only arises upon
the filing of a petition." Accordingly, "property of the debtor" in the Code
often refers to property interests of the debtor that existed before the filing of
the petition. Examples include the trustee's strong arm power under § 544(a)
to avoid unperfected prepetition transfers of "property of the debtor" that a
hypothetical creditor or purchase of real estate could avoid or references to
the prepetition delivery of "property of the debtor" to a custodian.8 9 To be
sure, Congress's choice is not always consistent. For example, under § 544(b)
the trustee may avoid unperfected prepetition transfers of "an interest of the
debtor in property" that an actual creditor could avoid. 9 The preference and
fraudulent conveyance sections allow
avoidance of prepetition transfers of
9
"interests of the debtor in property." '
Second, after the filing of a petition, there remains a distinction between
property of the estate and property of the debtor. Not all property interests of
the debtor are included in property of the estate. For example, § 541(a)(6)
excludes from property of the estate earnings from services performed by an
individual debtor after the commencement of the case. 9 In addition, the

84 Id. § 362(a)(3), quoted infra text accompanying note 311.

85 Id. § 362(a)(5), quotedinfra text accompanying note 311.
86 In a few sections, property of the estate and property of the debtor appear together. For example,
under 11 U.S.C. § 543(a), a custodian may not transfer or administer "property of the debtor... or property
of the estate" in its possession, custody, or control. See also id. § 363(i) (right of spouse to purchase
community property); id. § 542(d) (payment of insurance premiums); Id. § 552(a) (property acquired by the
estate or by the debtor afler the commencement of the case not subject to liens); Id. § 1222(b)(7) (plan
provision for payment of claims in farer reorganization); Id. § 1322(b)(8) (plan provision for payment of
claims in wage-earner reorganization).
87 See id. § 541(a) ("The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate."), quoted infull infra note 114.
88 Id. § 544(a).
89 Id. § 543(b), quoted infra note 182.
90 Id. § 544(b).
91 Id. §§ 547(b), 548(a). Before 1984, § 547(b) allowed the trustee to avoid a preferential "transfer of
property of the debtor." See 11 US.C. § 547(b) (1982). In 1984, Congress substituted "interest of the debtor
in property" for "property of the debtor." See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L No. 98-353, § 462(b)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 378 (1984).
92 11 U.S.C § 541(a)(6) (1994), quoted infra note 114. See, e.g., Schneider v. Nazar, 864 F.2d 683,
685-86 (10th Cir. 1988) (federal payments in kind arising out of crop reduction and diversion program under
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trustee can abandon property of the estate to the debtor under § 554.93
Property of the estate also does not include property acquired by an individual
debtor more than 180 days after the commencement of the case from
inheritance, divorce proceedings, or life insurance, or other property acquired
by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case. 4 Finally, an
individual debtor may exempt certain property from property of the estate. 95
The use of the term "property" outside the bundle of sticks metaphor
always interjects the basic property ambiguity-is it the thing or the interest?
The Code affects interests and relationships that range from the simple to the
very complicated. Use of the term "property" to mean the thing would be
inadequate in all but the simplest situations. 9' When not expressed in the
bundle of sticks metaphor, property in the Code should nevertheless mean the
legal understanding of property as a property interest, not the colloquial
understanding of property as the thing.97 Moreover, as the next Part discusses,

contract entered into after the filing of the petition were payments for services and therefore excluded from
property ofthe estate).
93 i U.S.C. § 544.
94 Propety ofthe estate does not include property acquired by an individual debtor more than 180 days
after the commencement of the case from inheritance. divorce proceedings, or life insurance. See id.
§ 541(a)(5), quoted infra note 114; see also In re Anders, 151 B.R. 543, 547-48 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993)
(holding that spousal support payments owed to the debtor under a prepetition support agreement do not
become property under state law until due and payable and therefore support payments that accrue more than
180 days after commencement of the case are property of the debtor and not property of the estate).
Although property of the estate includes property acquired by the estate after the commencement of the
ease, 11 U.S.C § 541(a)(7), quoted infra note 114, property of the estate does not include property acquired
by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case other than that provided in § 541(a)(5), discussed
in the previous paragraph. See Casey v. Hoehman, 963 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that
patent on invention made by individual debtor after he filed chapter 11 petition was property of debtor and
not property of estate); Bobroffv. Continental Bank, 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that cause of
action for defamation and tortious interference with contractual relations accruing in favor of individual
debtor after commencement of case was not "interest in property that the estate acquires after the
commencement of the case" under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7)); In re Doemling, 127 B.R. 954, 957 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1991) (tort claim for personal injury that accrued five months after petition).
95 See 11 U.S.C § 522(b).
96 See, e.g.. Begierv. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 n.3 (1990) (in holding that debtor's prepetition payment of
certain trust fund taxes was not a preference, treating "property of the debtor" in an earlier version of§ 547(b)
as the same as "interest of the debtor in property" under § 541 (a)(1)).
97 In a few instances, Congress specifically referred to the property thing. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(35A) ("'intellectual property' means (A) trade secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected
under title 35; (C) patent application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or (F)
mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17"); id. § 101(42A) ("'production payment' means a term
overriding royalty [defined id. § 101(56A)] satisfiable in cash or in kind (A) contingent on the production of
a liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon from particular real property"); id. § 101(44) ("'railroad' means common
carrier by railroad engaged in the transportation of individuals or property").
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the drafters of the Code reduced this ambiguity dramatically by using the
bundle of sticks metaphor to describe and regulate property interests.
II. THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
The bundle of sticks metaphor of "interests in property" is the dominant
means of incorporating property interests into the Code. The drafting history
of the Code shows that Congress's use of the metaphor was deliberate.
Although Congress was not completely consistent in applying the metaphor,
the extent of its consistent use confirms the specific Congressional intent that
courts and parties should determine the precise property interests of each
entity when deciding the rights and claims of the participants in a bankruptcy
case.
A. DraftingHistory
Congress began the last major modernization of the bankruptcy laws of the
United States in 1970 by forming the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United StatesP to make recommendations for changes in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. 99 In 1973, the Bankruptcy Commission issued its report' °0 and
proposed a draft of a new bankruptcy act.'0 ' Congressional sponsors
introduced the act proposed by the Commission into the House of Representatives and the Senate in the 93d and 94th Congresses,re along with a similar but
competing proposal recommended by the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges.' °3
The revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was a massive undertaking.
One of the many proposals of the Commission was to replace the language by

98 See Bankruptcy Study Commission, Pub. L No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), reprinted In 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 545; see also Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L.
REv. 941,942-43 (1979).
99 Ch. 541,30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1103 (1976 & Supp. H 1978)
(repealed 1978)).
100 See also COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt.
1(1973).
1o1 Id. pl. 2.
102 See S. 236, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 31, 94th Cong. (1975); S. 4026, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 10792,
93d Cong. (1973). See generally Klee, supra note 98. at 943-44.
103 See S. 235, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 16643, 93d Cong. (1973). A
companion bill was not introduced in the Senate in the 93d Congress. See generally Klee, supra note 98, at
943-44.
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which the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 described the property interests of the
debtor to be administered in the bankruptcy case." 4 The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 contained a laundry list of ten specific types of property interests, the
most general of which was "property which prior to the filing of the petition

[the bankrupt] could by any means have transferred or which might have been

levied upon and sold under judicial process against him."'0 5 Although the
approach of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act may have represented an improvement
over earlier bankruptcy acts, t " many believed that it had become seriously
inadequate.' 7
104 See H.IL REP. No. 95-595, at 175 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136; see also
BANKRUPrCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, pt. 1, at 15-17, 192-200.

105 11 U.S.C. § I10(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). This subsection provided:
The trustee of the estate ofa bankrupt... shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title
of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing ofthe petition [excluding exempt property] ...to all of
the following kinds of property wherever located
(1) documents relating to his property;
(2) interests in patents, patent rights, copyrights, and trademarks, and in applications
therefor [subject to revesting in the bankrupt if applications not prosecuted];
(3) powers which he might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might
have exercised solely for some other person;
(4) property transferred by him in fraud of his creditors;
(5) property, including rights ofaction, which prior to the filing ofthe petition he could by
any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered [excluding certain
rights of action for libel, slander, and personal injury if not subject to judicial process under
state law, and excluding in the case of a natural person, life insurance policies if the cash
surtender value is made available to the trustee];
(6) rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of
or injury to his property;
(7) [certain nonassignable contingent remainders and similar contingent interests in
property that become assignable within six months];
(8) property held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors ....
All property, wherever located [excluding exempt propety], which vests in the bankrupt within
six months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or inheritance shall vest in the trustee ....
All property, wherever located [excluding exempt property], in which the bankrupt has at the date
of bankruptcy an estate or interest by the entirety and which within six months after bankruptcy
comes transferable in whole or in party solely by the bankrupt shall, to the extent it becomes so
transferable, vest in the trustee ....
Id.
106 See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517, 22-24 (repealed 1878) ("all the estate, real and
personal, of the bankrupt, with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, ... the title to all such
property and estate, ... all rights in equity, choses in action, patents and patent rights and copyrights; all
debts due him or any person for his use, and all liens and securities therefor and all his rights of action for

1218
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The Commission recommended that the "property of the estate be defined
in the act comprehensively and that the tests of transferability and leviability
under state law be abandoned."'0 8 Expanding on this recommendation, the
Commission proposed "that all property owned by the debtor as of the date of
the filing of the petition be considered property of the estate subject to
administration."''
Section 4-601(a) of the act proposed by the Commission
and the bills introduced into the 93d and 94th Congress provided: "The
following is property of the estate: (1) all property of the debtor as of the date
of the petition, except as provided in clause (5) of this subdivision."" 0 The
competing proposal of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
contained identical language."'

property or estate, real or personal, and for any cause of action [excepting household items and necessaries
not to exceed $500, wearing apparel, military uniforms and equipment, and property exempt by law, and
property held by the bankrupt in trust]"); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 442-43 (repealed
1843) ("all the property, and rights of property, of every name and nature, and whether real, personal, or
mixed,... all the rights, titles, powers, and authorities to sell, manage, and dispose of the same, and to sue
for and defend the same"; the assignee of the bankrupt could also prosecute and defend any suits to the same
extent as the bankrupt could; household goods up to $300 and wearing apparel exempted); Act of Apr. 4,
1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (repealed 1803) ('all the estate, real and personal, of every nature and
description to which the said bankrupt may be entitled, either in law or equity ...[necessary wearing apparel
and bedding excepted] and also... all deeds and books of account, papers and writings belonging to such
bankrupt"). The 1800 statute was based on the English Bankrupt Act in effect at that time. See 5 Gco. 2, ch.
30, § 1 (1732) (Eng.) ("all such Part of his, her or their the said Bankrupts Goods, Wars, Merchandizes,
Money, Estate and Effects, and all Books, Papers and Writings relating thereunto, as at the Time of such
Examination shall be in his, her or their Possession, Custody or Power [necessary wearing apparel
excepted]").
107 For example, Veto Countryman wrote an influential article describing the shortcomings of the
property provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Veto Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases (Pan ),47 N.Y.U. LR. 407, 431-75 (1972). The Commission cited this article in its report. See, e.g.,
BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 100, pt. 1. at 194 & n.93, 195 & n.95.
10 BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 100, pt. 1, at 17.
109 Id.pt. 1,at 192.
It0 Id. pt. 2, at 147; see S. 236, 94th Cong. § 4-601 (1975); H.R. 31,94th Cong. § 4-601 (1975); S. 4026,
93d Cong. § 4-601 (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong. § 4-601 (1973); see also Hearingson H.R. 31 & H.R. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 941h Cong.,
app. 163 (1975-1976) (comparison of the Commission's act, H.R. 31, and the bankruptcy judges bill, H.R.
32). Subsection (a)(5) covered the extent to which community property, powers of appointment, and
contingent interests were included. The other elements, set forth in subsections (a)(2)-(4), were payments
made by or recovered from a general partner of a bankrupt partnership, property transferred prepctition and
recovered by the trustee from a custodian or under the avoidance powers (lien avoidance, preference,
fraudulent conveyance); and property acquired by the debtor within six months by bequest, devise, or
inheritance, or from a divorce property settlement. Id.; see also BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 100, pt.
2, at 147.
1" See S. 235, 94th Cong. § 4-601 (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong. § 4-601 (1975); H.R. 16643, 93d Cong.
§ 4-601 (1973). See also Hearingson H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supra note 110, at 163.
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Although the 93d Congress took little action on the bankruptcy revision
bills, the 94th Congress devoted significant attention to them. Subcommittees
in both the House and the Senate conducted lengthy hearings.'1 2 After these
hearings the staff of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Judiciary Committee produced a revised bill near the end of 1976.
At the beginning of the 95th Congress in early 1977, the sponsors introduced
this draft in the House of Representatives as H.R. 6.13 H.R. 6 renumbered and
recast the section defining property of the estate in the earlier versions into
substantially the current form of § 541(a).1 4 H.R. 6 also introduced the
formulation "interest in property" throughout the Code."'
112 Hearingson H.R. 31 & HR. 32, supra note 110 (in four volumes, 2700 pages, covering 35 days of
testimony, with over 100 witnesses); Hearings on S. 235 & S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvement in
Judiciary Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) (in one volume, 1316 pages,
covering 3 days of testimony, with 75 witnesses). See Klee, supra note 98, at 944.
113 See H.R. 6,95th Cong. (1977). See Klee, supra note 98, at 945-46.
114 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994) with H.R. 6, 95th Cong., § 541(a), at 82-83 (1977) (underline
indicates additions to H.R. 6, stiilt elu ,, shows deletions from H.R. 6):
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections stibeeien (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as of the
commencement of the case that is-(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable claim against
the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to the extent that such
interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n). 543, 550,
553. or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered transferred to the estate
under section &
510( ) or 551 of this title.
(5) Ant A* interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such interest
had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, and that the
debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date-(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(3) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, or of an
interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or et profits of or from property of the estate,
except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the
commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.
!!5 See, e.g., H.L 6, 95th Cong., § 361 (1977) (adequate protection); id. § 362(d) (relief from stay); id.
§ 362(f) (relief from stay); id. § 363(e) (conditioning use of property upon providing adequate protection for
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After further discussions in Congress, the sponsors revised H.R. 6 and
introduced the revision as a successor bill, H.R. 7330, on May 23, 1977.11

The sponsors then revised this bill and introduced the revision, H.R. 8200, on
July 23, 1977.2 7 The House and the Senate amended H.R. 8200 several times,
and Congress eventually enacted the final version of H.1R 8200 as the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.118 As the draft of the Code evolved through
H.R. 6, H.R 7330, and H.R. 8200, Congress made very few minor changes to
the new § 541(a) that first appeared in H.R 6.219 The only significant
amendment added subsection (7) to include in property of the estate property

acquired by the estate after the commencement of bankruptcy.

Congress

added this subsection in the final amendments to H.R. 8200 to reconcile
differences between two
earlier versions of H.R. 8200 passed separately by
20
the House and Senate.

Congress has since amended the Code several times. In 1984, Congress
made minor modifications to § 541.1 In addition, Congress further implemented the Code's use of the bundle of sticks metaphor by substituting
"interest of the debtor in property" for "property of the debtor" in the
preference section, § 547(b).'2 Other later amendments remained faithful to

entity with interest in property); id. § 363(f) (sale of property subject to interest of non-debtor); Id. § 506(a)
(definition of secured claim); id. § 544(b) (avoidance of transfer of interest of debtor in property by trustee to
extent actual creditor could avoid transfer); id. § 548 (avoidance of fraudulent conveyance).
116 H.R. 7330, 95th Cong. (1977). See Klee, supra note 98, at 946.
117 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. (1977). See Klee, supra note 98, at 947.
118 See Klee, supra note 98, at 947-53. The Senate began to work on a companion bill, S. 2266, in
October 1977. After H.R. 8200 passed the House and was received in the Senate in February 1978, the
Senate revised and adopted S. 2266. Although similar to H.R. 8200, S. 2266 as approved contained
substantial differences. Finally, after approving S. 2266, the Senate amended H.R. 8200 by striking out the
text and substituting all of S. 2266. Klee, supra note 98, at 949-53.
119 H.R. 8200, as introduced in the House as a revision of H.R. 7330, added a reference to subsection
(cX2) in subsection (a)(l). Compare H.R. 8200,95th Cong. § 541(a) (as introduced July 11, 1977), with H.R.
7330, 95th Cong. § 541(a) (as introduced, May 23, 1977). See supra note 114.
120 These amendments also added the word "all" in the first clause of § 541(a), added "553" in
subsection (a)(3), and changed "510(b)" to "510(c)" in subsection (a)(4). Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L 95-598, § 541(a), 92 Stat. 2549,2594 (1978), codifiedin 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. 111978)
with H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 541(a) (as passed by the House on Fcbruary 8, 1978) and S. 2266, 95th Cong.
§ 541(a) (as reported by Mr. Long of the Committee on Finance on August 10, 1978). See also Infra text
accompanying note 277.
121 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L 98-353, § 456(a)(2)-(5), 98
Stat. 333,376 (1984). This act added to § 541(a) the words "and by whomever held" and the cross references
to § 329(b) and § 363(n) in § 541(a)(3) and the stylistic changes in § 541(a)(5) and (6). See supranote 114.
122 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L No. 98-353, § 462(b)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 376 (1984); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 59 n.3 (1990)
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the bundle of sticks metaphor.' 2 On the other hand, as discussed below, a few
amendments were not consistent.1'
That Congress itself could not
consistently apply an admittedly sophisticated understanding of property
interests should temper the criticism leveled at courts that do not apply the
formulations of property interests correctly.
B. Consistency in the Use of the Definition
The explicit use of the bundle of sticks metaphor in § 541(a)(1) shows that
Congress intended to distinguish the debtor's interest in a property item 5 and
a third party's interest in the property item. To the extent that a third party has
an interest in a property item in which the debtor has an ownership interest,
that interest is excluded from the interest of the debtor in that property item.
If a third party has a lessee's leasehold interest or a security interest in a
property item owned by a debtor, then the debtor's interest is limited to a
reversion or an equity interest.
The Code maintains this distinction in most of the important sections. In a
few sections, the distinction appears to be blurred, but further analysis shows
that it holds. In a few other sections, however, Congress has explicitly
confused property of the estate-the interest of the debtor in property-with
the property item in which the debtor or the estate has an ownership interest.
A few of the inconsistent provisions concern a creditor holding a lien on
the property item. Accordingly, one could view property of the estate in these
sections as including all of the estate's property interests as if there were no
lien on those property interests. In a few other inconsistent sections, however,
this interpretation would fail. I view these few sections as drafting mistakes.
Accordingly, unless the context of the specific section requires otherwise,
courts should interpret "interest of the debtor in property" and "property of the
estate" to be only those specific interests-"no more, no less"' 26-- that the
debtor had and the estate has.
(treating "property of the debtor" in the earlier version of § 547(b) as the same as "interest of the debtor in
property" under§ 541(a)(1)).
123 See infra notes 147 & 149 and accompanying text.
124 See Infra note 159 and accompanying text.
125 See supra text accompanying note 44 for the definition of property item.
126 Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984). See also In re Squymes, 172 B.R.
592, 594 (Bankr. C.D. I1. 1994) (upholding insurance company's subrogation rights to debtor's settlement
proceeds and stating that notwithstanding the broad interpretation of property of the estate, "the debtor's
interests in an asset or his rights against others are not expanded by the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding");
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Section 363 is an important section that tests whether Congress really
meant what it said in § 541(a)(1). Subsections 363(b) and (c) empower the
trustee to use, sell; or lease property of the estate either with or without prior
court approval. 2 7 Under the definition of property of the estate, the trustee
may use, sell, or lease the interest that the debtor had in property.
Presumably, under these two subsections, the trustee may not use, sell, or
lease interests of third parties in property.
This construction makes sense. If the debtor were a lessor of a real estate
property item or a tangible personal property item, the trustee may use only
the debtor's reversion, which essentially means the trustee has the right to
receive the rental payments. The trustee may also sell the reversion. It may
not use the lessee's interest, which is the right to possess and to use the
property item during the term of the lease.
If the debtor owns a property item, but has granted a lender a security
interest in the property item, the trustee may use, sell, or lease the debtor's
equity interest. In most cases, the debtor's equity interest includes the right to
possess and to use the property item, as well as the right to redemption and
surplus. 2 " Accordingly, the trustee may use a warehouse and a drill press that
was owned by the debtor (and now owned by the estate) in the possession of
the estate even though a lender may have a mortgage on the warehouse and a
security interest in the drill press.
The specific contrast between the estate's interest in property and another
entity's interest in property also appears in the definition of cash collateral in
§ 363(a). The subsection confirms the literal reading of subsections (b) and
In re Baquet, 61 B.R. 495, 499-500 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (finding that stock in closely held corporation
subject to shareholder's agreement becomes property of estate subject to transfer restrictions in agreement

and therefore trustee may not sell stock without complying with those restrictions).
127

11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).

(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary
course of business, property of the estate.

(c)(1) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section 721, 1108, 1203,
1204, or 1304 of this title and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may enter into
transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of
business, without notice or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of
business without notice or a hearing.
Id. § 363.
128 See NELSON & WI.trrMAN, supra note 3, §§ 4.1-4.29 at 127-225. See also U.C.C. §§ 9-206, -503, 504(2), -506 (1995).
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(c). Subsection 363(a) states: "In this section, 'cash collateral' means cash,
negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or
other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity
other than the estate have an interest ....
Other subsections present some interpretative challenges. Some of these
could be read to blur the distinction between property of the estate and the
property item. For example, § 363(f) provides that the trustee may, if certain
stringent conditions are met, "sell property under [§ 363(b) or (c)] free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate."t3 If
the word "property" in this subsection refers to "property of the estate" as
used in § 363(b) and (c), then this statement makes no sense unless property of
If the
the estate means more than the "interest of the debtor in property..''
debtor owned a parcel of land and had granted either a lease or a security
interest to a third party, the debtor's interest would consist only of the debtor's
reversion or equity interest. The trustee could sell the reversion or equity
interest, but she would not be selling it "free of' the leasehold or security
interest.
There is another interpretation. Section 363(f) contains stringent conditions to the trustee's ability to sell property interests in which others have an
interest. One limitation requires that local law permit such a sale; another
129 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
130 Id. § 363(f) (emphasis added).
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankniptcy law pemits sale of such property free and clear of such
interest:
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than
the aggregate value ofall liens on such property;
... ;or

(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money
satisfaction of such interest.
Id. § 363(f).
131 Section 1206 also suffers from this ambiguity:
After notice and a hearing, in addition to the authorization contained in section 363(), the trustee
in a case under this chapter may sell property under section 363(b) and (c) free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate if the property is farmland or farm
equipment, except that the proceeds of such sale shall be subject to such interest.
Id. § 12116 (emphasis added).
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requires that, in the case of a lien, the sale proceeds be sufficient to pay the
secured claim in full."2 It is likely that Congress intended § 363(f) to

authorize the sale of a property interest in which the estate and a third party
had an interest, like the parcel discussed above, free of the third party's
interest if, and only if, those conditions were met.' In this event, reading the
word "property" in this subsection as the "property in which the estate has an
ownership interest" implements this intent 3 4 This subsection gives the trustee
a broader authorization to sell property than that in subsections (b) and (c),
which only authorize the sale of the estate's interest in a property item. The
phrase "under §§ (b) or (c)" simply incorporates the limitations of those
subsections that distinguish between sale in and out of the ordinary course of
business rather than incorporate the limitation that the trustee can only sell the
interest of the debtor in property."' Because the subsection says "property"
and not 3"property of the estate," this interpretation harmonizes the sub-

sections.

1

132 See id. § 363(0(1), (3), quoted supra note 130. If there are several liens on a property, all of the liens
must be repaid. Id.
133 See. e.g., Austein v. Schwartz (In re Gcrwcer), 898 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting, without
discussing the meaning of the word "property," that § 363(f) authorized the sale of property in which both the
estate and an another entity had an interest).
13 It is necessary to include the word "ownership" in this subsection to constrain the trustee's power
when the debtor has a property interest that is less than a fee simple absolute interest in a property item. For
example, if the debtor owns an option to purchase a parcel of real estate owned by a third party (and such
option were considered an interest in a property interest, as discussed in note 23), or is the lessee of such
parcel under a long term ground lease, the trustee should not have the power to sell the parcel. However, if
the debtor is the lessee of a parcel owned by a third party, and the debtor has granted a leasehold mortgage to
M, then the trustee should be able to sell the ground lease if she meets the requirements of§ 363(0.
135 One example is the sale in the ordinary course of business of inventory subject to a security interest.
Under U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1995), buyers in ordinary course take free of the security interest. The sale of
inventory by a trustee (including a debtor in possession) operating the business of the debtor would likely be
in the ordinary course of business under 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) and would be permissible under § 363(0(1)
(applicable law pennitting sale of property free of a non-debtor's interest). On the other hand, if the trustee
wanted to sell a warehouse subject to a mortgage for a price sufficient to repay the mortgage, which would
satisfy § 363((3), the trustee would need court permission under § 363(b)(1) because such a sale is not
likely in the ordinary course of business. The limitation in § 363(f) of "under subsection (b) and (c)" also
incorporates the limitation in § 363(c)(2) on the sale of cash collateral. See Infra note 141.
13 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994). It is possible that Congress intended § 363() to prevent the sale of such a
property interest free of a third party's interest under other provisions of the Code unless those conditions
were met. See, e.g., id. § 725 (disposition of property), quotedsupra note 59; Id. § 1123(a)(5)(d) (disposition
of property chapter 11), quoted infra in text accompanying note 169; Id. § 1206 (disposition of fasmland or
farm equipment), quoted supra note 131; Id. § 1222(b)(8) (same), quoted Infra in text accompanying note
171. This interpretation, however, does not account for the phrase "under subsection (b) or (c)." Id. § 363(0.
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This broader reading of "property" standing alone--necessary to maintain
the internal consistency of the Code-applies to other subsections of § 363.
Some of these subsections also reinforce the distinction between property of
the estate and a property item. Subsection 363(e) provides that "at any time,
on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or
proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a
hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to
7 Because the definition
provide adequate protection of such interest."'M
of
property of the estate includes only the debtor's interest in property and
excludes all other interests in property, this subsection cannot be limited to
"property of the estate.. ' ... Section 363(h) also presents the term "property" in
a context requiring the broader reading:
Notwithstanding subsection (f) of this section, the trustee may sell
both the estate's interest, under subsection (b) or (c) of this section,
and the interest of any co-owner in property in which the debtor
had, at the time of the commencement of the case, an undivided
interest as a tenant in common,13joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety
[if certain conditions are met.] Y
That Congress intended "property," when standing alone in § 363, to mean
more than property of the estate, is confirmed by § 363(1), the very important
subsection that invalidates ipsofacto clauses:
Subject to the provisions of section 365, the trustee may use, sell, or
lease property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section, or a plan
under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title may provide for the use,
sale, or lease of property, notwithstanding any provision in a
contract, a lease, or applicable law that is conditioned on the
insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title concerning the debtor, or on the
appointment of or the taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian, and that effects, or gives an option to effect,
131 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1994) (emphasis added).

138 One could argue that using "property" in § 363(e), (J), (h), & (i) implies that property of the estate
means more than just the debtor's interest in property. See infra text accompanying note 201.
19 Id. § 363(h) (emphasis added). The important conditions are as follows:
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would realize significantly less for the
estate than sale of such property free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of co-owners outweighs
the detriment, if any, to such co-owners ....
Id. § 363(h).
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a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor's interest in
such property."4
Finally, two other subsections specifically implement the bundle of sticks
metaphor. Section 363(c)(2) prohibits the trustee from using cash collateral
unless "each entity that has an interest in the cash collateral consents or the
court after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use."''

Section 363(o)

provides: "In any hearing under this section ... (2) the entity asserting an
interest in property has the burden of proof on the issue of the validity,
priority, or extent of such interest."'42 Because Congress went to the trouble
of distinguishing between entities that have an interest in property, Congress
must not have intended that "interest of the debtor in property" in § 541(a)(1)
mean the interests of both the debtor and others in property.
Other important sections in the Code distinguish property of the estate and
the property item in which the estate has an interest. One is § 522, allowing
an individual debtor to exempt property from property of the estate.
Specifically, § 522 provides that an individual debtor, under the federal
exemptions, 143 may exempt "the debtor's interest" up to a specified amount in
specified property items, such as residential property, a motor vehicle, and
other personal property items.' 44 The lien avoidance provisions of this section
Id. § 363(1) (emphasis added).
141 Id. § 363(c)(2) ("The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this
subsection [authorizing use, sale or lease in the ordinary course of business by a trustee operating the
business ofthe debtor] unless (A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents: or (B) the
court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in accordance with the provisions of this
section."). This subsection, limiting the use of cash collateral, immediately follows subsection (c)(1),
authorizing ordinary course dealing with property of the estate, could support an argument that property of
the estate in subsection (c)(1) means more than the debtor's interest in property. To succeed, however, this
argument would have to elevate the placement of subsection (c)(2) immediately after subsection (c)(l) over
the specific language of"interest in property" in both subsection (c)(2) and § 541(a)(1).
142 Id. § 363(o) (emphasis added).
143 Section 522(b) allows the debtor to choose between the federal exemptions and the exemptions
created by state law, unless the state has provided that a debtor in bankiuptcy may choose only the state
exemptions. Id. § 522(b).
144 Id § 522(d). Section 522(d) provides:
140

The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(l) of this section:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $15,000 in value, in real property or
personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a
cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(2) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $2,400 in value, in one motor vehicle.
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $400 in value in any particular item or $8,000 in
aggregate value, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
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are also consistent Section 522(f) provides that "the debtor may avoid the
fixing of certain liens on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been
46
entitled.' 14' As the Supreme Court noted in Farreyv. Sanderfoot,"
the word

books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that areheld primarily for the personal,
family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $I,000 in value, in jewelry held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value, in any implements,
professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the
debtor.
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $8,000 less any amount of
property of the estate transferred in the manner specified in section 542(d) of this title, in
any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of, any unmatured life insurance
contract owned by the debtor under which the insured is the debtor or an individual of
whom the debtor is a dependent.
Id. § 522(d).
145 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994). Section 522() provides:
(0(1) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions but subject to paragraph (3), the debtor may
avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is-(A) a judicial lien, other than a judicial lien that secures [certain alimony or spouse or child
maintenance or support obligations]
(B) a nonpossessory, nonpurehase-money security interest in any(i) household fimishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,
crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or
household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,
(ii) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor or
(iii) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(2)(A) For the purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to
the extent that the sum of(i) the lien;
(ii) all other liens on the property; and
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the
property; exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the
absence of any liens.
(3) [In
certain other cases] the debtor may not avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor in property if the lien is. a nonpossessoy,
nonpurchase-money security interest in implements, professional books, or tools of the
trade of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor or farm animals or crops of the debtor or a
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"fixing" implies that this section requires a debtor to have an interest to which
the lien attached. 47 Moreover, the description of the liens that can be avoided
refers not to liens on "property of the debtor" but to liens on certain specific
property items."
Furthermore, § 522(f)(2), added in 1994, uses the § 541(a)(1) definition
consistently: it provides that a lien impairs an exemption to the extent that "the
sum of (i) the lien; (ii) all other liens on the property; and (iii) the amount of
the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens on the
property exceeds the value that 'the
49 debtor's interest in the property would
have in the absence of any liens.' 1
Two other significant sections are §§ 725 and 726, providing for the
disposition of property of the estate. Section 725 requires that "before final
distribution of property of the estate under § 726 of this title, the trustee, after
notice and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an entity other
than the estate has an interest, such as a lien," that has not already been
disposed of.'0 Section 726 then provides that "property of the estate shall be
distributed" in payment of administrative expenses and unsecured claims.,',
These two sections expressly implement the idea that property of the estate
only includes the debtor's interest in a property item or property interest.
Congress also used the bundle of sticks metaphor in other sections
governing property interests. For example, § 361 states "when adequate
protection is required under § 362, § 363, or § 364 of this title of an interest of
an entity in property," such adequate protection may be provided by various
means when there is a decrease in the value of "such entity's interest in such
property.,"" Section 362(b) provides that the automatic stay does not apply to
dependent of the debtor to the extent the value of such implements, professional books,
tools of the trade, animals, and crops exceeds $5,00t0.
Id. § 522(f) (emphasis added). See generally David Gray Carlson, Security Interests On Exempt Property
After the 1994 Amendments to the Bankrptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKL. INST. L REV. 57 (1996).
146 500)U.S. 291 (1991).
147 Id. at 296-97, 300. The terminology in § 522(f)(3), added in 1994, is also consistent with this
reading. See I1 U.S.C. § 522(0(3) (1994), amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103394, § 310(2), 108 Stat. 4106,4137-38 (1994), quoted supra note 145.
141 See II U.S.C. § 522(f)(l)(B), quoted supra note 145.
149 See Id. § 522(0(2) (emphasis added), amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103394, § 303(4), 108 Star. 4106,4132 (1994), quotedsupra note 145.
1'0 11 U.S.C. § 725 (emphasis added), quoted supra note 59.
151

Id. § 726.

152 Id. § 361(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Section 361 provides:
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"any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in
Sections
property" under certain circumstances or within certain times.'
362(d)5 4 and 362(05 also refer to protecting entities' interests in property.
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of an interest of
an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such entity,
to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section
363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in
the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such stay,
use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation allowable
under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, as will result in the
realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such
property.
Id. § 361 (emphasis added).
153 Id. § 362(b) (emphasis added). Section 362(b) provides:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title... does not operate as a stay-

(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the
perfection of, an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are
subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such act is
accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) ofthis title.

Id. § 362(b).

154 Section 362(d) provides:

On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the
stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying,
or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in
interest;
(3) with respect to a stay of an act against single asset real estate under subsection (a), by a
creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real estate, unless [certain conditions are
met, including the payment of interest] on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate.
Id. § 362(d) (emphasis added).
155 Section 362(t) provides:
Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall grant such relief
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable
damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before
there is an opportunity for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.
Id. § 362(f) (emphasis added).
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Most of the sections of the Code referring to property of the estate or the
terminology "interest in property" are consistent in referring only to the
interests of the debtor or some other entity.'56
In a few sections, however, Congress has confused the distinction between
an interest in a property item and the property item itself. For example, the
definition of secured claims initially follows the bundle of sticks metaphor but
then suggests that a secured creditor has an interest in property of the estate,
i.e., an interest in an interest of the debtor in property. Section 506(a) states:
"An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest [-a consistent usage--] is a secured claim to the extent
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property
...

.,,157

This definition is technically deficient. A secured creditor has a

security interest in a property item owned by the debtor and now by the
estate-a car or a home. The debtor has its equity interest in the property
item-the debtor's right (normally) to possess and to use the item as well as
the right to redeem the item from the secured debt. 5 ' The secured creditor
does not have an interest in the debtor's interest. The definition of property of
the estate excludes the secured creditor's security interest. Accordingly, consistency requires that the phrase "the estate's interest in" should be omitted, so
that the creditor has a secured claim "to the extent of such creditor's interest
in such property."
Other sections make the same mistake. Section 521(2), which was added
in 1984, provides that an individual debtor must take certain actions if the
debtor's "schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which are
secured by property of the estate."' 59 To preserve consistency, the clause
modifying "consumer debts" should read "which are secured by property in
which the estate has an ownership interest." A few other sections also
confuse the definition because they refer to a lienholder having an existing
interest in or lien on property of the estate. ° Again, these formulations are
156 See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text. The exceptions are discussed infra notes 157-71 and
accompanying text.
157 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
158 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
'59

11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1994), added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of

1984, Pub. L No. 98-353, § 305(3), 98 Stat. 333,352 (1984).

160 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (1994) (the court "may authorize the obtaining ofcredit or the incurring
of debt- ... (2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not otherwise subject to a lien; or (3)
secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien") (emphasis added); Id.
§ 1129(aX7)(B) (emphasis added) (specifying as a requirement for confirming a chapter 11 plan that holders
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inconsistent with § 541(a)(1), because the debtor's interest excludes the
lienholder's interest.
One way to reconcile the inconsistency of §§ 506(a) and 521(2) would be
to treat the "interest of the debtor in property" in § 541(a)(1) as including the
security interest of the holder of the lien. This interpretation reflects the
second class status to which the contemporary legal culture assigns security
interests.'' Indeed, the drafting of the inconsistent sections probably reflects
this second class status.
The difficulty with this interpretation is that there is nothing in the
definition of property of the estate in § 541(a)(1) and in other implementing
sections, such as § 541(d), to support this interpretation. This interpretation
requires a conclusion that the few, scattered inconsistent provisions amend by
implication the simple and direct language of § 541(a)(1) that defines property
of the estate. This is not a reasonable interpretation."'
Moreover, in the specific context of exempt property, this interpretation
would contradict the intent of Congress that only the value of the debtor's
interest in exempt property-the value of the debtor's equity-could be
exempted under the federal exemptions. Thus, if a debtor owns a car worth
$10,000, subject to a security interest securing an $8,000 debt, only $2,000 is
exempt under the federal exemptions even though the federal exemption
authorizes an exemption of up to $2,4002 6' The Supreme Court addressed this
point in Owen v. Owen:' 64
Section 522(b) provides that the debtor may exempt certain property
"from property of the estate"; obviously, then, an interest that is not
possessed by the estate cannot be exempted. Thus, if a debtor holds
only bare legal title to his house-if, for example, the house is
subject to a purchase-money mortgage for its full value-then only
of claims of a certain class receive under the plan property having a value of not less than the "value of such
holder's interest in the estate's interest in the property that secures such claims."); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(I1) (a
plan is fair and equitable if the plan provides that each holder of a claim receive deferred cash payments at
least equal to the value of such holder's "interest in the estate's interest in such property.") (emphasis added).
'6' See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute PriorityAfter Ahlers, 87 MIcH. L REV. 963, 989-90 (1989);
Mary Josephine Newbom, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobelman, and the Decline of
Priority,25 Aiz. ST. LJ. 547,556 n.26, 581 (1993); James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors'
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy
Clause, 96 HARV. L REV. 973, 988-94 (1983).
162 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUThS AND STATUTORY CONSTRucroN § 51.01, at 118 (5th ed. 1992).
163 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (1994), quoted supra note 144.
164 500U.S. 305 (1991).
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that legal interest passes to the estate; the equitable interest remains
with the mortgage holder, [11 U.S.C.] § 541(d). And since the
equitable interest does not pass to the estate, neither can it pass to
the debtor as an exempt interest in property. Legal title will pass,
and can be the subject of an exemption; but the property will remain
subject to the lien interest of the mortgage holder.
The redemption provision, § 722, resembles the confusion in the exemption sections. This section states:
An individual debtor may ...redeem tangible personal properly
intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a
lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is
exempted under section 522 of this title or has been abandoned
under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the
amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured
by such lienas
The first "property" suggests that the debtor may redeem a property item. The
second "property," however, requires that the property be exempted under
§ 522. One way to interpret this is to say that the debtor could redeem the
entire property item only if the entire property item were exempt. However,
the federal exemptions under § 522(d) allow exemption of the debtor's
interests in specific property items up to a certain amount. Accordingly, this
interpretation would limit the redemption right, which is already limited to
consumer goods securing consumer debt, more than the exemption right. This
is an unlikely intent.
Instead, it appears that Congress intended the debtor to be able to redeem
the entire property item if it met the criteria of the section. t67 This interpretation more accurately reflects the use of the word "redeem." To redeem a
property item means to extinguish the secured party's security interest in the
property item in which the debtor has an equity interest by paying the secured
creditor the amount of the debt outside of bankruptcy"as or the amount of the
165 Id. at 318419. The Court noted that survival of a lien was the rule of Long v.Bullard, 117 U.S. 617
(1886), which was codified in § 522. "Only where the Code empowers the court to avoid liens or transfers
can an interest originally not within the estate be passed to the estate, and subsequently (through the claim of
an exemption) to the debtor." Owen, 500 U.S. at 309.
166 1 U.S.C. § 722 (1994) (emphasis added).
167 See David Gray Carlson, Redemption and Reinstatement in Chapter 7 Cases, 4 AM. BANMKR
INST. L
REv.289, 293 (1996).
16 U.C.C. § 9-506 (1995). Under state law, the secured party is also entitled to the expenses reasonably
incurred by the secured party. See id. Typically, the security arrangement would also provide that such
expenses become part of the secured obligation. See id. The definition of "redeem" also reflects the property
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allowed secured claim in bankruptcy. If so, the phrase in § 722 that reads "if
such property is exempted under section 52T' should read "if the debtor's
interest in suchproperty is exempted under section 522."
The occasional confusion in the Code exhibited by the sections discussed
above extends to more than the interest of a holder of a lien on property.
Subsection 1123(a)(5) provides that a plan of reorganization must provide
adequate means for the plan's implementation, such as "sale of all or any part
of the property of the estate, either subject to or free of any lien, or the
distribution of all or any part of the property of the estate among those having
an interest in such property of the estate."'"6
One could construe this
subsection to be consistent with the definition of property of the estate if it
referred only to interests of third parties created after the filing of a petition,
such as a postpetition security interest. A postpetition security interest in a
property item owned free and clear by the debtor at the time of the filing
would be an interest in property of the estate. Congress, however, probably
intended a broader interpretation, similar to that found in § 725.171 If so, this
subsection would incorrectly contemplate that property of the estate is
property in which the debtor has an interest, and in which others-including a
lienholder, a lessee, a lessor, or a holder of an option-may have interests.'
Again, this subsection directly conflicts with the express language of
§ 541(a)(1) and the many other provisions that differentiate between property
in which the debtor has an interest and the debtor's interest in property.
The sensible way to interpret these few conflicting sections is to
acknowledge them as drafting errors. Liens and other interests of non-debtors
may be interests in property in which the estate or the debtor has an interest,
but they are not interests in property of the estate or property of the debtor.
Given the complexity of the Code, it should be no surprise that there are in
fact inconsistencies. These inconsistencies do not detract from the overall
dominance of the bundle of sticks metaphor requiring the identification of
ambiguity confusing the property thing with the property interest. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HousE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1615 (2d ed. unabr. 1987), which defines "redeem" to mean both
"to buy or pay off. to clear by payment: to redeem a mortgage" and "to recover (something pledged or
mortgaged) by payment or other satisfaction: to redeem a pawned watch."
169 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (emphasis added).

170 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
171Section 1222 contains the same mistake. 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(8) (the plan may "provide for the sale
ofall or any part ofthe property of the estate or the distribution of all or any part of the property of the estate
among those having an interest in such property").
172 See supra notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
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specific property interests. They certainly give no basis for the Supreme
Court's disregard for
73 the definition of property of the estate in United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc.
III. BREAKING THE BOUNDARIES: THE COURT'S DECISION IN WHITING POOLS
The Supreme Court first analyzed property of the estate under the
Bankruptcy Code in Whiting Pools. The Court's decision is one of the most
troubling decisions in bankruptcy. It ignored the precise language of the Code
that controlled the case, it created the potential for destroying the already
broad statutory boundary for determining property of the bankruptcy estate,
and it offered no analytical basis for solving this or other issues of property
under the Code.
Whiting Pools, Inc., sold, installed, and serviced swimming pools and
related equipment and supplies. Having failed after assessment and demand
to pay approximately $92,000 in federal income taxes and Federal Insurance
Contribution Act taxes withheld from employees, its property became subject
to a lien under the Federal Tax Lien Act.74 On January 14, 1981, the IRS
seized7 all of Whiting Pools' personal property. The next day Whiting Pools
filed a chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. 76 The IRS then sought permission
from the bankruptcy court to sell the seized goods in its possession. 7 7 Whiting
Pools as debtor in possession counterclaimed for an order pursuant to § 542 of
the Bankruptcy Code'7 8 requiring the IRS to return the seized goods to the
debtor in possession to enable it to reorganize. 71
173 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
174 Pub. L No. 89-719, § 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6334 (1994). Section 6321 provides: "If any person liable
to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the

United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal belonging to such person."
175

I.

176

11 U.S.C. §§ 11t1-i146 (Supp. V 1981).

§ 6331.

177 The IRS sought a declaration that the automatic stay of§ 362 of the Bankruptcy Code did not apply,
and in the alternative, relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d). See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 200-01.
178 11 U.S.C. § 54 2(a) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in
possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease
under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall
deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.
Id. § 542(a).
179 Whiting Pools,462 U.S. at 200-01.
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The bankruptcy court refused to lift the stay. Further, finding that the
goods had a liquidation value of $35,000"8o and a going concern value of
$163,876,' the bankruptcy court ordered the IRS to return the seized goods,
not under § 542(a) but under § 543(b). 2 The district court reversed and held
that neither section required the IRS to return the seized goods.'83 The court of
appeals reversed the district court and held that § 742(a) required the
requested return of the goods.'" This holding conflicted with the decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Cross Electric Co.
v'. UnitedStates1

A. 7he Court'sReading of the Statute
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Court first addressed the statutory
framework. It correctly noted that the IRS "holds a secured interest in
Whiting's property.""" It then noted that § 542(a) required the return of7
and (c).1
property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under § 363(b)
Pursuant to § 363(b) and (c), the trustee may use, sell, or lease "property of
the estate," the main component of which are the "interests of the debtor in
property."'' 8
180 Liquidation value is the value that the property likely would have sold for at a foreclosure sale. See
David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standards in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 13 BANKR.DEV. . 1,
2 (1996).
181 Going concern value is the value of the property items to the business as a going concern, measured
by what someone would pay for the business or, in the case of inventory, the present value of the future sales.
See Id. at 2-3.
112 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 201. 11 U.S.C. § 543(b) provides:
(b) A custodian shall-(1) deliver to the trustee any property of the debtor held by or transferred to such custodian,
or proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property, that is in such custodian's
possession, custody, or control on the date that such custodian acquires knowledge of the
commencement of the case; and
(2) file an accounting of any property of the debtor, or proceeds, product, offspring, rents,
or profits of such property, that, at any time, came into the possession, custody, or control
of such custodian.
Id. § 543(b).
183 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 202.
184 Seeid.

185 664 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1981).
186 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 202.
87 See id. at 202-03.
188 The Court referred specifically to a sale of"property of the estate" under subsections (b) and (c). Id.
at 203. Section 542(a) refers to § 363. Section 363(t) also authorizes the trustee to sell "property," which has
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Under the plain reading of the statute laid out by the Court, the IRS was
required to return not the seized goods owned by Whiting Pools but the

"interests of [Whiting Pools] in property" that the trustee or a debtor in
possession could use, sell, or lease. Because the IRS seized the goods to sell
them to satisfy its lien, Whiting Pools' "interests" contained three elements:'89
(1) its right to any surplus 90 if the IRS sold the goods for more than the

amount of the lien-an unlikely event because the amount of the lien was
$92,000 and the liquidation value of the goods was $35,000; (2) its right to
redeem the IRS's lien on the goods by paying the amount of taxes due$92,000; 191 and (3) its right to notice of the foreclosure sale.'92
The Court faced a dilemma. The Court believed that Congress intended
that a property item seized by a secured creditor, but not yet sold, and hence
still owned by the debtor, should be returned to a debtor who was attempting
to reorganize. Unfortunately, the precise language in § 542(a) does not
accomplish this alleged intention. Under the language of the statute, which

embodies the bundle of sticks metaphor, the IRS was at most obligated to
return to Whiting Pools its interests in property over which the IRS had
possession, custody, or control. 93 Whiting Pools and not the IRS had
possession, custody, or control over its right to redeem the seized goods, its
right to notice, and its right to an unlikely surplus. The IRS was not in
possession, custody, or control of any rights of Whiting Pools. Under
was not entitled to the return of anything, let alone the
§ 542(a), Whiting
94 Pools
seized goods.
a broader meaning than property of the estate, if the conditions of that subsection are met. See supra note
130 and accompanying quote and infra note 254 and accompanying text. That subsection was not applicable
in Whiting Pools because the debtor in possession wanted return of the goods for use and not sale, and the
conditions of that subsection, such as having sufficient proceeds to satisfy the lien, could not be satisfied.
See supranote 132 and accompanying text.
I"
The rights that Whiting Pools retained constitute a single property interest that is generally
summaized in the expression of its "residual" interest or its "equity" interest. This interest may be sold; this
interest is exclusive to Whiting Pools as the owner of the property items; and this interest may have value.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Whether any separate right itself---eithcr the ight to redeem or
the ight to any surplus-would be a separate property interest is not an issue in this case or in this Article.
190 See 26 U.S.C. § 6342(b) (1994).
t9' See id. § 6337(a).
192 See Id. § 6335(b).
193 In a colloquial sense, one could think that the IRS had control over the eight to redeem. By selling
the goods, the IRS would terminate the ight to redeem. This control, however, is not control of a separate
property interest; it only defines the property interest. The ight to redeem the IRS's lien on the goods is
controlled by Whiting Pools until the IRS sells the goods. See Infra text accompanying notes 303-07 and
315.
194 This interpretation does not make § 542(a) meaningless. See Infra text accompanying notes 245-54.
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Another possible argument supporting the presumed Congressional intent
would be to interpret the phrase "interests of the debtor in property" for
purposes of § 541(a)(1) to mean the debtor's ownership interest in the
property, the debtor's title. The Court correctly pointed out that the seized
goods in the hands of the IRS were previously owned by the debtor Whiting
Pools and then by the estate t9S The seizure of the goods by the IRS did not
transfer ownership to the IRS."" The IRS's interest in the seized goods was
limited to the value of its lien. 9 7 The Federal Tax Lien Act considers the
taxpayer whose property has been seized to be the owner of the property until
it is sold to a third party.9 8 The right of the defaulting taxpayer under the
Federal Tax Lien Act to a surplus after the sale of seized goods, like the right
of any borrower to surplus after a secured party has foreclosed upon his
security interest, is an important feature of ownership.'99
This analysis resembles a gross lump concept analysis. Because the estate
is the "owner" of the goods, the goods are therefore property of the estate.20'
If either § 542(a) or § 541(a)(1) spoke in terms of "property of the debtor," the
ambiguity in the term "property"--is it the "property interest" or the "property
item"?-would allow a court to use this analysis. The bundle of sticks
terminology in § 541(a)(1)--'interests of the debtor in property"-precludes
this solution. Whiting Pools had undoubtedly been the owner of the goods,
but the remedies that nonbankruptcy law made available to the IRS severely
curtailed Whiting Pools' ownership interests. Furthermore, the IRS was not in
"possession, custody, or control" of Whiting Pools' ownership interest. What
Whiting Pools wanted was the return of possession of the specific goods and
neither § 542 nor § 541 provides for that return.
How did the Court read a statute that requires a return of an "interest of the
debtor in property" to require a return of the goods themselves? By
dismissing the statutory language. "Although [§§ 542(a), 363(b) and (c), and
542(a)(1)] could be read to limit the estate to those 'interests of the debtor in
property' at the time of the filing of the petition, we view them as a definition
of what is included in the estate, rather than as a limitation.'

195 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 209-11.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 211).

198 See id. at 211 & n.19 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) & (b)).
199 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1995).
200 See supra note 35.

201 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203.
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This statement is wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation. Section
541(a) states that the bankruptcy estate "is comprised of' a number of items,
one of which is "all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property." The definition of "comprise" is "to include or contain"; "to consist
of, be composed of'; or "to form or constitute."2' m Although "include" is one
definition, most authorities consider the word "comprise" to limit a particular
limiting.2 03
thing to the listed elements, and the word "include" not to be so
Furthermore, the definition of "to be comprised of' is "to consist of; be
composed of' and is less susceptible to the meaning "to be included.2 04
The word "comprise" and the phrase "is comprised of' appear only in
§ 541(a)(1) of the Code. Nevertheless, the drafters were very careful in other
sections to designate those concepts that were not limited. For example, the
"insider" "includes" certain enumerated entities, like
definition ' 2of
"relatives, 5 but this definition leaves open the possibility that other entities
2
" Other defined terms using
not listed, like a girlfriend, may also be insidersY.
'2
the "includes" formulation are "corporation, 7 "entity, 20 4 "farming opera202 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 421 (2d cd. unabr. 1987); see also THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 745 (1933): WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 467 (1976) ("comprise" means "to include esp. within a particular scope: sum up:

[clover, [c]ontain... to consist of. be made up of... to make up: [c]onstitute").
203 See THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN, THE CAREFUL WRITER; A MODERN GUIDE TO ENGLISH USAGE 228
(1965) ("The word include, however, usually suggests that the component items are not being mentioned in
their entirety. If all [of the component items] are being mentioned, it would be better to write... 'were'; or,
if there is an irresistible urge for a fancy word, to use comprised.") (emphasis added); BERGEN EVANS &
CORNELIA EVANS, A DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN USAGE 110-111 (1957) ("It is better to use
comprise when all of the constituent parts are enumerated or referred to and to use include when only some of
them are.") (emphasis added); H.W. FOWLER, JR., MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 275 (Ernest Gowers ed., 2d cd.
1965) ('[Tlhe distinction in meaning between [include and comprise] seems to be that comprise is
appropriate when what is in question is the content of the whole, and Include when it is the admission or
presence of an item. With include, there is no presumption.., that all or even most of the components are
mentioned; with comprise, the whole of them are understood to be in the list.") (emphasis added); THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 202, at 967 ("To include is to contain
as a part
or member, or among the parts and members, of a whole: The list includes many new names... To
comprise is to consist of,as the various paris serving to make up the whole: This genus comprises 50
species.") (emphasis added).
204

THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 202, at 421.

205 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(31) (1994) (listing relatives, related partnerships. general partners, related corpomtions, director, officers, persons in control, elected officials, affiliates, and managing agents).
206 Gennet v. Docktor (In re Levy), 185 B.R. 378, 384-85 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995); Freund v. Heath (In re
Melver), 177 B.R. 366,370 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995).
207 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1994). The term "corporation":
(A) includes (i) association having a power or privilege that a private corporation, but not an
individual or a partnership, possesses; (ii) partnership association organized under a law that
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tion," 2° "person," 210 "security, 21' "State,, 212 and "United States., 213 2 In
14 addilimiting.
not
are
'including'
and
'includes'
that
states
102(1)
§
tion,
When the drafters intended that a definition be limiting, they used the term
"means" in the definitions.2 '5 The word "means" does not fit easily in
§ 541(a). A statement that the bankruptcy estate "means all of the following"
does not work well. On the other hand, if the drafters had intended that the
enumerated items in § 541(a) not be limiting, the word "includes" does fit
easily. The sentence would read: "such estate includes all of the following."
The use of the words "is comprised of'more strongly suggests Congress's
intent to limit the bankruptcy estate to the enumerated items in § 541(a). This
interpretation fits the context as well. It is hard to imagine a broader
definition for property of the estate than "all of the legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. ' 216 What else
could there be? The interests of the debtor's neighbor in property at the
commencement of the case? I would think not217 If this language is not
limiting, then there is no limit to property of the estate. Under the Court's
statement that this definition is not limiting, no buyer of a property interest
could ever be assured that she would acquire the property interest free of the
bankruptcy risk of the seller. 8 This risk would reduce either the price that
makes only the capital subscribed responsible for the debts of such association; (iii) joint-stock
company; (iv) unincorporated company or association; or (v) business trust. but (B) does not
include limited partnership.
Id. § 101(9)(A).
208 Id. § 101(15).
209 Id. § 101(21).
210 Id. § 101(41).

211 Id. § 101(49).
212 Id. § 101(52).
213 Ird. § 101(55).
214 Id. § 102(3).
215 See, e.g., Id. § 101(12) ("'debt' means liability on a claim).
216 Id. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added), quoted supra note 114.
217 See, e.g., In re Mills, 41 B.R. 849 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1984). In this case, the debtors, husband and
for their children pursuant to a property settlement
person in trust
wife, had transferred their home to a third
allowing the wife to reside there with her children. After a judgment, creditor sought to revive a judicial lien
that had attached to the home, the debtors filed a bankruptcy petition and sought to claim the house as
exempt property under § 522 and avoid the lien under § 522(f). The court denied this maneuver because the
home was not property of the estate.
218 The Court did recognize that the sale
by the IRS "may" have removed the goods from property of the
estate. United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983). This provides less comfort in view of
note 391 and accompanying text, and the
reliance by later courts on the "not limiting" language, see infra
rejection by later courts of the Court's attempt to limit its holding in Whiting Pools to its specific fact pattern:
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buyers would pay or the willingness of buyers to buy. This risk would
diminish sellers' ability to sell their property. Further, because no one can
generally convey a greater interest than she has,2 19 the risk of recapture by a

bankruptcy trustee exists for each seller in a chain of resales. These results
would reverse the centuries long trend toward increasing, not decreasing, the
freedom of alienation of property.220
The Court attempted to justify its "not a limitation" statement in several
ways. It stated in a footnote that § 541(a)(1) "speaks in terms of the debtors
'interests... in property,' rather than property in which the debtor has an
interest, but this choice of language was not meant to limit the expansive
scope of the section." 22' This statement absolutely contradicts the definition of
property of the estate.
Moreover, the Court did not give any reason ior this conclusion. It merely
explained that "Congress intended to exclude from the estate property of
others in which the debtor had some minor interest such as a lien or bare legal
' That statement is not quite
title."222
right. It confuses the property item with
the debtor's property interests. As demonstrated by § 541(a)(1) and a host of
other sections,2 Congress intended to exclude from property of the estate
property interests of third parties regardless of the significance of the interest
that the debtor retained. If the debtor is a lessee, property of the estate does
a reorganizing debtor seeking the return of goods possessed by a creditor because of foreclosure and not for
purposes of perfection, see infra note 341 and accompanying text. Further, David Carlson argues that
Whiting Pools undcnines the legal foundation of the entire securitization industry. Carlson, Rotten
Foundations,supranote 77.
219 See John F. Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework:Conveyancing Principlesand PropertyInterests, 59 B.U.
L REV. 811, 812-13 (1979); David Friseh,Buyer Status Underthe U.C.C.:A Suggested Temporal Definition,
72 IowA L REa. 531, 531 (1987); Steven L Harris, Using Fundamental Principlesof Commercial Law to
Decide UCC Cases, 26 Loy. LA. L REv. 637, 639 (1993).
220 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 29-33, § 2.15, at 77-79, § 3.21, at 141-43 (real property
interests); GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (Vol. 1) §§ 7.3-7.12, at 200-49
(1965) (assignability ofchoses in actions); Steven L Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based
Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L REV. 2021, 2047-53 (1994); see
alsoU.C.C. §§ 2-210(2), 9-318 (1995) (abrogating limitations on assignment ofrights to damages for breach
of contract or accounts or pledging of gecral intangibles for money due).
221 WhitingPools, 462 U.S. at 204 n.8.
222 Id. The Court cited specific statements in the legislative history relating to these minor interests. The
Court continued: "These statements do not limit the ability of a trustee to regain possession of property in
which the debtor had equitable as well as legal title." Id. Having knocked down this strawnman, however, the
Court could not point to any statement to support the trustee's ability to regain possession of property items
from a levying creditor. See id.
223 See supra notes 127-55 and accompanying text. See also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF
BANKPrcy276-78 (1997).
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not include the lessor's reversionary interest. If the debtor is a co-owner of
property, the co-owner's joint interest is not part of the property of the
estate.224 If the debtor had a lien on a property item, this lien becomes
property of the estate.2' If the debtor had bare legal title, say as a trustee, then
that limited interest is the property of the estate.a6
The Court also relied on the fact that other clauses of § 541(a) bring into
the bankruptcy estate property interests that the debtor did not have as of the
commencement of the case.227 This, however, proves too much. The Code

expressly authorizes each instance in which property interests may become
part of the estate after the commencement of the case. That prepetition
transfers of property may be added to the estate after the commencement of
the case-whether through avoiding unperfected, preferential, and fraudulent
transfers 22 -- does not make § 541(a) a black hole, 229 drawing into the estate
property interests not held by the debtor at the commencement of the case.
At one point, the Court paraphrased § 542 as requiring "an entity (other
than a custodian) holding any property of the debtor that the trustee can use
under § 363 to turn that property over to the trustee." 0 This paraphrase
subtly changes the issue. "Property of the debtor" interjects the "property"
ambiguity. 23' Is "property of the debtor" the property interests owned by the
224 The only exception forjointly owned property is ItU.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (1994) (property ofthe estate
includes interests of debtor and debtor's spouce in certain community property), quotedsupra note 114.
225 Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Bibo, Inc. (In re Bibo, Inc.), 200 B.R. 348, 350-51 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1996), vacatedas moot,139 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1998) (appeal of senior lienholder, whose attempt to foreclose
a mortgage lien had been stayed on grounds that foreclosure of debtor's junior lien was exercising control
over property of the estate, dismissed at senior lienholder's request because its lien had been satisfied);
Farmers Bank v. March (In re March), 140 B.R. 387, 388 (E.D. Va. 1992), afl'd, 988 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.
1993).
226 Missouri v. U.S. Bankr. Court for E.D. ofArk., 647 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1981).
227 Whiting Pools,462 U.S. at 205.
221 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3), quoted supra note 114. Section 541(a)(3) refers to property recovered
under § 550. Section 550 requires the return of property transferred if the transfer of the property has been
avoided under several sections of the Code, including unperfected, preferential, and fraudulent transfers
avoided under §§ 544, 547, or 549. Id. § 550. See also id. § 541(a)(4), quoted supra note 114, which
includes in property of the estate any interest in property preserved for the benefit of the estate under § 551.
Section 551 preserves for the benefit of the estate any transfers avoided under several sections of the Code,
including unperfected, preferential, and fraudulent transfers avoided under §§ 544, 547, and 548. Id. at 551.
229 A black hole is a body of extremely intense gravity from which nothing, not even light, can escape,
which can be formed by the death of a massive star.
See Freeman J.Dyson, Butterflies and Supersttings, in
THE WORLD TREASURY OF PHYSICS, ASTRONOMY, AND MATHEMATICS 128, 132-34 (Timothy Ferris ed.
1991); John Archibald Wheeler, Albert Einstein,in WoRLD TREASURY, supra, 563, 571.
230 Whiting Pools,462 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added).
231 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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debtor-that is, Whiting Pools' right to surplus, redemption, and notice-or
the property items owned by the debtor-that is, the seized goods? "Property
of the debtor" would permit the Court to exploit the ambiguity and order the
return of "the property." 2 The statute, however, is not ambiguous on this
point. It speaks of the debtor's "interest in property."
To support this statement, the Court cited the House Report: "[T]he estate
includes 'property recovered by the trustee under Section 542 . . . , if the
property recovered was merely out of the possession of the debtor, yet
remained "property of the debtor."""2 33 This statement, however, does not
support a shift from "interest of the debtor in property" to "property of the
debtor" because the House Report talks about property of the estate which is
out of possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case. Moreover,
the statement in the House Report does not address why the "property of the
estate" may be out of possession of the debtor or what Congress may have
intended § 542 to do.
Finally, the court hints at, but does not develop, an accepted mode of
statutory analysis to solve the Court's dilemma. In concluding its discussion
of the legislative history, the Court stated: "In effect, § 542(a) grants to the
estate a possessory interest in certain property of the debtor that was not held
'
by the debtor at the commencement of reorganization proceedings."
Section 542(a) does no such thing, but the Court supports this conclusion by
stating in a footnote: "Indeed, if this were not the effect, § 542(a) would be
largely superfluous in light of § 541(a)(1)."2" The Court left unstated the
punch line: Congress must have intended § 542(a) to require a secured
creditor to return possession of seized goods to the trustee, because otherwise
the section would serve no purpose.
Under the plain language of § 542(a), the trustee would be entitled to the
return of property interests out of possession of the estate during the case to
which the estate had a right of possession. Ignoring the specific legislative

232 In Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1950), the court of appeals
used this kind of analysis to hold that a provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 governing "property of' the
debtor authorized a plan requiring a secured creditor to return property items in the secured creditor's
possession. See infra note 267.

233 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 205 n.1 I (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted In 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323).
234 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207.
235 Id. at 207 n.15.
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history for this section, 2 6 one could interpret it to apply to property interests
out of the possession of the debtor before the filing of a petition to which the
debtor had a right to possession. Three obvious examples would be a
bailment,2 7 a conversion of property, 23 and possession of property by a cotenant when the debtor as co-tenant also had a right to possess.29 Technically,
under § 541(a)(1), the right of the debtor to obtain possession from a bailee,240
a person who had converted property interests, 24' or a co-tenant would pass to
the estate, and the trustee could enforce those rights without § 542(a). Hence,
one could argue that, under this interpretation, § 542(a) is superfluous. If so,
the rule of statutory construction that the legislature does not intend words to
be "surplusage 242 implies that Congress must have intended § 542(a) to reach
more than property of the estate.
This argument fails. The presumed legislative abhorrence of surplusage
does not apply when one part of a statute is a specific application of a general
principle set forth in another part of the statute. The reason is the well
founded suspicion, based on the past experience of lawyers and legislatures,
that courts will fail to apply correctly a general principle to a specific
236 See Infra text accompanying notes 277-79.
237 See, e.g., Boyer v. Cadton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. (In re USA Diversified
Prods., Inc.), 100 F.3d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1996) (retainer paid prepetition to law fir, which did not claim
entitlement to funds, was property of the estate in the custody of law firm and thus subject to turnover).
238 See, e.g., Miller v. Kasden (In re Kasden), 209 B.R. 239 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (court properly
ordered the debtor who, in chapter 7 case, concealed property items from the trustee that were property of the
estate to return the property items to the trustee); Pester Ref Co. v. Mapco Gas Prods., Inc. (In re Pester Ref
Co.), 845 F.2d 1476, 1480 (8th Cir. 1988) (natural gas liquids that were owned by debtor, held by agent for
debtor, and converted by agent at direction of unpaid seller were subject to turnover); In re Norris, 183 B.L
437, 463 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1995) (requiring individual debtor in involuntary chapter 7 case to return to
trustee $490,000 in currency representing moneys that debtor misappropriated from former law firm); Road
Patch Sers., Inc., v. Carapico (In re Road Patch Servs., Inc.), 154 B.R. 869 (Bankr.E.D. Pa. 1993) (ordering
return by lessor to chapter 7 trustee of property items owned by chapter 7 debtor but in possession of lessee
(another entity) and seized by lessorbecause oflessee's default); Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc., v.
Auto-Use (In re Tel-A-Communications Consultants, Inc.), 50 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (debtor's
leasehold interest in leased automobile repossessed by lessor postpetition in violation of automatic stay was
property of the estate, and debtor had right to turnover, subject to providing adequate protection).
239 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 5.8, at 211-15.
240 See, e.g.. Arens v. Boughton (In re Prudhomme), 43 F.3d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding,
without referring to 11 U.S.C. § 542(a), that because under state law an unearned retainer paid to attorneys
remain client funds, an attorney receiving a prepetition retainer was obligated to return the retainer to the
bankruptcy trustee as property of the estate).
241 See, e.g., Chapes, Ld. v. Anderson (In re Scaife), 825 F.2d 357, 361-62 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding,
without referring to I1 U.S.C. § 542(a), that a trustee could sue for damages for conversion of a ring).
242 2A NORMAN . SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 119, § 46.07, at 127
(5th cd. 1992).
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situation.2 43 Accordingly, when the legislature thinks of a specific application,
it will not hesitate to address it in the statute.2"

Section 542(b) is an uncontroversial example. That subsection requires
any person owing a debt to the debtor to pay it to the trustee. 45

Under

§ 541(a)(1), § 542(b) is redundant. A debt owed to the debtor is a property
interest, and under § 541(a)(1) the trustee as the holder of property of the
estate can enforce this property interest.2 46 Section 542(b) is not necessary to
effectuate the property interest.2 47 Another blatant example of specific
"superfluous" statutory language implementing the general principal of
§ 541(a)(1) is § 541(d). Section 541(d) repeats the obvious point that, if the
debtor held only the legal title to and not an equitable interest in property, the
property of the estate includes only the legal title and not the equitable
interest249 Other examples include the special powers of appointment in
243 Similarly, when lawyers become aware ofan issue in a transaction, they will draft a specific provision
in the governing documents to deal with the issue instead of relying on more general language in the
documents. Ifthey failed to do so, they might be liable for malpractice.
244 In addition to the examples discussed in the following text, Congress has dictated other specific
applications ofgcneral principles in several sections ofthe Code. For example, in 1988, a bankruptcy court
held, correctly, that a college's accreditation status was not property of college's bankruptcy estate, and
withdrawal of accreditation by the educational association did not violate automatic stay ofactions to control
property ofthe estate. See Nasson College v. NE. Assoc. of Schools & Colleges (In re Nasson College), 80
B.R. 610. (Bankr. D. Me. 1988). Nevertheless, in 1990 Congress added § 541(b)(3) to the Code, expressly
excluding a college's accreditation status from property ofthe estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3) (1994), enacted
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-508, § 3007(a)(2), 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-28 (19910).
245 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994):
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity that owes a debt that is
property ofthe estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such
debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to the extent that such debt may be offset under
section 553 of this title against a claim against the debtor.
246 See. e.g., Affiliated Computer Sys., Inc. v. Sherman (In re Kemp), 52 F.3d 546, 550-54 (5th Cir.
1995) (requiring an obligor on a debt to repay under § 541(a)(1) and § 542(a), and not citing § 542(b)).
247 One could object to this point by noting that this subsection contains limitations on the obligation of
the entity owing the debt to pay. These limitations, however, could have been adopted in § 542 without
restating the command that the entity owing the debt "shall pay." In addition, such an objection would not
distinguish § 542(a) because it too contains limitations.
241 1 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1994):
(d) Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only legal title and
not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real property, or an interest in such a
mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise
the servicing of such mortgage or interest, becomes property ofthe estate under subsection (a)(1)
or(2) of this section only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the
extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.
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§ 541(b)(1) 249 and the interest of a lessee in a terminated lease of
nonresidential real property under § 541(b)(2)5 0 Accordingly, § 542(a)
implements the general rule of § 541(a)(1) in the specific case of property in
the possession of a third party when the debtor has a right to possession. For
this reason, § 542(a) is not surplusage.
In addition, the particular history of the Code and the Bankruptcy Act of
1898 provides another reason why Congress included § 542 notwithstanding
the general principle of § 541(a)(1). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, to
enforce its rights as successor to the interests of the debtor, such as the right to
the return of possession of goods in the hands of a bailee or converter or the
right to payment of a debt, the referee, later renamed the trustee, had to resort
to state courts. 2 Under the Bankruptcy Code, it was intended that the trustee
could bring such actions in the bankruptcy courts. 2 2 The provisions of

This section specifically mentions mortgage servicers who retain legal title. Apparently, no amount of
assurance about the proper interpretation of§ 541(a)(1) could give those legislators looking alter the interests
of mortgage servicers enough comfort for them not to insist on specific language. Other specific provisions,
such as a subsection excluding withholding taxes from property of the estate and a subsection giving the
estate all of the defenses that the debtor had, had been included in the Senate bill, see S. 2266, 95th Cong.,
§ 541(b)(3), (d), at 424, 425 (as reported by Mr. Long of the Committee on Finance on August 10, 1978),
which was amended into H.R. 8200. Apparently, the assurances of the members of the House were sufficient
to convince the Senate to agree to their elimination because these provisions were not included in the final
version of the bill that became the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. H 1978), enacted by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, § 541, 92 Stat. 2549, 2594-95 (1978).
249 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1994). See Shurley v. Texas Commerce Bank (In re Shurley), 115 F.3d 333,
338-39, 343 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 444 (1997); see also Marie Rolling-Tarbox, Note,
Powers ofAppointment Underthe Bankruptcy Code: A Focus on General Testamentary Powers, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 10141, 1042-53 (1987).
250 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(2). See, e.g., Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc. v. Paradise Village Inv. Co. (In re
Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc.), 893 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1990) (unexpired leasehold interest is "property of
estate," which debtor may assume or reject, only if debtor is lessee of property at time that bankruptcy
petition is filed); Erickson v. Polk, 921 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1990). Congress added this subsection in 1984.
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 363(a), 98 Stat. 333,
363 (1984); see also Kipp v. Depoy (In re Depoy), 29 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (holding that a
residential lease (which is not covered by § 541(b)(2)) that terminates is not property of the estate).
251 See H.L REP. No. 95-595, at 43-48 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6004-09;
BANKRupTcyCoMMIssiON REPORT, supra note 100, pt. 1,at 88-91.
252 See ILR. REP. No. 95-595, at 48-52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6010-14;
BANKRUPTCy COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 100, pt. 1, at 90-91. This intention was implemented by the
creation of independent bankruptcy courts with broad jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under the
Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related to ca.es under the Bankruptcy Code. Pub. L No.95-598, §§ 201(a),
241, 92 Stat. 2549,2657, 2668-71, codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 1471-82 (Supp. 1 1978). Following
NorhernPipeline Construction Co. v. MarathonPipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). which struck down the
broad jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy judges who did not have the status ofjudges under U.S. CONsT. art.
HI, § 1, this intention is now implemented by bankruptcy courts that are adjuncts to United States District
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§ 542(a) and (b) that implement § 541(a)(1) remove doubt about Congress's
intention to make a substantial departure from pre-Code law.23
Section 542(a) does authorize turnover of property items in the possession
of a creditor or perhaps another party in certain specific instances. Section
542(a) requires a party in possession of "property" that the trustee may use or
sell under § 363 to return it to the trustee. Section 363(f) authorizes the
trustee to sell "property" in which both the estate and another party have an
interest if the conditions of § 363(f) are met.2" "Property" in this subsection
does not mean "property of the estate"; it means a property item in which the
estate and another party have an interest.2" In the case of a property item
subject to a lien, one condition for the sale of the property item, and hence for
turnover under § 342(a), is that the sale price must exceed the value of all of
the liens on the property item.26 Thus, if the value of the goods owned by
Whiting Pools had-been greater than the amount owed to the IRS, and Whiting
Pools as debtor in possession intended to liquidate the goods, then the debtor
in possession would have been entitled to the return of the goods for
liquidation, so long as the IRS's interests in the proceeds were adequately
protected. '
By the express terms of the statute, under the limited circumstances set
forth in § 363(f), the trustee can regain possession of property items when the
right to possession is not part of property of the estate. The trustee's power,
however, does not come from the vague notion that somehow § 542(a) gives
the trustee the right to possession of property items simply because the estate
retains some property interest in those property items. The trustee's power in
this instance comes from the language of the statute.
The Court's failure of statutory analysis and its "not limiting" statement
are troublesome. Courts should eschew this approach and follow the principle
explicit in the statute: the bankruptcy estate does not, by virtue of § 541(a)(1),

Courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158, 1334 (1994), enacted by The Bankruptcy Amendments and Fedcrl
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, §§ 10 1(a), 104(a), 98 Star. 333,333,336,340-41 (1984).
253 Congress may have gone too far in expanding the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. See Thomas
E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not be Article IM Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.
(forthcoming 1999).
254 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
256 See 11 U.S.C. §363(1)(3),quotedsupranote 130.
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include greater property interests than what the debtor had the instant before
bankruptcy. 27
B. The Court'sReliance on Policy and LegislativeHistory
The Court justified its holding by relying on Congress's general policy
encouraging reorganizations and on legislative history. There are two
deficiencies with both justifications. First, they provide no guidance for
interpreting the statute. Second, to the extent that a court is going to rely on
legislative history, it should rely on the most pertinent legislative history. In
this case, there was direct legislative history on what Congress intended
§ 541(a) to cover and what it intended § 542(a) to do that the Court did not
mention. This direct legislative history provides more guidance than the
general policy considerations and the weak legislative history that the Court
did cite. If a court is to live by legislative history, it should be prepared to die
by legislative history.
In its discussion of policy, the Court reasoned that Congress intended to
provide for the reorganization of troubled enterprises to save jobs, satisfy
creditor claims, and produce a return for the owner; that Congress presumed
that assets would be more valuable if used by a rehabilitated debtor than if
sold for scrap; that reorganization would not be successful if property
essential to running the business were excluded from the estate; and that
property subject to a security interest was included in the estate."5 The Court
257 Although several courts have cited Whiting Pools for the proposition that property of the estate is
broad, they have nevertheless refrained from expanding property of the estate beyond the debtor's interests in
property as of the commencement of the case. See. e.g., Edwards v. Armstrong world Indus., Inc., 6 F.3d
312, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1993) (supersedeas bond issued by third party in favor of creditor not property of
estate), rev'd on other grounds,514 U.S. 300, 3)7 n.5, 309-310 (1995) (not questioning analysis of property
of the estate): Casey v. Hochman, 963 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (10th Cir. 1992) (referring to the "not a
limitation" language but holding that a patent on an invention made by an individual debtor after he filed a
chapter 11 petition was property ofthc debtor and not property ofthe estate): In re Jones, 768 F.2d 923, 92728 (7th Cir. 1985) (vendor's interest in real estate sold by an installment sales contract is personal property
and therefore not exempt; the estate's rights are limited to "whatever rights a debtor had at the
commencement of the case--no more, no less" (quoting Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th
Cir. 1984))); see also supra note 126.
In my view, the courts must limit the bankruptcy estate to the debtor's interests. Congress's power to
enact laws on the subject of bankruptcy, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, does not permit it to expand the rights of
debtors against persons who are not creditors of the debtor or to diminish the rights of these third parties. See
Plank, ConstitutionalLimits, supra note 75, at 559-81.
251 United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1983). Charles Tabb suggested that the Court
should have acknowledged that the statute simply did not accomplish Congress's intent to provide for the
return of repossessed property items and simply declare the Code to provide for that turnover. See Charles J.
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also correctly noted the Code's requirement for "adequate protection" of the
secured creditor's interest when the trustee wanted to use property of the
estate.2r The Court then stated, "The creditor with a secured interest in
property included in the estate must look to this provision for protection,
rather than to the nonbankruptcy remedy of possession." 2"
For debtors in possession of property items subject to a security interest,
the court's statements are correct. These statements follow directly from the
definition of property of the estate in § 541(a)(1), the automatic stay
provisions of § 362(a)(6), 26' and the provisions of § 363 authorizing a trustee
to use property of the estate. When the debtor has possession of property
items subject to a security interest, the debtor's possessory interest in the
property items (including the ability to use the property items)" is part of the
property of the estate.2 63 If the trustee wants to use the property items in her
possession, she must provide adequate protection to third parties who claim an
interest in the property items.2" A secured creditor may not seize the property
items or foreclose its security interest without first obtaining relief from the
automatic stay. 265 One of the grounds for relief is lack of adequate protection.2 " Granting adequate protection removes a basis for granting relief
from the stay, and therefore the stay will continue to prevent foreclosure.
This statutory scheme changed the pre-Code law. 67 Thus, the Court's
statements add little to the analysis. For example, the bankruptcy estate does

Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. Prrr. L REV. 477, 507-514 (1988). This
would have been an intellectually more honest approach, although it still leaves open the question of how do
we know what is Congress's intent in this particular instance if the statute does not provide for it.
259 Whiting Pools,462 U.S. at 204, (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1994)).
260 Whiting Pools 462 U.S. at 204.
261 See Infra note 311 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
263 See. e.g., Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1435 (6th Cir.
1985) (right of chapter 13 debtor to cure mortgage default under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1994) teninates
upon foreclosure sale of mortgaged property; until sale, chapter 13 plan may provide for cure).
264 11 U.S.C. § 363(e (1994).
265 Id. § 362(d), discussed infra in note 319.
266 Id. §362(d)(1), quotedsupra note 154.
267 In liquidations under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the United States district court sitting as a
bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction only over property items in the possession of the bankrupt; the
Supreme Court held that a referee could not use summary proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act to compel a
creditor, the Internal Revenue Service, in possession of property items owned by the bankrupt to return them
to the referee; instead, the referee had to institute a plenary proceeding, which required the referee to litigate
its claims in whatever state or federal court would have been available to the bankrupt. See Phelps v. United
States, 421 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1975). Under the Bankruptcy Act, the difference between summary
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not have any property interests in property items previously owned by a
debtor that were seized and sold by a creditor before the debtor filed a
petition."a ' Filing a bankruptcy petition after the debtor has lost all interest in
the property, no matter how valuable to the debtor's business, will not cause
any property sold to be included in the bankruptcy estate.

jurisdiction and plenary jurisdiction made a substantive difference in the ability of the referee to recover
assets that had been owned by the bankrupt but that were subject to a tax lien or to challenge the IRS's lien
on those assets. See id. at 333 n.2. However, under chapterXI of the Act of 1898, authorizing reorganization
of large corporations, the district court had jurisdiction over all "property of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 511
(1976) (repealed 1978). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that this
provision authorized a plan requiring a secured creditor to return property in its possession. See
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1950); Patrick A. Murphy, Use of
Collateral In Business Rehabilitations:A Suggested Redrafling of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 63 CAL. L REa. 1483, 1492-93 (1975). Generally, under the case law that developed under the act,
there was a return of collateral only if there was debtor equity. See David Gray Carlson, PostpetitlonInterest
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L REv. 577, 590-96 (1989). There was no similar holding
regarding reorganizations of smaller businesses under chapter X of the 1898 Act, although chapter XI has the
same provision on jurisdiction. 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1976) (repealed 1978). Interestingly, chapter XI was used
more often than chapter X because of its flexibility. See BANKRPITCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 100,
pt. 1, at 246-47.
268 Boyd v. United States (In re Boyd), 11 F.3d 59 (5th Cir. 1994) (debtor had no interest in home under
Mississippi law after foreclosure sale and recordation of trustee's deed before filing a chapter 13 petition, and
thus property never became property of the estate; debtor filed 33 months after sale and shortly after state
appellate court affirmed judgment for eviction; confirmation of chapter 13 plan entered by bankruptcy court
without objection did not revest property in debtor); Brown v. Financial Enter. Corp. (In re Hall), 188 B.R.
476 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (foreclosure completed before filing; home no longer property of the estate, even
though debtor still in possession; debtor could pursue rescission of mortgage on grounds of incapacity); In re
Smith, 169 B.R. 659 (Bankr. E.D. Miss. 1994) (property purchased by bank at prepetition foreclosure sale,
though deed remained unrecorded at time of petition by chapter 13 debtor, not property of estate); Abdelhaq
v. Pflug, 82 B.RL 81)7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (foreclosure sale under deeds of trust of condominium units
before filing of chapter 11 petition extinguished debtors' interest in such property, and hence, property never
became part of bankruptcy estate); Welbom v. Ruegsegger (In re Welbom), 75 B.R. 243 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1987) (chapter 12 debtors' interest as buyers under real estate installment sale contract terminated, pursuant
to state court foreclosure action, before filing of bankruptcy petition, and thus debtors could not reinstate
contract for deed pursuant to chapter 12 payment plan); In re Crctella, 42 B.R. 526, 530 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that, under New York law, purchaser of property at prepetition real estate foreclosure sale
divested debtor of any interest in property notwithstanding that actual deed was neither delivered nor offered
to be delivered until after petition was filed, and thus property could not be regarded as property of debtor's
estate, and debtor lacked power to de-accelerate or reinstate the mortgage and cure any defaults).
To the extent that nonbankruptcy law gives the debtor rights with respect to such property, such as a
statutory right of redemption, those rights do remain with the debtor and would be included in property of the
estate. See, e.g., In re Rice, 42 B.R. 838 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984) (despite mortgage foreclosure sale, debtors
retained one-year statutory right of redemption when they filed their bankruptcy petition, which became part
of property of the estate; debtors exercised right of redemption through their chapter 13 plan to which lender
failed to object; creditor not entitled to relief on the basis that bankruptcy court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the real property).
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The precise policy question that the Code does not explicitly address is the
middle position: must a creditor who has already repossessed goods subject to
a security interest look only to "adequate protection" of its security interest
rather than its right of possession and therefore relinquish its possessory rights
to the debtor? The Court concluded that the creditor must return possession.
The Court's statement, however, that a creditor must look to adequate
protection instead of possession is not a reason for the Court's eventual
conclusion. It is a mere repetition of the conclusion as it applies to a creditor
already in possession.
One could make a good case for the opposite conclusion. Congress could
quite easily have decided that a debtor that was so inattentive to its financial
condition and so inept in the conduct of its affairs as to allow a creditor to

seize goods before it filed for bankruptcy probably could not be reorganiz-

ed.269 Indeed, most chapter 11 petitions for reorganization are converted to
chapter 7 liquidations.27' Accordingly, a general policy of sup-porting
reorganization--which allows a debtor in possession of property to continue
that possession and use of the property--does not necessarily require the
return of property seized by a creditor before the debtor has filed a petition in
chapter 11 .27
269 The opinions in Whiling Pools do not tell us how much time the debtor had to file for bankruptcy
after the initial assessment of the deficiency. See Whiting Pools, Inc.. 462 U.S. at 199-210: United States v.
Whiting Pools, 674 F.2d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 1982). In re Whiting Pools, 15 B.R. 270, 271 (W.D.N.Y. 1981);
United States v. Whiting Pools (In re Whiting Pools), I0 B.R. 755, 756 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981). Under the
Internal Revenue Code, however, the debtor had a minimum of)40 days between the time of the assessment of
a tax deficiency and seizure of the goods. Ifthe taxpayer does not pay the deficiency It days after demand,
the IRS may collect the deficiency by levying on the taxpayer's property. 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a) (1994). The
IRS, however, must give 31) days notice before it seizes the property items ofthe taxpayer. Id. 6331(d). See
also Bonny H. Richardson, Comment, Prepetition Tax Levies on Intangible Property: The Aftermath of
Whiting Pools, 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 587, 588-89 (1993). Furthermore, unless the taxpayer has admitted its
liability, the IRS cannot make an assessment of tax deficiency for at least 90 days after it has sent the
taxpayer a notice of a tax deficiency. Id.
270 See, e.g.. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-SystemsFailure Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 99, 100 (1983); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11,
1993 WIs. L REv. 729, 731 (only 26% of the chapter II petitions filed in one year in the Western District of
Missouri were successful). After the Supreme Court's decision, Whiting Pools never filed a reorganization
plan and on May 5, 1986, the chapter 11 petition was eventually dismissed for lack of prosecution.
Bankruptcy Case Record (docket) at 6, United States v. Whiting Pools (In re Whiting Pools), 10 B.R. 755,
756 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (No. 81-20063 (CHP 11)). It is probably unfair to make too much of this point
because the IRS did keep possession of the seized goods for over two years while the issue was being
litigated in the district court, the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court, and this alone may have been
enough to have doomed the reorganization prospects of Whiting Pools.
271 In holding that, under state law or the Code, the foreclosure sale terminates the debtor's interest in
mortgaged property, see supra note 268, several courts have noted that the debtor has plenty of notice of the
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The Court's selective use of legislative history is also troubling. First, the
Court construed the language of § 541(a) that property of the estate is
"comprised of... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the case" as not limiting what could be included in
property of the estate. 2 It presumably believed that there was an ambiguity
in the statutory language, perhaps in the meaning of the words "comprised
of.,,2
If there were a genuine ambiguity in the statute, it would be
appropriate to look at the House and Senate Reports. The House Report stated
that the new bankruptcy law "determines what is property of the estate by a
simple reference to what interests in property the debtor has at the
commencement of the case." 27 The Senate Report similarly stated that § 541
"defines property of the estate, and specifies what property becomes property
of the estate. 27 " The Senate Report also noted that, although the section
included actions and claims by the debtor against others, it was not intended to
expand the debtor's rights against other parties more than they exist at the
commencement of the case. 276 These reports, therefore, contradict the Court's
interpretation'that § 541(a)(1) is not limiting.
Second, the Court failed to discuss direct legislative history indicating that
the purpose of § 542(a) was to require an entity that acquired property of the
estate after the commencement of the case to return it to the trustee in
bankruptcy. Just before final passage of the Code, Congress made last minute
amendments to the bills that became the Code. One amendment changed the
reference to the timing of an entity's possession or control of property in

impending sale and plenty of time to cure the default or file a petition. See Federal Land Bank of Louisville
v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428. 1435-36 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The foreclosure sale normally comes only
after
considerable notice giving the debtor opportunity to take action by seeking alternative financing or by
negotiating to cure the default or by taking advantage of the benefits of Chapter 13."); Abdelhaq v. Pilug, 82
B.R. 807, 811 (Bankr. IED. Va. 1988); In re Cretella, 42 B.R. 526, 528-29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(foreclosure proceeding filed January 4, 1984; foreclosure judgment entered May 8; mortgagor notified of
sale date on June 14; foreclosure sale on June 28; petition filed on July 25).
272 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
274 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 175 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136, quoted supra
note 72. The House Report referred to the Bankruptcy Commission Report for the detail. Id. The
Bankruptcy Commission Report made the same point. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 100,
pt.1, at 192. See supra text accompanying note 100.
275 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 175 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868.
276 See S.REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868, quotedsupra note
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§ 542(a) from "on the date of the filing of the petition" to "during the case. ',11 7
The sponsors explained the reason for the change:
Section 542(a) of the House amendment modifies similar provisions
contained in the House bill and the Senate amendment treating with
turnover of property to the estate. The section makes clear that any
entity, other than a custodian, is required to deliver property of the
estate to the trustee or debtor in possession whenever such property
is acquiredby the entity during the case, if the trustee or debtor in
possession may use, sell, or lease the property under section 363, or
the debtor may exempt the property under section 522 .... 279
This change accompanied an addition to the definition of property of the

estate to include "property that the estate acquires after the commencement of
the case. 279 Under this legislative history, § 542(a) would apply only to
property acquired after the case began. If the Court were to follow this
legislative history in interpreting § 542(a), then Whiting Pools would have no
right to the return of the seized goods because the IRS did not "acquire" any
property interests from Whiting Pools during the case.

277 The language in these earlier versions of § 542 referred to an entity "in possession, custody, or
control, on the date of the filing of the petition" of property that the trustee may use. See S. 2266, 95th
Cong., § 542(a), at 426 (as reported by Mr. Long of the Committee on Finance on Aug. 10, 1978) (emphasis
added); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., § 542(a), at 103 (as introduced July 11, 1977) (same). At the last minute,
however, Congress amended § 542(a) in these bills. The new language referred to an entity "in possession,
custody, or control, during the case," of property that the trustee could use. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L 95-598, § 542(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2595 (1978), codified in 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (Supp. 111978).
The Court analyzed § 542(a) on the assumption that the section required the return of"property of the
estate" in the custody of the IRS at the time of the filing of the petition. The House and Senate Reports
discussing § 542 give this impression: "Subsection (a) of [§ 542] requires anyone holding property of the
estate on the date of thefiling of the petition, or property that the trustee may use, sell or lease under 363, to
deliver it to the trustee." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 369 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6325,
and S. REP. No. 95-989. at 84 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5870 (emphasis added). The
United States in arguing against the return quoted this language. Brief for the United States at 15, Whiting
Pools, 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (No. 82-215). These reports reflected the draft language of§ 542(a) in S. 2266
and H.R. 8200 at the time that they were written.
278 124 CONG. REC. 1111089 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Don Edwards, Upon Introducing the House
Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 8200), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6455 (emphasis
added). See also 124 CONG. REC. S17406 (Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Dennis DeConcini, Upon Introducing
the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to H.R. 8200), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6455
(same). The bankruptcy reform bills were finalized late in the legislative session. For practical reasons, the
sponsors could not use a conference committee to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate
bills. Accordingly, the sponsors in the House and the Senate informally reconciled the differences and both
houses accepted the final compromise. See Klee, supra note 98, at 953-56.
279 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7). See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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The statute does not use the word "acquire". It simply refers to property in
the custody of an entity "during" the case. Technically, if the IRS had custody
of property of the estate because of its seizure of the goods before the filing of
the petition, then it had custody "during" the case. Accordingly, the statute
would require the IRS to return possession of the goods if the right to
possession were property of the estate. As discussed above in Part III.A, the
estate had no right to possession, and therefore, under the language of the
statute, the IRS need not return the seized goods. There is no ambiguity, and
there is no need here to look to "policy" or legislative history to discern the
meaning of the statute.
If a court is to rely on policy and legislative history, however, it cannot
ignore the most pertinent statement of legislative intent. Congress's statement
of the intent of § 542(a) must override the more general statements of policy
and other less direct evidence of intent, such as the testimony of witnesses.
Under this statement of intent, § 542 did not apply.
The legislative history that the Court did cite is feeble. The Court noted
that the House and Senate Reports were silent on this precise issue. 2 0 The
Court noted that several witnesses testified before Congress that the Code
should include a provision requiring the return of property of the debtor in the
possession of secured creditors. 28 ' The Court then noted that § 542(a)
appeared in the draft of the Code that followed these hearings.82 It then
law.2' 3
concluded that its reading of § 542(a) was consistent with pre-Code
On this issue, the Court endorsed the fuller analysis of the testimony of these
witnesses by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 284
210 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207. The Court did not appreciate that § 542(a) had been amended since
those reports and that there was very clear legislative history suggesting that Whiting Pools had no right to
require the return ofthe goods. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
281 Whiting Pools.462 U.S. at 207.

282 Id. at 207-208. Section 542(a) appeared in a forn close to its current form in H.RL 6, a precursor to
H.R. 8200. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. It was subsequently amended for a reason that
removes the rationale that the Court adopted. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
283 Whiting Pools,462 U.S. at 208. See supranote 267 and infra note 284.
284

Whiting Pools. 462. U.S. at 207 n.16.

Judge Friendly for the court of appeals discussed this

testimony in some detail. See United States v. Whiting Pools, 674 F.2d 144, 153-55 (2d Cir. 1982). During
the hearings on the Bankruptcy Act proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission and the competing proposal of
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, four witnesses stated that the trustee should be able to regain
possession of property in the hands of a secured creditor if necessary for a reorganization. See supra note
103 and accompanying text. Most witnesses agreed, however, that the proposed legislation-specifically,
§ 4-603 of the pending bills that eventually became § 543(b), regarding the duty of a custodian to return
"property" of a debtor-did not include language to provide this result. Indeed, the National Bankruptcy

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

This legislative history is underwhelming. Section 542(a) as originally
drafted in H.R 6, which later became H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, did not explicitly implement the turnover provision that the witnesses before Congress urged.
Moreover, the last minute change to § 542(a) in the final H.R. 8200 that was
enacted to require the return of property of the estate acquired by a third party
during the case and the explanation of that change by the sponsors of the
Code dictate the opposite result.
One must ask the fundamental question: Are these vague notions of
Congressional policy and the skimpy legislative history that the Court found
(especially in light of the more definitive legislative history that the Court did
not cite) really a more reliable indication of Congressional intent than the
carefully chosen words of the statute? The answer is no. It is questionable, as
a matter of democratic theory, to read into reasonably clear legislative
provisions a particular result that has substantial ramifications for the property
interests of creditors on the basis of such slender evidence. It is more
troubling that the Court would ignore the precise language of a statutory
provision that is a cornerstone of the entire Code to reach this result. The
Court later rejected this method of analyzing property of the estate.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REPUDIATION OF THE BREACH
In Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf,5 6 the Court repudiated the
approach to defining property of the estate that Whiting Pools had used.
Strumpf involved the question of whether a bank's administrative hold of a
debtor's checking account violated the automatic stay. The debtor, Strumpf,
had a checking account with Citizens Bank of Maryland. When he filed a

Conference submitted an amendment to proposed § 4-603 that would explicitly extend it to a creditor in

possession of goods.
After these hearings, § 542(a) appeared in H.R. 6, a revision of the earlier bills. See supra note 103
and accompanying text. Judge Friendly stated that "Itlhis sequence of events compels the inference that
§ 542 was added to the Code to make clear-as a number of witness had explicitly urged--that the turnover

power approved in RFC v. Kaplan [Reconstrction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950),
discussed supra note 267 was to be incorporated in the new statute." WhilingPools 674 F.2d 144, 155 (2d
Cir. 1982). Judge Friendly apparently was not aware of the last minute change to § 542(a) and the statement
of the legislative intent that § 542(a) apply to property acquired by the estate after the filing of the petition.
Moreover, the language of § 542 does not make Judge Friendly's result "clear." Indeed, the sequence of
events envisioned by Judge Friendly could compel the opposite inference: Congress did not intend to
incorporate the turnover power approved in Kaplan.
285 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
286 516U.S. 16(1995).
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chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, he also owed Citizens $5,068. The bank put
an "administrative hold" on the funds in the checking account to preserve its
right to set off the checking account against Strunpf's debt to the bank. The
bank refused to honor withdrawals that would have reduced the checking
account below the amount of the debt owed to the bank. The bank then
moved for relief from the automatic stay, and Strumpf moved for sanctions
287
against the bank for violating the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court held
that the administrative hold was a set off that violated the automatic stay.2M
On appeal, the district court held that the administrative hold was not a set off
and reversed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Court ruled that an administrative
hold, or freeze, was not a set off within the meaning of § 362(a)(7). The
Court also noted that § 553 specifically preserved the right of set off in
bankruptcy except as the Code otherwise provided, and that § 542(b)
specifically authorized a third party who owed money to a debtor to refrain
from paying the debt owed to the trustee to the extent that the third party had a
right to set off the debt against a claim owed by the debtor. 289
The Court also rejected the argument that an administrative hold violated
the automatic stay against "any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate." 290 The Court's analysis is brief:
Respondent's reliance on these provisions rests on the false premise
that petitioner's administrative hold took something from
respondent, or exercised dominion over property that belonged to
287 Strumpf 516 U.S. at 17-18. Under I1U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994), an individual debtor injured by a
willful
violation of a stay may recover actual damages, including attorneys fees and costs, and punitive
damages.
288 Strumpf,516 U.S. at 18. Section § 362(a)(7)provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or
303 of this title, or an application filed under § 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-... (7) the setoffofany debt owing to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against
the debtor.
I1 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). Several weeks later, the bankruptcy court granted the bank's motion for relief from
the stay and approved the set off. By this time, however, Strumpf had withdrawn all moneys in the account,
and there was no money left to set off against thz debt owed the bank.
289 Strumpf 516 U.S. at 18-20. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1994), quoted supra note 245.
290 1 U.S.C. §362(a)(3)(1994).
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respondent. That view of things might be arguable if a bank
account consisted of money belonging to the depositor and held by
the bank. In fact, however, it consists of nothing more or less than a
promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor.... and petitioner's
temporary refusal to pay was neither a taking of possession of
respondent's property nor an exercising
of control over it, but
2
merely a refusal to perform its promise. F
This analysis uses the precise meaning of property of the estate: the
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. In
Strumpf, those property interests did not consist of the money in the checking
account. They consisted of the rights that the debtor had under his contract
with the bank that established the account.29 2 To the extent that the bank had
the right under the contract to exercise set off or an administrative hold, which
is normally the case, 293 the debtor's contract right to withdraw moneys from
the account was subject to the bank's contract right to set off.294 Therefore,
the bank's administrative hold did not interfere with the debtor's contract
rights, that is, with any interest of the debtor in the property.
Although brief, the Court's analysis of the property aspects of the debtor's
checking account is a significant repudiation of the Court's analysis in
Whiting Pools of the definition of "property of the estate." First, the debtor in
its brief conceded that the funds in his account were not property of the estate,
only the right to withdraw funds was property of the estate. The debtor
nevertheless argued that the bank's administrative hold impeded the debtor's
access to the funds and therefore represented an exercise of control over

291 Strumpf516U.S. at21.

292 See generally supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also Bamhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398
(1992) ("A person with an account at a bank enjoys a claim against the bank for funds in an amount equal to
the account balance."); JAMES J. WHITE& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-1, at 650
(4th ed. 1995).
293 As a matter oflaw, banks have a right to set offunless restricted by contract. See Studley v.

Boylston

Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913); Hayden v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Baltimore, 87 A. 672, 673 (Md.
1913). See also RAY D. HENSON & WILLIAM B. DAVENPORT, U.LA U.C.C. FoRMs AND MATERIALS,
ARTICLES 1TO 7, § 4-40 1-Form 3, Signature Card, at 304 (1968) (providing in a signature card for a joint
account that "you [the bank] shall have the right to charge against this account any liabilities, at any time
existing and however arising, of any one or more of us [the customers] to you [the bank]").
294 See Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101 (1966) (noting that a bankruptcy trustee under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that seeks to enforce the debtor-creditor relationship established between a bank and
its customer "is subject to all claims and defenses which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but
for the filing of the petition") (cited by Strumpf,516 U.S. at 21).
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property of the estate.295 The Court rejected this interpretation of property of

the estate.
Second, several cases finding that an administrative freeze violated the
automatic stay had reasoned that the debtor's interests in property consisted of
the money in the debtor's checking account and that therefore the freeze was
exercising control over property of the estate. 21' The Court in Strumpf
repudiated these cases. These courts had confused two distinct property
interests: (1) the money in the possession of the bank, and (2) the rights of the
debtor under the checking account contract.
297 Typical of this reasoning is the
district court in Cusanno v. FidelityBank:
The freeze on their bank account deprived Mr. and Mrs. Cusanno
[the debtors] of the use of these funds. The bank's action was thus
tantamount to removing the funds from the possession of the
Cusannos and placing the funds in the bank's possession until
resolution of the distribution of the estate. Fidelity's action thus
appears to have violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) even if the administrative29hold was not a "setoff' within the meaning of
§ 362(a)(7).

8

This is silly. When the Cusannos opened their checking account and
deposited moneys "into" the account, they relinquished possession and
ownership of the money to the bank. They were left with simply their rights
under their account agreement.2 9 Those rights, coupled with the attendant

295 Brief forthe Respondent at 13, Stnampf,516 U.S. 16 (1995) (No. 94-1340).
296 See. e.g., B.F. Goodrich Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 967 F.2d 505,
511 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that "the funds in the Patterson's account became property of the estate"); In re
Wicks, 176 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1995) (same effect); In re Flynn, 143 B.R. 798, 801 (Bankr.
D.ILL 1992); In re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991); In re Wildcat Constr.
Co., 57 B.IL 981, 983 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (stating that "the money in the bank accounts is property of the
estate"); Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. S10, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1983), vacated, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984)

(mem.).

297 29 B.R. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1983), vacated,734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984) (mem.).
298 Id. at 812.
299 Most people think ofthe money credited to their checking accounts as "their" money. The presence

of federal deposit insurance of up to $100,000 per depositor has perhaps conditioned most people to think
that way. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994). However, the people who had deposited money in state savings and
loan associations in Maryland in the 1980s soon learned the property lesson the hard way when both the
associations and their private deposit insurance failed and the depositors could not get "their" money. See,

e.g., United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 512 A.2d
1047, 1048-50) (Md. 1986) (describing the Maryland savings and loan crisis, and the moratoria on
withdrawals by 34,497 depositors from accounts at one savings and loan association totaling approximately
$601) million).
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liabilities (including the bank's right to freeze or set off moneys in the
account), were the property of the estate, not the moneys themselves.3°
To be sure, Whiting Pools and Strumpf involved two different types of
property items and two different ownership structures. In Whiting Pools, the
IRS as the levying creditor had possession of goods that the debtor still
owned. The debtor still had an interest in the goods themselves, albeit a
limited interest. In Strumpf, the bank conceptually had possession of the
money, and it owned the money credited to the debtor's checking account.3 'O
The debtor did not have a property interest in the money; it merely had a
contract right against the bank. This contract right is an "interest in property,"
but it is not an interest in the money. Further, the issue in Whiting Pools was
the turnover of goods under § 542(a); the issue in Strumpfwas the right of set
off and an administrative hold. Accordingly, Strumpf does not directly
overrule Whiting Pools. Indeed, Strumpf does not even mention Whiting
Pools.
Nevertheless, the property interests retained by the debtor-the property of
the estate-in each case are similar. In Whiting Pools, the debtor's property
interest was only the right to redeem the goods by paying the amount of the
debt and the right to surplus if the goods were sold for more than the amount
of the debt. In Strumpf, the debtor's property interest was his right to
withdraw money from the account after satisfying the debt owed to the bank.
Both debtors had rights against a creditor. A court using the analytical
approach of Whiting Pools could easily conclude that the rights retained by
the debtor in Strumpfconstituted sufficient property rights in the money owed
to the debtor by the bank to make the bank's refusal to pay the money
tantamount to exercising control over "property of the estate." Indeed, several
cases used this very reasoning to conclude that an administrative hold violates
302
the automatic stay.

300 It is possible to deliver money to a bank and retain ownership of the money, either by putting it in a
safe deposit box at a bank or by establishing a true trust account with the bank. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 92a(4)
(1994) (trust powers of national banks and limitations on those powers). The bank will typically charge a fee
for holding the money, and unless the owner makes arrangements for the investment of money by the bank
the money will simply sit there. Even with trust accounts, the "owner" is no longer the owner of specific
items of money: it retains an equitable interest in a sum of money held by the bank in its trust department.
301 This is an oversimplification. The "money" owed to the debtors represents a liability of the bank that
it must satisfy from assets that it owns.
302 See supranote 297 and text accompanying notes 298 & 299.
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Accordingly, the differences between Whiting Pools and Strumpf do not
alter the jurisprudential force of Strumpf. The Court in Strumpf analyzed
precisely the property rights of the debtor as of the commencement of the
case-the right to the payment of money by the bank on the debtor's order,
subject to the bank's right to refuse to honor such order under its contract with
the debtor. The Court drew the logical conclusion from this analysis: The
bank's refusal to honor the checks of the debtor did not result in an exercise of
control over property of the estate.
V. RESTORING THE BOUNDARIES: TumOvER, STAY,
AND THIRD PARTY INTERESTS
As discussed in Part III, the specific language of § 541(a)(1) and § 542(a)
does not support the Court's conclusion in Whiting Pools. To reach the result
the Court rejected the statutory language, ignored the most pertinent
legislative history, and relied on vague notions of policy favoring
reorganizations and the testimony of a few witnesses before Congress,
followed by no specific statutory language addressing their points. This
opinion, therefore, provides no analytical bases for resolving similar or
derivative issues of property interests in bankruptcy. As discussed in Part IV,
however, the Supreme Court has rejected the analytical model for analyzing
property of the estate used in Whiting Pools. This rejection has significant
implications for interpreting the provisions of the Code affecting the property
interests of creditors and non-creditors.
First, Strumpf has important implications for the theoretical understanding
of property interests under the Code. Under the Court's analysis of property
interests in Strumpf, which is also consistent with the Court's treatment of
property interests in Owen v. Owen, °3 each property interest in a property item
is exclusive. To the extent that one person has rights that derive from a
property interest in a property item, the other persons do not have those rights.
For example, if the owner of a property item grants a lender a security
interest in the item, the owner now has only her equity interest. The lender
has a right to force the sale of the property item to obtain repayment of the
debt. The lender's power defines the limit of the owner's equity interest.
Thus, when the lender repossesses the property item, it is not taking any action
against or otherwise controlling the owner's property interest, the equity
303 501) U.S. 305, 308M09 (199 1), quoted supra text accompanying note 165.
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interest. Similarly, the owner's equity interest allows her to redeem the
lender's security interest by repaying the secured debt. The assertion of her
rights does not diminish the lender's security interest; it merely defines the
limits of the security interest.
These examples may seem counterintuitive. In a colloquial sense, we
generally think that a foreclosing lender is taking action against the owner's
property interest. On an unsophisticated level, this view reflects the popular
concept of property as the thing and not the property interest. A more
sophisticated view, which Professor David Carlson describes as the
"qualitative" view of property interests3 ° and I describe as the "overlapping"
view of property interests, posits that, when one person with a property
interest in a property item has the power to control the property item, that
person also has the power to control the other person's property interest. This
control is itself an interest in the other party's property interest.
Under the overlapping view, when the secured lender causes the sale of a
property item to collect his debt, the sale of the property item also disposes of
the owner's equity interests. Hence, the lender's security interest gives the
lender an interest not only in the property item but also in the owner's equity
interest"0 5 Similarly, the equity interest of the owner of the property item
allows the owner to redeem the lender's security interest by repaying the
secured debt. When the owner redeems the property item, and reacquires fee
simple ownership of the property item, the owner essentially forces the sale of
the secured lender's security interest to the owner and dispossesses the lender
of his property interest.
This overlapping view of property interests is an acceptable theoretical
conception of property for many purposes. Nevertheless, interpreting the
phrase "interest in property" in a statute like the Bankruptcy Code to mean the
qualitative or overlapping nature of property interests would render the
meaning of the statute indeterminate. Under this view, each person's property
interest would be an interest in the other person's property interest.
Accordingly, the statute would need an additional set of rules to determine

304 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U. L REV.
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with author).
305 As discussed above, a few sections of the Code seem to adopt the view of a non-debtor having an
interest in property of the estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994), discussed supra note 157; see also
supra notes 159 & 160 and accompanying text.
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which of the two competing property interests should prevail in any particular
situation.
Further, the problem presented by an overlapping view of property
interests extends beyond those dynamic situations when one holder of a
property interest is taking action that "controls" (in a qualitative or
overlapping sense) the other property interest The problem also would arise
for static situations in which more than one person has a property interest in a
property item.
Contrasting dynamic and static situations in the case of a lease will
illustrate this point. Suppose that a landlord has rented a warehouse to a
tenant for five years. If the landlord has given the tenant a right to renew the
lease for another five year term, the tenant's option to renew would "control"
(under the qualitative or overlapping view) the landlord's reversionary
interest. However, even if the tenant did not have this option, the tenant's
leasehold interest "controls" the landlord's reversionary interest because the
tenant's leasehold interest by definition gives the tenant the right to use the
property item, the warehouse. This right to use the warehouse "controls" the
landlord's right to use the warehouse, although in a static sense and not a
dynamic sense. Under a qualitative or overlapping view of property interests,
"controlling" the landlord's right to use the warehouse also "controls" the
landlord's reversionary interest. Although it is harder to conceive of
"controlling" the landlord's reversionary interest in the static case, there is no
logical difference in concept between the static and the dynamic case.
The indeterminancy that would arise from an overlapping view of property
interests does not exist under the exclusive view of property interests. In a
statute like the Code that regulates property interests, the identification of the
specific rights of each person with respect to a property item, and the
exclusion of the other property interests from those rights, implement the
necessary priority rules. In particular, the use of the exclusive view of
"interests in property" in the definition of property of the estate makes it
possible to decide definitively what is or is not included in property of the
estate under the Code.
In addition, if property of the estate contains only the specific and
exclusive property interests of a debtor under the Code, there will be
consistency of treatment among the holders of property interests. When an
owner of a property item grants a security interest to a lender or leases the
item to a tenant, the property interests of all three persons will receive the
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same treatment under the definition of property of the estate whether the
owner, now the holder of only an equity interest or a reversionary interest, the
lender, or the tenant becomes a debtor under the Code. Those parties will be
treated differently under the Code only when specific statutory provisions
require a different treatment, such as the automatic stay against actions by
lenders to collect a claim."'
These considerations apply as well to intangible property interests, like
executory contracts, in which each party has an asset-the performance due
from the other-and a liability-the performance due the other party. If one
party fails to perform, the injured party has the power to cancel the contract3 7
and deprive the breaching party's right to the performance by the injured
party. Similarly, to the extent that the contract gives one party the power to
terminate the contract, the power of one party to terminate the contract merely
defines the extent of the other party's rights under the contract but does not
"control" the other party's property interest, the rights under the contract, or
effect a transfer of that party interest.
In addition to the theoretical understanding of property interests, the
analytical methodology of Strumpf has implications for past and future cases
that have relied or may rely on Whiting Pools. Some courts have ignored
Whiting Pools and focused on the specific language of § 541(a)(1) that
requires an analysis of the particular property interests of a debtor in
bankruptcy.0 8 Other courts have blindly followed Whiting Pools without
paying particular attention to the specific interests of the debtor in property.
In still other cases, the courts' reliance on Whiting Pools has diverted their
attention from the precise issues of the case. Most of these cases have
expanded the debtor's rights at the expense of secured creditors. A few have
306 See infra text accompanying note 319.
307

See. e.g., UCC §§ 2-106(4),-70t3(f), -711(l) (1995).

308 See, e.g. TTS, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re TTS, Inc.), 158 B.R. 583, 586-587 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993)
(the debtor's legal title to an escrow fund established to provide for defened compensation to fonncr
president and its right to receive payments from the escrow fund for any damages caused by president's

breach ofemployment agreement do make entire fund property of the estate). In Jones v. GE Capital Mort.
Co. (In re Jones), 179 B.R. 450,455 (Bankr. ED. Pa. 1995), the court did not require the return of proceeds
of a casualty insurance policy for post-petition damage to the debtor's residence payable to the debtor's
mortgagee pursuant to the terms of the mortgage and the insurance policy. The debtor's rights under the
insurance policy were property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and the proceeds of the policy were
property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (proceeds of property of the estate). See Jones, 179 B.R. at
454-55. Nevertheless, the court held that the debtor's right to turnover under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) was limited
by the contractual provisions of the mortgage and the policy, and ultimately concluded that the debtor did
not have "a right to any of the insurance proceeds in issue at any time." Jones, 179 B.R. at 455.
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relied on Whiting Pools to expand the debtor's property rights and to diminish
the property rights of non-creditors. In light of Strumpf, however, the cases
that breach the outer boundaries of property of the estate-including Whiting
Pools-should no longer be considered good law.
A. CreditorPropertyInterests
In Whiting Pools, the Court interpreted § 542(a) and § 541(a)(1) to require
the IRS as a secured creditor to return to the debtor in possession the goods
that it had repossessed. Applying the analysis of property of the estate that the
Court used in Strumpf to the facts in Whiting Pools, however, would have
changed this result. The property of the estate in Whiting Pools was the
debtor's equity interest in the goods possessed by the IRS. The debtorhence, the debtor in possession, as successor in interest-had the right to
redeem the goods by paying the debt or the right to surplus upon sale. The
IRS, however, was not in possession, custody, or control of this right." 9
Therefore, under § 542 and the definition of property of the estate, the IRS
need not return the goods to the trustee. Although Strumpfdid not overrule or
even mention Whiting Pools, the Court's later rejection of the Whiting Pools
analysis of property of the estate and the inherent deficiencies in the Whiting
Pools decision discussed in Part III-its analytical emptiness, its reliance on
general policy and weak legislative history, and its ignorance of direct
legislative history requiring a different result--suggests that Whiting Pools'
interpretation of § 542 should no longer be considered good law valid.1
The analysis of property of the estate that Strumpf uses also has
implications for the operation of the automatic stay against creditors. Section
362(a) provides that the filing of a petition stays:

309 See supra text accompanying notes 193 & 303-07.
310 The conclusion that Whiting Pools is no longer good law does not relieve all creditors who have
repossessed property items of an obligation to return the items under the Code. There are other provisions of
the Code that could under certain circumstances require such a turnover in a liquidation case or a
reorganization. See Thomas E. Plank, Limited Turnoverof Repossessed Propertyin Bankruptcy: A Textualist
Analysis (forthcoming). Specifically, to the extent that the debtor retains equity in the property item,
§ 363(f)(3) authorizes the trustee to sell the property item, and, accordingly, the trustee could obtain the
property from the secured creditor for this purpose. See supra notes 133-36, 254 and accompanying text. In
addition, a reorganization plan may provide for the disposition of property items in the possession of the
secured creditor. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. The circumstances under which a secured
creditor might he required to return the repossessed property items coincide with the circumstances under
which the creditor would be unable to get relief from the automatic stay. See infra note 319.
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(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate [i.e.,
interest of the debtor in property] or of property from the estate or
to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title.
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.31
Under the definition of property of the estate, the sale of goods seized by a
secured creditor does not violate the automatic stay as an act to control
"property of the estate," under § 362(a)(3), or to enforce a lien against
"property of the estate," under § 362(a)(4). Some courts have erroneously
concluded that such a sale would violate these provisions. These courts reach
this conclusion because they assume, as Whiting Pools suggests, that the
repossessed property items in the possession of a creditor are still property of
the estate, notwithstanding the definition of property of the estate as an
"interest of the debtor in property." 12 As the Supreme Court pointed out in
Strumpf and as discussed in Part IV, this analysis erroneously confuses a
property item with the debtor's interest in property or, in the case of the
checking accounts, confuses two distinct property interests, because a debtor's
313
interest in a checking account is not an interest in a separate property item.

311

11U.S.c. § 362(a)(3)-(6).

312 See infra notes 321-34 and accompanying text.
313 Professor Carlson has argued that a secured party who has repossessed property items need not
voluntarily return the seized items to a trustee or debtor in possession in a chapter 7 or chapter 11 case, but
must return such goods to the debtor in a chapter 13 case. David Gray Carlson, Turnover of Collateral In
Bankruptcy: Must a Secured Part-in-PossessionVolunteer?, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 483 (1997). In his
argument, Professor Carlson first
concedes that continued possession of the seized property items is the
exercise of control over property of the estate under § 362(a)(3) and therefore would violate the automatic

stay. Id. at 487. He then notes that § 542(a) authorizes the trustee
to obtain a return of such repossessed
property items by a court order. Therefore, this requirement for a court order creates an implied exception to
the automatic stay in chapter 7 and chapter 11 cases. However, because the debtor does not have the power
of a trustee
in a chapter 13 case, there is no implied exception to the automatic stay in these cases. See Id. at
487-88.
As discussed above, I disagree. Indeed, Professor Carlson notes that the creditor-bank in Strumpfis
analogous to the secured creditor who has repossessed, Id. at 488, and Strumpfheld that continued refusal to

honor a withdrawal request by a chapter 13 debtor did not exercise control over property of the estate. See Id.
at 488. Accordingly, under a plain reading of the definition of property of the estate, the property items held
by a secured creditor are not part of the property of the estate, and there is no need to imply an exception to
the automatic stay to make the Bankruptcy Code workable.
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A more subtle form of the argument is that a foreclosure sale of the
property items exercises control over the debtor's interest in the property
itemns. This also fails. Under § 541(a)(1), for example, the property of
Whiting Pools' bankruptcy estate consisted of (1) a right to any surplus from
the sale by the IRS of the seized goods, (2) a right to redeem the seized goods
at any time before the sale, and (3) a right to notice of the sale. 4 Selling the
seized goods, however, would not be an attempt to exercise control over these
interests or to enforce a lien against them.3 " First, selling the seized goods
would not exercise control over Whiting Pools' right to a surplus. Selling the
goods actualizes that right. It is the only way to realize the right, the only way
to reduce Whiting Pools' right to a tangible benefit, if there be one.
Second, selling the seized goods would not interfere with Whiting Pools'
right to redeem. Rather, the act of selling defines the extent of the right. The
right exists under the statute only until the IRS has sold the goods. In this
regard, a right to redeem is substantially the same as an option. The debtor
may redeem until the sale date set by the IRS. Whiting Pools therefore had
until the sale date to exercise its right to redeem. An attempt by the IRS to sell
before the sale date would interfere with Whiting Pools' right. A sale on the
sale date, however, would not interfere with the right. The right simply
terminates by its own terms, like a lease terminates at the end of its term.
In addition, the IRS had a lien against the goods, but it had no lien against
property of the estate-the debtor's equity interest. Thus, exercising its rights
would not be enforcing the lien against property of the estate.3t6 Moreover,
the automatic stay would not prevent the IRS from selling the seized goods
because selling the seized goods would not be an act to enforce a prepetition
314 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
315 See also Appeal of Owens (In re Wayco, Inc.), 947 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1991) (tenant
security deposit held by agent for landlord debtor not property of estate because trustee did not satisfy
conditions for appropriating deposits under state law and therefore deposits need not be turned over to the
trstee); United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that Department of
Justice's use of software in its possession does not violate automatic stay prohibition of exercising control
over property of estate of debtor software company consisting of intangible trade secret rights in the
sollware).
316 This interpretation of§ 362(a)(3) does not make § 362(aX4) any more superfluous than it already is.
If property of the estate includes more than just the debtor's equity, any act to "control" such property under
subsection (3) would include an act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien under subsection (4). Subsection (4)
becomes completely redundant under this interpretation. That property of the estate refers only to the
debtor's interest in property does not make subsection (4) any more redundant. The redundancy was created

in 1984, when Congress added "control" to § 362(a)(3). See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-353, § 441(a)(2), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 333, 371.
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lien against "property of the debtor" under § 362(a)(5). Under § 541(a)(1),
whatever interest Whiting Pools had as debtor became part of the bankruptcy
estate. Whiting Pools as debtor in possession had custody and control over
property of the estate.317 After the filing of the petition, however, Whiting
Pools as a debtor had no interest in the goods.1 8
This interpretation of the automatic stay undoubtedly reduces the role of
property of the estate in the automatic stay. It does not seriously detract from
the stay, however, or eliminate the role of property of the estate. First, in the
case where the IRS has possession of the seized goods, selling the goods
would be an "act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case" under § 362(a)(6). The IRS had
a claim for $92,000. It could recover that claim only by selling the seized
goods and applying the proceeds of the sale to the payment of the claim.
Accordingly, continued possession of the repossessed property items by a
secured creditor would not violate the automatic stay, but selling them would
unless the31 9 IRS were able to obtain relief from the automatic stay under
§ 362(d).
Second, in the case of goods possessed by the debtor at the time of the
filing of the petition, any attempt by the creditor to seize the goods after the
filing would still violate the automatic stay. True, the debtor's continued right
to possession, part of its equity interest, is subject to the secured creditor's
right to foreclose the debtor's equity interest. Thus, taking possession does
not violate the debtor's right to possession, because the debtor loses that right
upon default. Nevertheless, possession itself, as distinguished from the right
of possession, is also part of the debtor's property interest, and an attempt to
deprive the debtor of possession, even though the debtor has no right to
See I I U.S.C. § 323(a) (1994) (trustee is "representative of the cstate").
318 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
319 Section 362(d) provides that a bankruptcy court "shall" grant relief from the stay on three grounds.
317

11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994). The first ground, under subsection 362(d)(1), is "for cause." Id. § 362(d)(1),
quotedsupra note 154. "Cause" includes the lack ofadequate protection of an interest in property. Cause
would include a decline in the value of an undersecured secured creditor's collateral unless it is othetwise
provided "adequate security," such as periodic payments to compensate for the decrease in value or a security
interest in other property of the estate. Id. § 361, quoted supra note 152. See United Say. Ass'n. v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 37) (1988). Subsection 362(d)(2) describes another set of
circumstances for relief "with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) ofthis section,
if(A) the debtor does not have an equity [sic] in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an
effective reorganization." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1994). Subsection 362(d)(3) provides additional grounds
for reliefin the case of"single asset real estate." Id. at § 362(d)(3). "Single asset real estate" is a real estate
project encumbered by no more than a $4 million mortgage. Id. at § 101(51B).
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possession, would be an act against property of the estate. Furthermore,
§ 362(a)(3) specifically prohibits acts to obtain possession of property of the
estate.32
The definition of property of the estate and Strumpf require that courts pay
closer attention to analyzing the specific property interests of debtors and
secured creditors. Many have failed to do so. Some explicitly follow Whiting
Pools, some emulate the reasoning that the Court used in that decision, and
some extend Whiting Pools beyond its facts or rationale. Some decisions
produce erroneous results. In other instances, despite the faulty analysis,
courts have reached a result that may be correct, but for an unarticulated
reason.
1. Tangible PropertyItems
The most egregious examples of the uncritical expansion of Whiting Pools
are those cases that impose an affirmative obligation on the secured creditor to
return the property items seized by a secured creditor before the trustee takes
action to seek their return. These cases also hold that continued possession of
the goods by the creditor violates the automatic stay. The leading case
imposing an affirmative duty on secured creditors to return property
321 items in
Knaus).
re
(In
Co.
Lumber
Concordia
v.
Knaus
is
possession
their
In Knaus, Concordia Lumber Co. obtained a judgment against Knaus for
the failure to pay for lumber sold to Knaus and, pursuant to a writ of
execution, had the sheriff seize other goods owned by Knaus. Knaus then
filed a chapter 11 petition and demanded return of the seized goods.
Concordia refused. Knaus then sought an order for the return of the seized
goods. At the hearing, -the creditor conceded that the goods were property of
the estate and consented to the turnover. The court found the initial refusal to
return the goods to be a willful and malicious violation of the automatic stay
and imposed sanctions, including attorneys fees and punitive damages.322 The
district court reversed, but the court of appeals reversed the district court and
reinstated the bankruptcy court's order.
The court of appeals, citing Whiting Pools for the erroneous proposition
that "property seized but not yet sold before the filing of the bankruptcy
320 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1994), quotedsupra in text accompanying note 311.
321 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989).
322 See id. at 774. The attorneys fees awarded were $270 and punitive damages were $750.
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petition is property of the estate," 3 failed completely to examine or to
understand the property interests of the debtor. The court analogized this
situation to an earlier decision, Small Business Administration v. Rinehart,"' in
which the court ordered the return of funds received by a creditor after the
filing of the petition."' Responding to the creditor's effort to distinguish
Rinehartbecause of the different timing, the court stated: "We fail to see any
distinction between a failure to return property taken before the stay and a
failure to return property taken after the stay."3"' There is, of course, a great
distinction. If a debtor has possession of property items at the time of filing
the petition, the possessory interest-the actual possession and the right of
possession-are part of the property of the estate. A postpetition seizure of
those property items by any person, creditor or no, takes a property interest
from the estate and violates the automatic stay of acts to exercise control over
property of the estate.
A seizure of property items from the debtor pursuant to state law before
the filing of the petition, however, gives the other person possession and the
right of possession and leaves the debtor with whatever property interest she
has under state law. If the debtor had sold the property items for fair
consideration paid, but had failed to deliver them to the buyer, and the buyer
had then seized them in a replevin action, 27 the debtor would have no property
interests. If a secured creditor had seized property items upon default, the
debtor would have its remaining equity interest, including the right to redeem
and the right to surplus, but no present right to possession or use. If a third
party had stolen the property items before the petition, the debtor would have
a right to bring an action for conversion. That right becomes property of the
estate. The automatic stay, which is designed to preserve the status quo and
prevent a race to the courthouse pending the resolution of the bankruptcy case,
is totally irrelevant to the rights of the parties as of the filing of the petition. 3 a

323
324

325

Id. at 775.
887 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1989).
In Rinehart, the SBA had obtained payment of certain farm program payments due from the

Department of Agriculture to a debtor after the filing of the petition. Id.
326 Rinehart, 889 F.2d at 775.
327 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716 (1995).
328 The court in Knaus did not provide the dates for the seizure of the goods and the filing of the
petition. If the goods were seized less than 90 days before the filing of the petition, the levy would be
avoidable as a preferential transfer because the levy would have enabled the judgment creditor to receive
more than it would receive as an unsecured creditor in a chapter 7. See I1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
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The court further displayed its failure to examine the property interests of
the estate and the creditor. It stated that the duty to return property under
§ 542(a) is not contingent upon any order of the bankruptcy court or any
demand by the creditor. As support for this position, it quoted the bankruptcy
judge's concern that:
[I]f persons who could make no substantial adverse claim to a
debtor's property in their possession could, without cost to
themselves, compel the debtor or his trustee to bring suit as a
prerequisite to returning the property, the powers of a bankruptcy
court ...would be vastly reduced.., and those who upiustly retain
possession of such property might do so with impunity.
The flaw in this reasoning is that, notwithstanding the creditor's erroneous
concession that the seized goods in its possession were property of the estate,
the creditor had a substantial adverse claim to the goods. Although still
owned by the debtor, the creditor had possession of them pursuant to a lawful
writ of execution of a judgment for the purpose of attaining payment of the
judgment.
hi re Sharon'" is a recent egregious case following Knaus. After her new
car was repossessed, a debtor filed a chapter 13 petition and demanded
immediate return of the car. The court held that the secured creditor violated
the automatic stay because it failed to return the car on demand. The court
relied extensively on Whiting Pools,3. and expressly held that "the Debtor's
33 2
Vehicle, specifically its possession and use, are property of the estate.
Because the debtor no longer had the right to use or possess the car at the time
of the filing, this holding is not correct. Further, the court held that, although
the debtor had no equity in the car, the car--a new $25,000 Mitsubishi 3000
GT, a luxury sports coupe 33 ---was "necessary for reorganization" because the
debtor needed it to drive to her cleaning business.33 Therefore the court
denied the creditor's application for relief from the stay.
329 Rinehart, 889 F.2d at 775 (emphasis added).
330 200 B.R. 181 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
331 Id.at 191.
332 Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
333 Consumer Reports lists this car as a "sporty/sports car over $25,000." 60 CONSUMER REPORTS 225
(1995). This category includes the Chevrolet Corvette, the Nissan 300ZX, and the Toyota Supra. Id
334 Sharon, 2011 B.R. at 194. This conclusion seems questionable because the monthly income of the
debtor, a single parent with dependent children, was $3,420, and the amount of the secured claim to be paid
under the plan was $24,737.50. Id. at 195-196. This vehicle was a luxury sports coupe with a leather
interior, custom wheels, and a sunroof. One could argue that retention of this vehicle, the monthly payments
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Under the plain language of § 541(a)(1), especially after Strumpf, mere
possession by a secured creditor of property items owned by the debtor, with
no attempt to sell the property items to collect the secured debt, does not
violate the automatic stay.3 5 Accordingly, unless there are other grounds for
requiring turnover, the secured creditor has no obligation to volunteer to
return such property items. Cases like Knaus and In re Sharon holding that
continued possession violates the stay and imposing on the creditor an
affirmative duty to return the goods are wrong3 6 In light of Strumpf,3 " these
cases should not be considered good law. 3 Because these cases also illustrate

on which would continue to be more than $900 a month, instead of huying a cheaper and less fancy car, was
detrimental to reorganization. See id. at 186.
335 See supra notes 294 and 313-19 and accompanying text.
336 See. e.g.. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Ryan, 183 B.R. 288 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Coats v. Vawter
(In re Coats), 168 B.R. 159, 165 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (citing Whiling Pools for the proposition that
property of the estate includes property items seized prepetition by a creditor); Can"v. Security Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 130 B.R. 434, 437 (D. N.J. 1991) (although creditor had repossessed car afier obtaining relief from
automatic stay in debtor's first bankruptcy, creditor was still required to return car when debtor filed a second
bankruptcy petition). The court in Sharon. 200 B.R. at 191, stated that these cases represent the majority
view, but it included cases in which a creditor had seized property items after the filing of the petition. See
also Abrams v. Southwest Leasing & Rental (In re Abrams), 127 B.R. 239, 240 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re
Holman, 92 B.R. 764,766 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); Cadsen v. IRS (In re Cadsen), 63 B.R. 706, 708 (Bankr
C.D. Cal. 1986). These cases present a completely different situation, because the estate had possession at
the commencement of the case. Postpetition deprivation of the estate's possessory interest in property is
exactly the type of activity prohibited by the automatic stay. Nevertheless, later decisions have followed the
reasoning of Knaus and Sharon that the failure of a secured creditor to return a repossessed property item
violates the automatic stay. See, e.g.. In re Berscheit, 223 B.R. 579, 581 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1998) (incorrectly
treating the secured creditor as being "in possession of estate property"); In re Zaber, 223 B.R. 102, 104-06
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998). But see infra note 338.
337 The court in Sharon stated that Strumpf was consistent with Whiting Pools because "the creditor
made no attempt to exereise control over property of the estate without filing a motion for relief from the
stay." Sharon, 200 B.R. at 191 n. 10. This statement is not accurate, because the bank in Strumpf imposed
the administrative hold before it filed for relief. Even if it were true, it is not apparent what significance it
has in the analysis.
338 See. e.g., In re Young, 193 B.R. 620 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996). In this opinion, the court thoughtfully
examined the interplay of several sections of the Code to find that a repossessing creditor that refused to
return a repossessed car did not violate the stay's prohibition against "exercis[ing] control over property of
the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(aX3) (1994). The court relied heavily on the requirement that a creditor be
provided adequate protection of its interest and held that immediate return would preclude adequate
protection. Unfortunately, the court, relying on Whiting Pools, made the too common mistake of confusing
the property item--the car-with the debtor's interest in property-4he debtor's nonpossessory equity
interest. It treated the car and not the equity interest as the "property of the estate." Id. at 621. Without this
error, it would not have had to struggle to find that retaining possession was not "exercising control." Id. at
624-25. In addition, the court incorrectly stated that Strumpfprovided no guidance on the issue because that
case involved a set off. Id. at 623 n.6.
See also Spears v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Spears), 223 B.R. 159, 165-67 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1998)
(erroneously following Whiting Pools to conclude that the debtor's right of redemption required the return
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how the failure of analysis in Whiting Pools contributed to their error, courts
should avoid the blind application of Whiting Pools.
The Court in Whiting Pools explicitly tried to limit its holding to its factual
patten-a secured creditor who repossessed goods and a debtor who sought
the goods to reorganize under chapter 11. The Court disclaimed any opinion
on two situations: when the creditor has possession pursuant to an agreement
and not as a result of default339 or when the debtor is liquidating under chapter
7 or adjusting its debts under chapters 12 or 13.340 Nevertheless, some courts
have uncritically expanded the application of Whiting Pools beyond its
particular holding without focusing on the precise definition of property of the
estate.
For example, in Leeling v. Smith (In re Leeling),341 the court required a
secured creditor who had possession of a note for purposes of perfecting his
security interest to return the note to the trustee of the debtor in a chapter 7
liquidation.3 42 First, the court did not analyze the remaining property interests
of the debtor in the note. It just applied the result in Whiting Pools to hold that
the entire note in the possession of the secured party was property of the
estate.343 Evidencing the weakness of Whiting Pools in providing guidance for
lower courts, the court also rejected the dictum in Whiting Pools that "if
property is pledged to the secured creditor so that the creditor
' 344 has possession
prior to any default, [§] 542(a) may not require a turnover.

under a chapter 13 plan of a car repossessed prepctition by a secured creditor, but rejecting Knaus, discussed

supra text accompanying notes 321-29, and Sharon, discussed supra text accompanying notes 330-34, and
following Young, supra, to conclude that the creditor's refusal to return the car voluntarily, which the court

saw as a passive act, did not violate the automatic stay against controlling property of the estate); Brown v.
Joe Addison, Inc. (Irre Brown), 210 B.R. 878, 883-84 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1997) (same. also relying on Strumpf

for proposition that refusal to act is not exercising "control").
311 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 206-07 n.14.
340 Whiting Pools 462 U.S. at 209 n. 17 ("C'uranalysis in this case depends in part on the reorganization
context in which the turnover is sought. We express no view on the issue whether § 542(a) has the same
broad effect in liquidation or adjustment of debt proceedings.").
341 129 B.R. 637 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
342 This case and the next discussed in the text involved property items-a note and certificated
securities--4hat in essence are intangible property interests represented by and "reified" in physical pieces of
paper. See supra note 71. Because they are what could he called "tangible intangible property," I have
included them in this subsection because of the actual possession of the property items by a secured creditor.
343 Leeling, 129 B.IL at 641 ("Consequently, the Court finds that the entire Van wagner note is property
of the estate and is subject to the turnover requirements imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).").
344 Id. at 640, citing Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 206 n. 14.
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The result in Leeling was not necessarily wrong. The value of the note
exceeded the secured debt. Return of the note for purposes of liquidation
under § 363(f) may have been appropriate .1 4 The problem is the failure to

analyze the debtor's property interests. This kind of failure has led other
courts to require the return of pledged property without regard to a precise
analysis of the requirements of the Code.346
PesterRefining Co. v. Mapco Gas Products (In re PesterRefining Co. 47
also shows the thoughtless application of Whiting Pools. In this case, a
pipeline company, asserting its carrier's lien for unpaid shipping charges
authorized by state law and its tariff, retained possession of 3,260 barrels of
normal butane that were to be delivered to the debtor in possession in a
chapter 11 case. The court of appeals upheld the bankruptcy court's order,

under § 542(a), requiring the return of the normal butane to the debtor in
possession. The court merely recited the Supreme Court's erroneous
statement that in effect § 542(a) "grants to the estate a possessory interest in
certain property of the debtor that was not held by the debtor at the
commencement of reorganization proceedings. 348 The court of appeals also
rejected the pipeline company's argument that Whiting Pools, by its own
dicta, 49 did not apply to a pledge of goods before default by a secured
creditor. After finding that the retention of the butane pursuant to a carrier
lien was not a pledge as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Whiting Pools,
the court went further: "Moreover, to interpret Whiting Pools as suggested by
345 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
346 See also In re Iferd, 225 B.R. 501, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1998) (correctly ruling that the owner of a
repossessed car retains legal title until the creditor sells the car, but, relying on Whiting Pools, incorrectly
holding that the debtor's legal title "is sufficient to make the vehicle property of the estate"); Spears v. Ford
Motor Credit Co. (In re Spears), 223 B.R. 159, 165-67 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1998) (erroneously following
Whiting Pools to conclude that the debtor's right of redemption required the return of a car repossessed
prepctition by a secured creditor); In re Becker, 217 B.R. 231, 235-36 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) (correctly
analyzing the interests in horses owned by a judgment debtor but levied upon by a sheriff for a judgment
creditor and in the possession ofthcjudgment creditor as bailce for the sheriff, but incorrectly concluding (in
reliance on Whiting Pools) that the judgment debtor's right of redemption transformed the horses into
property ofthe estate); Phillips v. Smith (In re Ayscue), 123 B.R. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (relied upon by
Leeling, 129 B.R. at 640)); Leverette v. NCNB South Carolina (In re Leverettc), 118 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1991) (citing Whiling Pools for the proposition that property of the estate encompasses more than just
property items in the debtor's possession at the time of filing the debtor's petition, and stating that the
debtor's right to redemption "is sufficient to bring the [automobile) within the meaning of 'property of the
estate."').
37 845 F.2d 1476 (8th Cir. 1988).
348 Id. at 1485 (quoting Whiling Pools. 462 U.S. at 207, discussed supra note 234 and accompanying
text).
39 Whiting Pools,462 U.S. at 206 n.14, quoted supra in text accompanying note 344.
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[the carrier] would deprive [the debtor's] bankruptcy estate of assets essential
to its rehabilitation effort, thereby frustrating the congressional purpose
behind the reorganization provisions."' 0 The court of appeals thus relied on
the result and analytical methodology of Whiting Pools and eschewed any
analysis of the property interests involved. Putting the cart before the horse, it
stated that it need not determine the validity of the carrier's lien because §
542(a) required the return of the butane."'
There was a simple and correct way to reach the same result. The carrier
asserted its carrier's lien and retained the butane it was holding for the debtor
after the debtor had filed a chapter 11 petition. The carrier's actions violated
the automatic stay as an act to enforce a lien against property of the estate and
an act to collect a prepetition claim.352 Accordingly, the court should have
analyzed this case as the simple postpetition conversion by the carrier of the
estate's ownership interest in the butane, including its possessory interest, and
the application of § 542(a) would have required the return
354 of such property of

the estate. 3 Whiting Pools is irrelevant to this analysis.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took a step in
the right direction in CharlesR. Hall Motors, Inc., v. Lewis (In re Lewis).35 In
that case, a secured creditor had repossessed the debtor's car before the
debtor filed a chapter 13 petition. The debtor's chapter 13 plan proposed to
repay the secured creditor 62% of the outstanding balance of the secured loan.
After the creditor refused to return the car, the debtor sought and the
bankruptcy court ordered the creditor to return the car to the debtor. The
district court reversed and the court of appeals affirmed the reversal.
Significantly, the court noted that under applicable state law the only interest
of the debtor in the car that became property of the estate was the debtor's
right to redeem the car by paying the full amount of the secured debt. The
court held that this right did not cause the car itself to become property of the
350 Pester Refining Co., 845 F.2d at 1486 (citing Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 208).
351 PesterRefining Co., 845 F.2d at 1487 n.21.
352 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), (6) (1994), quoted supra text accompanying note 311. See also supra note
320 and accompanying text.
353 See also supra note 238 and accompanying text.
354 The bankruptcy court had awarded conversion damages, which the court of appeals had affirmed.
See Pester Refining Co., 845 F.2d at 1486-87. There was no discussion of providing any adequate protection
forthe carder's putative lien for the payment of its shipping charges, although the court of appeals did recite
the requirement for adequate protection. See id. at 1485-86. Accordingly, the court of appeals may have
thought of this case as a simple conversion case and simply cited Whiting Pools tojustify its conclusion.
355 137 F.2d 1280 (llthCir. 1998).
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estate and subject to turnover under §§ 542(a) and 363(b). 5 ; The debtor in
Lewis could regain possession only by paying the debt.
This analysis differs from the Supreme Court's result in Whiting Pools.
The court in Lewis distinguished Whiting Pools on the ground that under state
law-Alabama law-repossession by a secured creditor transferred ownership
as well as the right to possession to the creditor."? The Supreme Court in
Whiting Pools had relied on the fact that, under the Federal Tax Lien Act,
ownership of the seized goods remained with the debtor until the foreclosure
sale had been completed. Thus, the force of Lewis is somewhat limited.
Nevertheless, location of title should not matter. What matters are the specific
property interests that each person has in a property item. If a secured
creditor has repossessed a property item, neither possession nor the right to
possession of that property item is part of property of the estate. The secured
creditor need not return the repossessed property item on the mistaken idea
that it is property of the estate.
2. Intangible PropertyItems
The analysis of property interests in tangible property items discussed
above applies to property interests in intangible property items as well. The
only differences between treatment of intangible items and tangible items are
those necessary to reflect the differences in the features of the specific
property items. A common example is an account-a right to payment from a
third party, the account debtor. 359 To the extent that a secured creditor with a
security interest has control over the account by having notified the account
debtor of its security interest, the secured creditor need not return it (by
reassigning it to the trustee) on the grounds that the account is property of the
estate.3 ° Unless there is some other basis for requiring turnover,3 1 the
creditor may continue to exercise "control" over it, although the automatic
stay prevents the creditor from foreclosing its interests by selling it.

356 Id. at 1284-85.
351 Id. at 1283-84, 1285 n.8.
358 But see supra note 310.
359 See U.C.C. § 9-106(1995).
360 See In re Seay, 97 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (holding entry ofjudgment on garnishment of
debtor's bank account by creditor before filing of petition tenninates debtor's interest in the account under
state law and therefore the account is not property of the estate and payment by the bank of funds in account
after filing ofpetition does not violate automatic stay).
361 See supranote 310.
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Intangible property items, like accounts, that generate cash payments or
other cash proceeds pose additional questions. Disputes over the rights to
these cash collections occur in two common factual patterns. In one, a

creditor has garnished or attached a debt owed by an obligor, the account
debtor, to the debtor before the filing of the petition, but the account debtor
has not yet paid the creditor by the time the debtor files its petition. In the
other, a debtor has pledged an account to a creditor before filing a bankruptcy
petition, and because of prepetition default the creditor has notified the
account debtor to make payments to it.362 The question is whether, after the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, the secured creditor may continue to receive
the payments from the account debtor, or whether it must return to the trustee
payments that the secured creditor receives.
The courts have resolved this problem in two ways. There is one line of
cases holding that collections from an account attached prepetition belong to
the creditor and therefore collections due to or received by the secured
creditor after the petition need not be paid or returned to the trustee. 63 A
second line of cases holds that the debtor still owns those collections and
therefore the collections must be paid or returned to the trustee.'" Although
the first line of cases that treat the collections as belonging to the secured

362 See U.C.C. § 9-502(1) (1995). Section 9-502(1) provides:
When so agreed and in any event on default the secured patty is entitled to notify an account
debtor or the obligor on an instrument to make payment to him whether or not the assignor was
theretofore making collections on the collateral, and also to take control of any proceeds to which
he is entitled under Section 9-306.
Id. § 9-502(1).
363 See U.S. v. Borock (In re Ruggeri Elec. Contracting, Inc.), 185 B.R. 750 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995)
(prepetition levy by IRS to collect taxes in amount of $196,000 on bank account containing $47,000
extinguished debtor's interest in bank account; trustee later recovered amount seized as a preference; see
Infra note 378); Sanwa Bank Cal. v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 111 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990)
(prepetition notice of levy by California Board of Equalization on bank account credited with approximately
$7,500 in order to obtain payment of past due sales taxes in the amount of $826,000 resulted in transfer of
ownership of moneys credited to account to Board); Rose v. Commercial Nat'l. Bank (In re Rose), 112 B.R.
12 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1989) (prepetition levy by IRS on account); Altman v. Commissioner, 83 B.R. 35 (D.
Haw. 1988) (prepetition levy by IRS on self-settled trust fund account). These are technically incorrect, if
practically sound. See Daniel S. Greenspan, Note, A Loose End ofWhiting Pools: The Chronic Problem of
Prepetitlon Levies on Cash and Cash Equivalents, 82 VA. L REV. 163, 171 n.45 (1996); Richardson, supra
note 269, at 595, 599-600, 604-08.
364 See United States v. Challenge Air Int'l. (In re Challenge Air Int'l.), 952 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992)
(prepetition levy by IRS on amounts due from American Express to debtor); In re AIC Indus., 83 B.IL 774
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988). See also Greenspan, supra note 363, at 171 n.45; Richardson, supra note 269, at
595, 608-12.
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creditor more closely respects the secured creditor's property interests,
neither of these approaches is correct.

365

Under state law, and therefore under § 541(a)(1), once the account debtor

has received notification to pay the creditor, the debtor no longer has the right

to control the account or the right to receive the collections. 3" The debtor's
status is analogous to the debtor who no longer has the right to possess
tangible property items seized by a secured creditor. The debtor remains the

owner of the account and retains an ownership interest in the cash payments.
Notification to the account debtor to pay the creditor does not effect a transfer
of ownership. The debtor has the right to surplus from the account (and the
collections) over the debt owed to the creditor, and the right to redeem the
account (and the collections). The automatic stay precludes the secured

creditor from selling the account because such a sale would be an act to
collect a prepetition claim.
The collections should be treated the same way. The automatic stay
precludes the secured creditor from applying the collections to the debt. This
result, however, does not require the account debtor to cease payment of the
amount due to the creditor or require the creditor to return the collections it
receives to the debtor. There is an important distinction between accepting

and holding the collections, on the one hand, and applying those collections to
reduce the debt, on the other. Accepting the collections from the account
debtor and holding them would not, by itself, constitute an act to collect a
claim. Applying the payments to the balance of the secured debt would.367
365 See Greenspan, supra note 363, at 176-78, arguing that a prepetition levy on a right to payment
practically extinguishes the debtor's interests in the right to payment to the extent of the levy and therefore
should be treated as the equivalent ora foreclosure sale.
366 See U.C.C. § 9-502(1). quoted supra note 362: see also Id. § 9-318(3) (account debtor may pay
assignor until notification of assignment and direction of payment to assignee).
367 Professor Carlson argues that collecting such payments would violate the automatic stay because the
payments represent postpctition proceeds of the account in which a new security interest is created, an act
stayed by § 362(a)(5) which stays acts to create security interests in property of the estate. Carlson,
Volunteer,supra note 313. at 506. 1 disagree. First, treating the conversion of the account into the proceeds
of the account as the creation ofa nev security interest stayed by § 362(aX(5) renders § 552(b) meaningless.
Section 552(b) provides that a security interest in the account automatically extends to the proceeds ifcertain
standard requirements are met. Second, in this case, unlike the case of pledged accounts in which the
account debtor is making payments to the debtor, neither the account nor the payments on the account are
property of the estate. The property of the estate is simply the debtor's residual rights. The debtor no longer
has any right to the payments themselves, other than the right to redeem those payments or receive the excess
of the payments over the debt. Thus, however one characterizes the creditor's interests in the payments, the
receipt of those payments is not the creation of a security interest in the interests of the debtor in those
payments.
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Accordingly, the secured creditor who is receiving collections on an account
must hold them apart, just as the bank in Strumpf must continue to preserve
the balance in the debtor's checking account, and the secured creditor that has
repossessed tangible property items of the debtor must continue to hold and
preserve those property items.'6
Because mere acceptance of the collections is not an act to collect a claim,
there is no basis in the definition of property of the estate in the Code for
requiring the immediate return of such collections or the cessation of the
receipt of such collections. Any such return would have to be done pursuant
to other provisions of the Code. This interpretation imposes no additional
burden on the debtor. Absent the consent of the secured party, any action to
liquidate the account or to use the payments collected by the creditor and the
remaining balance of the account would need court approval under § 363(c)
(2)(B).6
Accordingly, the line of cases that holds that the secured creditor need not
return the collections because the creditor owns them is wrong.370 The
creditor can only "own" the collections if it applies them to the debt Section
362(a)(6), prohibiting acts to collect a claim, stays such application and
renders it void or voidable."' The debtor still retains its equity interest in the
collections. As a practical matter, application of the collections to the debt
may make little difference to the trustee, because it must provide adequate
protection before it could use the cash. Still, like the bank in Strumpf, the
secured party needs to obtain relief from the stay before it can apply the
collections to the debt.

311 See U.C.C. § 9-207(i) (1995) ("A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody and
preservation of collateral in his possession. In the case of an instrument or chattel paper reasonable care
includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed.").
369 Seesupra note 141.
370 If the collection is applied to the debt before the filing of the petition, then the secured creditor owns
the collection and it is not property of the estate. See In re Scay, 97 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989),
discussed supra note 359. The only issue is whether the trustee could avoid the payment as a preferential
trnsfer under II U.S.C. § 547(b).
371 See In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 751 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding acts taken in violation of automatic stay
are voidable, not void); Schwartz v. United States (In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding acts in violation of automatic stay were void); Job v. Calder (In re Calder), 907 F.2d 953, 956 (10th
Cir. 1990) (relying on equitable principles to prevent stay from voiding state court judgment); Blatnick v.
Sanders (In re Sanders), 198 B.R. 326 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding violation of stay void but allowing
retroactive annulment of stay); see also Timothy Arnold Barnes, Note, The Plain Meaning of the Automatic
Stav In Bankruicy: The Void/Voidable DistinctionRevisited, 57 OHIO ST. UJ. 291 (1996).
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The cases requiring the immediate return of the collections of prepetition
accounts are also wrong. Typical of these cases is SPS Technologies v. Baker
Material Handling Corp. 7
In this case, the district court upheld the
postpetition payment of an account by the account debtor, Baker, to the debtor
in a chapter 11 reorganization even though the secured creditor, SPS, had a
security interest in the account and, before the filing of the petition, had
notified the account debtor Baker to pay SPS. Under state law, 73 Baker, as
the account debtor, was obligated to pay the secured creditor. Furthermore,
the debtor had no equity in the account. The amount of the secured debt was
over $300,000 and the account was about $115,000. Nevertheless, relying on
Whiting Pools, the district court concluded:
[The debtor's] right to redeem the Baker Receivable and its right to
any surplus in the receivable, even if they are rights that [the debtor]
could not, or would not, assert in the instant situation, are sufficient
to render the account "property" of [the debtor's estate and subject
to turnover under § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code.3 4
The court thus eschewed any examination of the interests of the debtor in
the collection from the account. The analytical role of Whiting Pools in this
case is simply that "'[t]he Whiting Pools decision authorized turnover of the
debtor's property held by the [secured creditor] to maximize the estate in
order to facilitate the debtor's reorganization."'' "' This case illustrates the
confusion spawned by Whiting Pools between a debtor's interest in property
and the property itself.
This case and other similar cases 76 ignore the statutory boundaries of
property of the estate. Although the estate has an equity interest in the
collections, it does not have a right to receive or use the collections. The
collections themselves are not property of the estate. Section 542(a) does not
require their return. 3 7
372

153 B.R. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

313 U.C.C. §§ 9-318,-502 (1995).

'74 SPS Technologies, 153 B.R. at 153.
375 I'd. (quoting United States v. Challenge Air Int'l (In re Challenge Air Int'l), 952 F.2d 384, 387 (11th
Cir. 1992)).

376 See. e.g.. Carlsen v. IRS (In re Carlsen), 63 B.R. 706, 710-11 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
377 Only by applying the other provisions of the Code might a court authorize a return of such
collections. See supra note 310. Because the amount of the collections in SPS Technologies was less than
the debt, SPS Technologies, 153 B.R. at 149-50, § 363(f) would not permit their return. See also supra note
130 and accompanying text.
In Gouvea v. IRS (In re Quality Health Care), 215 B.RL 543 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997), relying on
Whiting Pools, the court erroneously held that monies paid by a bank postpetition to the IRS pursuant to a
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This discussion applies only to a relatively narrow set of collections: rights
to payment that arose before the filing of the petition and collections received
by the secured creditor after the petition. This set of facts presents the most
difficult analytical issues. Other sets of circumstances involving accounts and
collections present easier solutions. Thus, if the creditor has received
collections and applied them to the debt before the petition is filed, the
collections are not property of the estate and the automatic stay would not
come into play. 78 If the secured creditor has a security interest in an account
but has not notified the account debtor before the filing of the petition, the
37 9
automatic stay would preclude such notification as an act to collect a clain
Any accounts (or any other property interests) that the debtor or the estate
acquires after the petition are not subject to the creditor's security interest and
hence none of the collections would be encumbered.380
Thus, in any situation involving intangible property items that generate
cash payments, courts must pay close attention to the interests involved. A
difficult example is the garnishment of employee wages. If a creditor has
garnished the wages of an employee who then files for bankruptcy, the
creditor has a prepetition lien on the wages that the employee has earned up to
the day of the filing of the petition. The employee's equity interest in those
wages is property of the estate. The secured creditor should be entitled to
receive and hold those prepetition wages, but not apply them to the debt.
To the extent that the garnishment would extend to wages earned after the
petition, a continuing attempt to collect those wages would violate the
automatic stay. Under § 541(a)(6), postpetition wages received by the
employee are not property of the estate," and, under § 552(a), a security
interest in wages earned by and received by the debtor after the petition is
prepetition levy on the debtor's bank account were property of the estate. 215 B.R. at 565-7 1. Nevertheless,
rejecting Knaus, discussed supra text accompanying notes 321-29, and Sharon, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 330-34, and following Young, supra note 338, and also citing Strumpf,the court held
that the IRS's refusal to return the monies paid was not a violation of the automatic stay. Id. at 572-80.
378 The application of the collections to the debt within 90 days before the filing of the petition may be a
preferential transfer avoidable by the trnstee. See II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994); U.S. v. Borock (In re Rugged
Elec. Contracting, Inc.), 214 B.R. 481 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (avoiding as a preference the prepetition levy on
debtor's bank account by IRS to collect taxes owed; bankruptcy court had previously ruled that prepetition
levy extinguished debtor's interest in bank account; see supra note 363).
319 See Id. § 362(a)(6), discussedsupratext accompanying note 319.
380 See Id. § 552(a); see also Thackerv. Etter (In re Thacker), 24 B.R. 835, 837 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)
(analyzing neither property interests involved nor § 552, but concluding that collection of postpetition wages
pursuant to prepetition garnishment violated automatic stay).
381 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6).
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void." 2 These results follow not from a generalized notion that property items
subject to a security interest in which the debtor has some equitable interest
are themselves property of the estate, as stated by the Court in Whiting Pools,
but from the specific application of the provisions of the Code to specific
factual situations, as done by the Court in Strumpfi
B. Non-CreditorPropertyInterests
The extension of Whiting Poolsto third party property interests that are not
liens is more troubling. In the extreme, the analysis could go like this: under
§ 542(a), any party who has a property item in which the debtor has an interest
must return that property item to the trustee. Thus an owner of a parcel of real
estate must give the parcel to the trustee if the owner has granted the debtor (i)
a leasehold interest, (ii) a security interest, or (iii) some other property
interest."
This conclusion does not comport with the definition of property of the
estate. This conclusion, however, is supported by the Court's statement in
Whiting Pools that the definition of property of the estate in § 541(a)(1) is not
limiting!M Accordingly, if property of the estate includes more than "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property" as of the commencement of
the case, plus property added to the estate after the commencement of the
case, then property of the estate could include property in which the debtor
has a lesser interest, such as a warehouse owned by a non-debtor and leased to
the debtor. Indeed, under this view, there is no limit to what is in the estate.
Property of the estate could include property items in which the debtor does
not have any interest.
There is no indication that Congress intended such a result. And, if it did
intend such a result, it lacks the power under the Bankruptcy Clause38 and
under
the Whiting
Fifth Amendment
not taken
Poolsthis far.to effectuate such a result. Most courts have

382 Id. § 552(a).

383 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 77, at 1099 (arguing that the fantastic "logic" of Whiting Pools
supports this conclusion and destroys the legal foundation of many securitizations).
384 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
385 See supra note 75.

386 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. Several commentators have argued that a congressional abolition of security
interests would not violate the Fifth Amendment. See. e.g., James S.Rogers, The Impairment of Secured
Creditors* Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L REV. 973 (1983). Although I agree that, under the Bankruptcy Clause,
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Still, Whiting Pools has induced a few courts to expand the property rights
of debtors too far at the expense of third parties. The most prominent example
of an unwarranted expansion is Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer (In re
3 87
Meridian Reserve).
In this case, the owner had absolutely assigned an
account to Rimmer. The assignment was not for security, and the seller
retained no residual interest in, liability on, or opportunity for gain or loss
from the account. Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that the account was
still part of the property of the bankruptcy estate of the seller because Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code defined a buyer's interest in an account as
a "security interest."'g' The court supported its "analysis" by quoting the
Supreme Court's statement in Whiting Pools that property of the estate was
not limited by the enumerated items in § 541."9
The suggestion in Whiting Pools that property of the estate may include
more than the enumerated items in § 541(a) gave the court of appeals a license
to include in the bankruptcy estate property interests that were not owned by
the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition. 90 That a United States court
of appeals would rely on the "not limiting" language of Whiting Pools instead
of analyzing the specific incidents of the property item involved39 suggests
that Whiting Pools presents a real threat to the principled resolution of the
Congress could abolish security interests in bankruptcy, I am not convinced that it could do so under the
Fifth Amendment. Professor Rogers' analysis looks at this issue from the point of view of the secured
creditor, and he is right that a prospective abolition of the right to create a security interest does not deprive
the secured creditor of any property interest. Nevertheless, restricting the ability of an owner of property to
grant a security interest may be depriving the owner of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
387 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
388 Octagon Gas, 995 F.2d at 955 ("The impact of applying Article 9 to [the buyer's] account is that
Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral would place [the buyer's] account within the property of
[the seller's] bankruptcy estate."); id. at 956 C'We do not agree that the assignment of the account to [the
buyer] effectuated a transfer to [him] of all property interests in the account, leaving [the seller] with no
property interest in [the buyer's] account which the bankruptcy trustee could reach under II U.S.C. § 541.").
389 Id. at 955 (stating that the Court in Whiting Pools "determined that § 541 merely defines what is
included in the bankrupt's estate rather than placing a limit on the scope of the estate").
390 No financing statement had been filed to perfect the assignment, as required by U.C.C. § 9-302(1)
(1995), and it is possible that the trustee could have brought the account back into the estate as a hypothetical
lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1). The trustee had not done so, however. In addition, there is a good
chance that the assignment, which was an assignment of only 5% of the receipts from the sale of gas, would
have been automatically perfected under U.C.C. § 9-302(l){e) (1995) as an assignment of an account "which
does not alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the
outstanding accounts of the assignor."
391 There is some question about the nature of the "account" that had been "sold." The assignment may
have evidenced a sale
of an existing account representing the obligation of third parties to pay money, one
kind of a property item, or the creation of an account representing the obligation of the debtor to pay money
or a combination of the above. See Plank,supra note 77, at 454 n.262.
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conflicting property interests of the entities involved in a bankruptcy case.
Under a broad application of Whiting Pools every outright purchaser of a
property interest could lose her property interest to a prior seller if that
property interest would help that seller reorganize or help pay more to the
seller's unsecured creditors.
Uncertainty in determining what is property of the estate poses a
substantial risk for numerous business transactions. These include the entire
securitization industry, which involves many hundreds of billions of securities
transactions.392 Securitization gives originators of residential or commercial
mortgage loans, automobile loans, credit card receivables, equipment leases
and loans, trade receivables, and other receivables an additional way to raise
capital to extend credit to consumers or to finance their operations.
Securitization is the transformation of these receivables into securities that can
be sold in the capital markets. Most originators of these receivables lack the
strong credit rating that would enable them to sell their own securities in the
capital markets. Originators, however, can structure securities-known as
asset backed securities 9 -backed solely by the receivables themselves so that
these securities receive a rating from a rating agency394 higher than any rating
that the originator could obtain on its debt securities." 5 Thus a much larger
392 Board ofGov. of Fed. Res. System, Domestic Financial Statistics, 84 FED. RES. BULL A35, tbl. 1.54,
II. 1, 68 (Dec. 1998) (of the $5.4 trillion of mortgage loans outstanding as of the end of March 1998, $484
billion was held in the form of private pools of securitized assets); id. at A36, tbl. 1.55, I1.5, 11 (of the
approximately $1.3 trillion of consumer credit loans outstanding as of the end of July 1998, $346 billion was
held in the form of pools of securitized assets) (not seasonably adjusted figures).
393 I will use the term "asset backed securities" to refer to securities backed by mortgages as well as by
non-mortgage receivables. Because mortgage backed securities were the first ofthese securities and because
the underlying loans have substantially different characteristics, such as much longer terms, and are subject to
much different legal regimes, it is common to refer separately to mortgage backed securities backed by
mortgage loans and to asset backed securities backed solely by non-mortgage receivables. See, e.g.
STANDARD & POOR's, STRUCTURED FINANCECRTERIA 61, 79 (1988).

394 There are four main nationally recognized rating agencies: Standard & Poor's Ratings Services, a
division of McGraw Hill; MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, Inc.; Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co.; and Fitch
IBCA, Inc. These rating agencies assign ratings to debt securities. The four highest rating categories (AAA,
AA, A, and BBB for Standard & Poor's, for example) are generally considered "investment grade" securities.
See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S, STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA 3-7 (1988): Peter V. Darrow ct al., Rating
Agency Requirements, in I SECoRTtZATION OF FINANCIAL AssTs § 7.01 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d cd.
1996); Moody's Investors Service, 63 MOODY'S BOND RECORD 3-4 (October 1996). Some investors, such as
banks and insurance companies, have limits on the quality of securities they may hold or the amount of
capital that must be reserved against such securities. See Michael G. Capatides et al., Investment by Banks
and Bank Holding Companies, in 2 SECURMZATION OF FINANCIAL AssErs § 17.04; Francesca M. Maher &
Mare L Klyman, Investment by Insurance Companies, in 2 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AssETs § 17.03.
395 Large, credit-worthy originators also use securitizations to maintain favorable debt-equity ratios. In
addition, the higher the rating that an issuer of debt securities can achieve, the lower the interest rate on the
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universe of investors can purchase asset backed securities than would or could
buy securities of the originator. This additional source of capital lowers costs
to consumers and businesses and promotes the creation and growth of
businesses that originate loans that would not otherwise take place. 9
The essential ingredient for a securitization is isolating the asset backed
securities from the risk that the originator will become a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code. The originator, as an operating company, could become a
debtor under the Code, either voluntarily or involuntarily, for reasons
unrelated to the credit quality of the receivables. Accordingly, the originator
must transfer the receivables in a "true sale" to a bankruptcy remote entity
whose sole purpose is to issue securities backed by the receivables.3 97 If the
securities. On the other hand, achieving a higher rating imposes other costs, such as a lower debt to equity
ratio by the issuer, which then requires having a larger amount of more expensive equity investors. See, e.g.,
STANDARD & PooR's, STRUCTURED FINANCE CRITERIA 61 (1988); Jason H.P. Kravitt, The Nature of
Securitlzation, in 1SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL AsSErs § 1.01, at 1-4 to 1-5 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed.
Scifinan, Identifying Legal, Accounting & Related Issues, in id. § 3.02.
1997); Jason H.P. Kravitt & Jeffrey
Each issuer assesses the costs of achieving the higher rating against the savings to be generated by those
higher ratings. One study found that General Motors Acceptance Corporation lowered its interest costs by
securitizing its automobile loans instead of raising money through traditional debt financing. See James A.
Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized Credit, I J.APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Fall 1988, at 32.
396 See generally I TAMAR FRANKEI., SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 65-100, 156-58, 161-62 (1991); STANDARD & POOR'S, STRUCTURED
FINANCE CRITERIA 20, 61 (1988); Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, Association of
the City of New York, Structured FinancingTechniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 530 (1995); Stephen L Glover,
Structured Finance Goes Chapter 11: Asset Securitization by Reorganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAw. 611,
613-14 (1992); Charles E.Harrell & Mark D. Folk, FinancingAmerican Health Security: The Securitization
of HealthcareReceivables, 50 Bus. LAw. 47, 51-52 (1994); Charles E. Harrell ct al., Securitization of Oil.
Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 Bus. Law. 885, 887-88
(1997); Steven L Schwartz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STANFORD J. L BUS. & FIN. 133, 136-44
(1994); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution. Current Issues and New
Frontiers,69 TEx. L REV. 1369, 1383-99 (1991).
397 A bankruptcy remote entity, or special purpose entity, is a corporation, partnership, limited liability
whose sole purpose is to acquire the receivables and issue asset backed securities payable
company, or trust
from the receivables. The securities can be in the fomi of pass-through certificates evidencing an ownership
interest in the receivables held in a trust or in the form of debt secured by the receivables held by the entity.
In the case of pass-through certificates, the trust is not actually a separate legal entity that is eligible to be a
debtor under the Code. This trust is nevertheless referred to as a "special purpose entity" for the sake of
convenience. As a passive trust, the only significant duty of the trustee is to pass through to the holders of
the certificates the cash received ftom the receivables. The certificate holders acquire the essential risks of
owning the receivables.
In the case of debt securities, the bankruptcy remote entity is more elaborate. Under the Code, an
entity eligible to be a debtor cannot effectively preclude itself from filing a petition or being the subject of an
involuntary petition. Accordingly, the risk of bankruptcy cannot be eliminated. To reduce the risk of an
involuntary petition, the organizational documents preclude the entity from engaging in any other activity, or
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receivables are not owned by the originator, they would not be included in the
bankruptcy estate of the originator, and the automatic stay would not apply to
interrupt the payments generated by the receivables to the holders of the
securities."" If a trustee for an originator in bankruptcy, however, could
recapture the receivables that it had sold in a properly structured
securitization, then this method of raising money for all originators would be
destroyed" 9

in issuing any other debt (with limited exceptions). Thus, the entity should have no creditors other than the
holders of the asset backed securities who could file an involuntary petition against the entity. To protect
against a voluntary petition, the organizational documents require the assent of a party independent of the
owners of the entity to file a petition. This independent person will be an independent director on the board
of directors of a corporation, a general partner in a limited partnership or a member in a limited liability
company which itself is a bankruptcy remote corporation with an independent director, or a trustee of a
business trust. The organizational documents will also contain covenants designed to ensure that the
bankruptcy remote entity in fact operates as an independent entity separate from its owners. If an owner of
the bankruptcy remote issuer (a stockholder in a corporation, a partner in a limited partnership, a member in a
limited liability company, or a beneficial owner ofa business trust) were to become a debtor under the Code,
the bankruptcy remote issuer and its receivables would not be consolidated with the receivables of the debtor
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Frequently, a law firm will opine that such consolidation will not occur. See
STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 396, at 23, 68-70, 112-14; Committee on Bankruptcy, supra note 396, at
553-60; Schwarez, supra note 396, at 135-36; Steven L Schwarcz, The Pans are Greater Than the Whole:
How Securlzation of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital
Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLtM. Bus. L.REv. 139, 143-45. See also Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Death of Liability, 116 YALE L. 1,23-30 (1996).
398 STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 396, at 29-30, 68-69; Committee on Bankruptcy, Structured
Financing Techniques, supra note 396, at 541-53; Harrell, Securitizatlon of Natural Resource Assets, supra
note 396, at 909-17; Plank, supra note 42, at 307-10.
399 If the receivebles were included in the originator's bankruptcy estate, then all the consequences of
bankruptcy would apply to the asset backed securities. These include the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362,
which would prevent payment of the proceeds of the receivables to the holders of the securities or
enforcement of that payment, and the turnover provisions, which might require return of the receivables to
the bankruptcy trustee. Id. § 542(a). See also Plank, supra note 42, at 307-10 (discussing other implications
of including the receivables in the bankruptcy estate).
The desire ofpurchasers of asset backed securities to have as much assurance of repayment as possible
produces a tension in structuring the securities. On the one hand, the purchasers want to be isolated from the
risks of the bankruptcy of the originator. On the other hand, the purchasers want as much comfort as possible
from the originator that the receivables will perform well. Some forms of comfort, such as representations
and warranties about the receivables as of the date of the sale, are consistent with a true sale of the
receivables. Retention of risks of future collectibility of the receivables, such as an obligation by the
originator to repurchase defaulted receivables, are not consistent. See Id. at 290 n. 13, 314-28. To preserve
the true sale of the receivables, lawyers structuring these transactions for the issuer, who must deliver a "true
sale" opinion, must guard against other creative types of comfort that purchasers, investment bankers, and
their lawyers can devise to obtain additional assurance ofpayment. One example is deferring a portion of the
purchase price and calculating the amount of the deferred portion on the basis of how well the receivables
pay. If an originator retains future risks or benefits from the receivables, there is a risk that a bankruptcy
court will recharacterize the sale as merely a pledge to secure a loan. See id. at 288-90, 314-16, 322-27.
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Octagon Gas shows this risk is not merely theoretical. Octagon Gas did

not involve a securitization, and it has been roundly denounced as judicial
error'ro Nevertheless, the decision actually interrupted the securitization
industry as soon as it was publicly available in that it effectively precluded all
normal securitizations backed by accounts created by originators who would
be eligible to file a bankruptcy petition in the states included in the Tenth
Circuit.40' Later, the State of Oklahoma amended its version of the Uniform
Commercial Code to overrule the case, but Octagon Gas is still the "law" in
the Tenth Circuit. 4 2 If courts pay attention to the Supreme Court's focus on
the specific property interests of the debtor in Strumpf, the threat of the
analytical method used by Whiting Pools and extended by Octagon Gas
should end.
A more mundane example of the threat posed by Whiting Pools is
ProfessionalSales Corp. v. United States (In re ProfessionalSales Corp.).4°3
The debtor attempting to reorganize in this case had acquired a hazardous
waste site operated pursuant to an interim status authorization permitted by the

400 The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code issued a commentary disapproving
of the court's reasoning. PERMANENT ErroRIAL BI. FORTHE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY
No. 14 § 9-l02(l)(b) (June 10, 1994). For extensive analysis and criticism of Octagon Gas. see Plank, supra
note 77, at 453-61, and Thomas E. Plank, When A Sale ofAccounts ls Not a Sale:A Critiqueof Octagon Gas,
48 CONSUMER FIN. L Q. REp. 45-53 (1994). See also Nikiforos Mathews, Note, Circuit Court Erie Errors
and the District Court's Dilemma: From Roto-Lith and the Mirror Image Rule to Octagon Gas and Asset
Securilization, 17 CARDoZo. L REV. 739, 743-46 (1996).
401 See generally Plank, supra note 77, at 453-61, and Plank, Critique of Octagon Gas, supra note 400,
at 45-53. The states of the Tenth Circuit are Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Wyoming. These states do not generate as much economic activity as larger states like California, New
York, or Florida do. Just one decision by a bankruptcy or federal court with jurisdiction over these larger
states would have a dramatic effect on the financing of all accounts originated in those states. It takes only
one bad decision. In the early days of my legal career-I practiced law for 19 years before becoming a law
professor-I could not understand why law firms were so conservative in issuing legal opinions on the
meaning of a statute. It seemed that the firms were using a standard that asked whether there was some judge
out there who for whatever reason could read the statute in a weird way. I since learned that, as Octagon Gas
in the extreme shows, a lawyer and her clients cannot rely on the seemingly plain meaning of a statute, and
the lawyer in advising her clients must look for, advise against, and take into account all possible strained
interpretations.
402 The court was interpreting Article 9 of the U.C.C. in effect in Oklahoma. Oklahoma amended its
version of U.C.C. § 9-102, which provides that Article 9 of the U.C.C. applies to the sale of accounts and
chattel paper, to add a new subsection (4): "This article does not prevent the transfer of ownership of
accounts or chattel paper. The determination of whether a particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper
constitutes a sale or a transfer for security purposes is not governed by this article." 12A OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
9-102(4) (evst Supp. 1998). Because Article 9 is relatively uniform in the states in the 10th Circuit, the
viability of Octagon Gas in federal court in those states remains an open question.
403 48 B.IL 651 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
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EPA. After the debtor filed a chapter 11 petition, the EPA notified the debtor
that it was terminating the debtor's interim status authorization. The debtor
sought to enjoin the termination, and the bankruptcy court granted the relief.
The bankruptcy court interpreted the Supreme Court in Whiting Pools as
holding that "a wide reading must be given to [property of the estate] or '[a]
reorganization effort would have a small chance of success.""'4 " Finding that
the interim status authorization was property of the estate, the court concluded
that it had the power under § 105 to issue an injunction to protect property of
the estate and therefore to enjoin the EPA termination of the status.03
Fortunately, the district court reversed. 4" The district court noted that,
even if the interim status were property of the estate, the status was
conditioned on continued compliance with statutory and regulatory
requirements that the debtor had failed to meet.407 Noting that the debtor
wished to retain the interim status to maimize the value of the facility, the
court nevertheless stated that the interim status was encumbered with statutory
conditions that limited its value and that these statutory conditions were an
incident of any property right that the debtor enjoyed. It concluded that the
bankruptcy court's order limiting the EPA "does not preserve the status quo
but expands PSC's property rights beyond what they would be outside Chapter
11," an expansion that § 105 did not allow.4" 8
CONCLUSION

Congress very explicitly announced a general principle for defining the
property of the estate: it should contain the interests, and only the interests, of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. Because different
entities may have property interests in any one object of property, Congress's
formulation is a good one. To be sure, applying the principle is not always
easy, and Congress did not implement the principle completely consistently.
Congress also incorporated property concepts through the more ambiguous
404 Id. at 660 (quoting Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203). Curiously, the court also said that the
"description [of property of the estate in 11 U.S.C. § 541] is wide-ranging and non-inclusive." Id. The court
perhaps meant "non-exclusive," the position that Whiting Pools took. See supra note 201 and accompanying
text.
405 Professional Sales Corp., 48 B.R. at 660.
406 United States v. Professional Sales Corp. (In re Professional Sales Corp.), 56 B.1. 753 (N.D. I1.
1985).
407 Id. at 764.

408 Id.
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term "property" without reference to "interests in property." Nevertheless, a
rational resolution of the claims and interests of the persons in a bankruptcy
case requires identifying the specific property interests that each person has.
As the Supreme Court did in Strumpf, and unlike the Court in Whiting Pools,
courts must apply the provisions of the Code that affect property interests to
those specific, identified property interests.
This attention to the specific property interests of parties in a bankruptcy
case will produce greater certainty in interpreting the Code than Whiting
Pools' use of the general policy of Congress to foster reorganizations and an
obscure and incomplete legislative history. This greater certainty will reduce
the litigation costs that arise from a confused understanding of property
interests. It will also provide better guidance for all persons who organize
transactions or plan their affairs with a view to the risks and costs posed by
having any one person become a debtor under the Code. To the extent that the
application of the provisions of the Code to specific, identified interests
produces a result that may seem undesirable, Congress should revise the Code
to produce the desired result. To the extent that the rules are too complicated,
Congress should simplify them. In either event, courts should apply the rules
as written and not bend the rules and expand (or contract) the property
interests of the parties to suit a particular result. With a complicated statute
like the Code, and a complicated set of legal and human relationships
presented by an insolvent debtor and its creditors, the harm to all economic
actors from a "good" result for a bad reason greatly outweighs the fleeting
benefit that a particular debtor or some of its creditors may receive.

